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Summary 
This thesis investigates empirically three topics related, respectively, to school leaving, 
unemployment and retirement. It consists of three independent research articles, accompanied by 
a general introduction and a conclusion section. Chapter 1 investigates the extent to which the 
demand for post-compulsory education of British 16-year-olds responds to local labour market 
conditions. The findings show that prevailing unemployment rates influence the schooling 
decisions of students from a less affluent family background, while students from better-off 
families tend to enrol in post-compulsory education irrespectively of labour market conditions. 
Factors associated with the family’s socio economic status, such as parental tastes for education 
and social norms, are arguably at the base of the different behaviours. Chapter 2 analyses the 
persistence in unemployment incidence during the last two decades. The methodology employed 
allows disentangling the true state dependence from the confounding role played by observed 
and unobserved heterogeneity. The evidence supports that unemployment experiences "scar" 
British workers by compromising their future employability. The findings also suggest a 
countercyclical pattern of true state dependence as unemployment scars more during recessions. 
Chapter 3 studies the extent to which retirement influences the cognitive capital of British older 
workers. The analysis relies on an instrumental variable approach to address the endogeneity 
bias. Consistent with the "use it or lose it" hypothesis, the results suggests that retirement 
contributes significantly to the cognitive decline suffered at older ages by British workers. The 
final section of the thesis summarises the main findings of the three chapters and discusses 
policy implications and extensions.  
 10 
 
Introduction   
This thesis contributes to the labour economic literature by analysing three topics of great 
interest in the current economic climate. First, it studies the relationship between labour market 
conditions and enrolment in post-compulsory education in the UK. Second, it analyses the 
"scarring effect" of unemployment, defined as the extent to which unemployment experiences 
compromise workers' re-employability, and its relationship with the business cycle. Third, it 
investigates how retirement influences the cognitive abilities of British older workers. 
The research is relevant from a policy perspective, as the overcoming of the challenges imposed 
by the Great Recession and the extension of working lives have been important topics in the 
recent UK policy agenda. Furthermore, each chapter of this thesis covers a topic inherent to one 
phase of people's economic life, intended as a process which starts leaving education, continues 
with an economically active phase, and ends with retirement. The thesis hence assumes an 
almost lifetime perspective, and investigates and draws conclusions on three issues which affect 
the different phases of a person's life.  
The reminder of this section summarises the three studies. The first chapter, titled "The impact of 
local labour market conditions on school leaving decisions", analyses the role of prevailing 
labour market conditions in affecting the demand for post compulsory education in Britain. The 
chapter contributes to the relevant literature by investigating to what extent this relationship 
varies across socio-economic groups, a theme analysed by a relatively small number of studies. 
We find that local labour markets significantly influence the school leaving decisions of 16 year 
olds living in tenant households, specifically in social housing. For these groups, an increase in 
the local youth unemployment rates positively affects school enrolment – consistent with 
opportunity cost arguments – while high levels of adult unemployment discourage it. Labour 
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markets do not significantly affect the school leaving decisions of students from better off 
families. Our results suggest that factors associated with the family’s socio economic status, such 
as parental tastes for education, and social norms, outweigh economic considerations among 
students from higher socio economic backgrounds, who tend to enrol in post compulsory 
education irrespective of labour markets conditions. As labour market conditions improve after 
the Great Recession, our results highlight the importance of post-compulsory education being 
perceived as an economically attractive option, particularly among young people from lower 
socio economic backgrounds. 
The second chapter, titled "The scarring effect of unemployment from the early ’90s to the Great 
Recession", contributes to the literature on unemployment persistence addressing two issues of 
great importance in the current economic climate. First, it analyses the extent to which the 
experience of unemployment scarred British men during the Great Recession. Second, it 
provides an insight into the relation between true state dependence and the business cycle by 
investigating the role of local unemployment in affecting the persistence of unemployment 
incidence and by analysing the dynamics of unemployment scarring during the last two decades. 
Our results support the presence of true state dependence both during the Great Recession and in 
the other two sub-periods analysed, the early ‘90s and early 2000s. Moreover, we find evidence 
of a negative association between the scarring effect of unemployment and the business cycle. 
From a policy perspective, our findings imply that public interventions aimed at alleviating 
unemployment in the short term are also likely to be beneficial in the longer term. 
The third chapter, titled "Retirement and Cognitive Abilities", investigates how retirement 
influences the cognitive abilities of British older workers. The analysis relies on an instrumental 
variable approach to address the endogeneity of the retirement decision with respect to the 
cognitive functions. The use of a novel dataset for this area of research, the execution of separate 
analyses for men and women and the study of heterogeneous effects of retirement across levels 
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of education and job types constitute the main contributions of this paper to the limited UK-
based literature. Consistent with the "use it or lose it" hypothesis, we show that retirement 
induces cognitive decline, although the relationship is weaker for women employed in routine 
occupations. Disregarding potentially offsetting effects on other dimensions of health, we 
conclude that extending the working life has a beneficial effect on the cognitive capital of older 
workers and that maintaining a mentally engaging and stimulating life-style during retirement 
contributes to the cognitive health of the mature population. 
The main conclusion of the three chapters are summarised in the Conclusion section of the 
thesis, where extensions and policy implications are also discussed.  
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Chapter 1  
 
 
The impact of local labour market conditions on 
school leaving decisions 
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1.1 Introduction 
It is well documented that the recent Great Recession has had a considerable impact on the UK 
labour market, particularly among young people. For example, between 2008 and 2011 the 
unemployment rate among 16-21 year olds rose by more than 7 percentage points, reaching 25 
percent.1 There is increasing discussion in policy circles about the impact that high youth 
unemployment rates have on young people and their future careers, with concerns about whether 
an early experience of unemployment may leave lasting scars in terms of future labour market 
attachment, wellbeing and benefit dependency. These concerns led the Government to introduce 
a Youth Contract that was launched in April 2012 to help young, unemployed people get a job. 
This provides nearly 500,000 new work-based opportunities for people aged 18-24, including 
apprenticeships and voluntary work experience placements. These are intended to help keep 
young, workless people attached to the labour market. 
What has received less attention in these discussions is the potential effect of labour market 
conditions on school leaving decisions. According to the prediction of the human capital 
investment model (Becker, 1962; Card and Lemieux, 2001), education decisions respond to 
changes in labour market conditions as these affect both the opportunity cost and the expected 
returns of schooling. However, it is not possible to determine a priori whether a worsening in 
labour market conditions increases or reduces the demand for further and higher education. As 
well as reducing the opportunity cost of education, a worsening of labour market conditions can 
either encourage schooling if this is perceived as a way to avoid future unemployment, or 
discourage it otherwise (e.g. Meschi et al., 2011; Petrongolo and San Segundo, 2002; 
Micklewright et al., 1990; Kodde, 1988). Changes in labour market conditions can therefore 
                                                 
1
 Source:  2008 and 2011 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (April-June quarter). 
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affect demand for post compulsory education in potentially contrasting ways, and the net effect 
cannot be determined a priori.  
Focusing on the choice of staying at school at age 16, i.e., after completing compulsory 
education, in this paper we investigate empirically (i) how local labour market conditions 
influence the secondary schooling decisions of young people in the UK; and (ii) to what extent 
the responsiveness of the demand for post-compulsory education to labour market conditions 
varies across students from different economic backgrounds.   
Previous studies have shown mixed evidence on the relationship between labour market 
conditions and demand for schooling (Meschi et al., 2011; Petrongolo and San Segundo, 2002). 
Strong evidence exists in support of family economic circumstances playing a major role in 
affecting children’s educational achievements, either through (the lack of) credit constraints 
and/or because of unobserved characteristics that are associated with higher family resources - 
e.g., access to better schools, a school-friendly family environment, parental tastes for education 
(Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). Despite that, our knowledge 
about a socio-economic gradient in response to incentives from the labour market is limited and 
particularly relevant in the current economic climate. Changes in labour market conditions 
during the Great Recession might, in fact, not only have affected the demand for schooling in 
society, but also be associated with a widening or a shrinking in the socio-economic gap in 
educational achievement.  
Following Petrongolo and San Segundo (2002) and analysing data from the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) and Labour Force Survey (LFS), we use the local youth unemployment 
rate as a proxy for the opportunity cost of education and the adult unemployment rates to proxy 
future employment expectations (and, hence, return to education). Our preferred measure of 
family economic background is home ownership, as the home is usually the most valuable asset 
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held by a family and assets capture better than income the longer term family socio economic 
status (Nam and Huang 2009). In a different model specification, we also enrich our housing 
tenure definition by differentiating between home owners, private tenants and social tenants. 
Finally, as a robustness check, we analyse to what extent the response of the demand for post 
compulsory education to changes in labour market conditions varies across quintiles of 
equivalised household income. 
Consistently across model specifications, our results show that young people from economically 
worse-off families respond to increases in local youth unemployment rates by increasing demand 
for schooling, while they respond to increases in adult unemployment rates by reducing the 
probability of enrolling in post compulsory education. The results are consistent with theoretical 
predictions by Kodde (1988). The response to labour market conditions by young people from 
well-off families is not statistically significant.  
Although disentangling the role of credit constraints as opposed to other, longer term, factors 
associated with family resources goes beyond the scope of this analysis, our evidence suggests 
for the latter to be the most plausible explanation of the different responses to labour market 
incentives between young people from different socio-economic backgrounds. In particular, our 
results suggest that young people from worse-off families tend to assign more importance to 
economic considerations when choosing whether to enrol in post-compulsory education. 
Conversely, young people from better-off families tend to enrol irrespective of labour market 
conditions, arguably because of stronger family tastes for education which justify schooling even 
when economic considerations make it less convenient. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 1.2 introduces our theoretical framework and contains 
a review of the literature; Section 1.3 describes the BHPS and LFS data used in the empirical 
analysis and summarises the key variables of interest; Section 1.4 introduces the estimation 
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procedure and identification strategy; results are presented in Section 1.5 while Section 1.6 
concludes. 
1.2 Theoretical framework and literature review 
This section is organised as follows. Sub-section 1.2.1 introduces the theoretical framework that 
we use to analyse the relationship between labour market conditions and school leaving 
decisions and discusses the relevant literature. In sub-section 1.2.2 we summarise the previous 
findings on the relationship between family resources and schooling decisions. Sub-section 1.2.3 
discusses the extent to which family resources can affect the response to labour market 
conditions and its implications for our work.    
1.2.1 Labour markets and the demand for schooling 
Economic theory suggests that an increase in the unemployment rate faced by the youths reduces 
the opportunity cost of schooling as, intuitively, it becomes more difficult to find a job in the 
event of leaving school (Meschi et al., 2011; Petrongolo and San Segundo, 2002; Micklewright 
et al., 1990). Hence, we expect a positive relationship between youth unemployment rates and 
the demand for schooling.  
Under the assumption that adult unemployment rates influence future employment expectations, 
variations in adult unemployment rates are also expected to affect educational decisions. Kodde 
(1988) analyses two possible scenarios. On the one hand, an increase in adult unemployment 
might cause a downward shift in the relationship between future employment prospects and 
schooling. Intuitively, this happens if employment expectation declines constantly across levels 
of education. Such a shift would discourage investment in education. However, it is also possible 
for an increase in unemployment to reduce employment expectations more at the bottom of the 
education distribution than at the top. In this case, education could be seen as an enhancing 
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factor for future employability, with a consequent positive effect on the demand for schooling 
(Meschi et al., 2011; Petrongolo and San Segundo, 2002; Micklewright et al., 1990). Whether 
the first effect, which we term the “discouraged student effect”, or the second, that for simplicity 
we call the “insurance effect”, prevails is an empirical question which we address by exploiting 
data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
Previous research on the influence of labour market conditions on the demand for schooling has 
found mixed evidence. Using time series data covering various periods between 1955 and 2005, 
a number of studies have shown that unemployment rates affect the demand for post compulsory 
education in the UK, although the effects are sometimes found to be larger for males. In 
particular, Pissarides (1981) and Whitfield and Wilson (1991) report a positive association 
between adult unemployment rates and the demand for post-compulsory education, while 
McVicar and Rice (2001), and Clark (2011) find that the youth unemployment rate significantly 
increases schooling demand. Among microdata based studies, Meschi et al. (2011) show that the 
demand for post compulsory education is positively associated with local youth unemployment 
rates; Rice (1999) shows that the demand for schooling increases with local unemployment rates 
primarily for males with low levels of previous education attainment. By contrast, Micklewright 
et al. (1990) find that school leaving rates tend to increase with regional unemployment rates, 
although this finding is not robust to changes in the model specification. Analysing the 
relationship between labour market conditions and demand for post compulsory education in 
Spain, Petrongolo and San Segundo (2002) use the local youth unemployment rate as a proxy of 
the opportunity cost of schooling and the general local unemployment rate as an indicator of 
weak future employment prospects. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the authors show that 
the demand for schooling reacts positively to increases in the local youth unemployment rates 
and negatively to changes in adult unemployment. 
 19 
 
In this paper, we follow the methodology proposed by Petrongolo and San Segundo (2002) and 
analyse to what extent the demand for post-compulsory education responds to variations in the 
opportunity cost of schooling (measured by changes in youth unemployment rates) and to 
changes in the return to schooling (measured by adult unemployment rates). We add to previous 
studies by explicitly modelling the role of family resources, and in particular home ownership, in 
determining how young people respond to labour market incentives. 
1.2.2 Family resources and children's educational attainments 
Previous research has shown that family resources greatly affect children’s educational outcomes 
(see, among others, Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Blanden and 
Gregg, 2004; Huang et al., 2010). This relationship is usually explained by the presence of short 
term borrowing constraints and/or of a strong association between family resources and longer 
run factors which are also likely to boost children’s academic ability and educational outcomes. 
In the presence of credit market imperfections, the borrowing constraints hypothesis predicts that 
young people from low income families might face higher costs in accessing the resources 
needed to participate in post-compulsory education. The marginal cost of schooling would hence 
be higher for young people from constrained families, causing them to invest sub-optimally in 
education (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011). The second hypothesis suggests that the positive 
relationship between family income and educational attainment might be the consequence of 
long run factors associated with family resources. This theory suggests that family income is 
highly correlated over a child’s life cycle and that families with more resources during a child’s 
formative years are able to “better shape the abilities and expectations of their children, who are 
better able to perform at school” (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). Hence, higher family income is 
associated with higher ability and expectations among children, raising their educational 
attainment. Examples of long term factors associated with family income include the quality of 
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primary and secondary school attended or parental tastes for education which are then passed to 
their children (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). Although a number of papers have found evidence 
consistent with the presence of credit constraints in the US (e.g., Kane, 1996; Belley and 
Lochner, 2007), several studies have failed in identifying in the presence of borrowing 
constraints a quantitatively relevant limitation for schooling progression in the US (e.g., Carneiro 
and Heckman, 2002; Cameron and Taber, 2004; Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Huang et al., 2010).  
In addition to parental income, several studies suggest that parental assets are important in 
explaining educational outcomes. Nam and Huang (2009) suggest that assets are a good indicator 
of the household liquidity level since savings reduce the need for borrowing while tangible assets 
facilitate the access to credit by providing collateral. Moreover, the authors report that assets 
may be a better measure than income for socio-economic inequality and a more suitable 
indicator of the long term economic status of the family. As with the family income hypothesis, 
assets might affect schooling achievement through both a short term borrowing constraint and a 
long term family background perspective (Huang et al., 2010). 
The home is typically the most valuable and also the most commonly held asset. Lovenheim 
(2011) studied the effect of housing wealth on college enrolment in the US and reports that, 
between 1977 and 2005, 85 percent of college attendees came from homeowner families and 
finds a positive effect of housing wealth on college enrolment (see also Dietz and Haurin, 2003). 
Beyond financial reasons, and consistent with Carneiro and Heckman’s (2002) thesis on the 
association between family income and educational outcome, Green and White (1997) suggest 
several other paths through which home ownership might influence children’s educational 
outcomes. They suggest that owning a house may improve management skills which can be 
transferred to the children. They also argue that home owners might monitor more their own 
children and those of their neighbours to prevent the values of their properties being reduced by 
children misconduct. However, it is also possible that children of homeowners outperform 
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children of non-homeowners not because the parents are homeowners, but because their parents 
possess some unobservable attributes which make them more likely both to become homeowners 
and to raise successful students. 
A large literature has analysed the extent to which household resources influence educational 
attainment in the UK. Blanden and Greg (2004) find evidence of a positive relationship between 
household income and post compulsory education enrolment, and similar findings can be found 
in Rice (1987) and Chevalier et al. (2005) among others. Using cohort survey data for 1970 and 
1958 cohorts, Machin and Vignoles (2004) find evidence on the relationship between family 
income, parental social class and higher education achievement becoming stronger over time. 
Studying enrolment at higher education institutions, Chowdry et al. (2013) provide evidence in 
favour of an association between family socioeconomic status (SES) and educational outcomes 
too. However, the authors show that the impact of SES is greatly reduced when controlling for 
secondary school achievement. Hence, the result suggests that parental SES is particularly 
important at earlier stages rather than on university entry.  
Home ownership has also been found to be an important determinant of school leaving decisions 
in the UK. Micklewright et al. (1990), for instance, show that children in owner occupied 
households are less likely to leave school at the age of 16, while Dearden et al. (2009) find that 
the introduction of the Education Maintenance Allowance had a significant impact mainly 
among those living in rented accommodation, suggesting that credit constraints may be 
important. 
1.2.3 Family resources and responses to labour market conditions 
A small number of articles have analysed the extent to which incentives from labour markets are 
heterogeneous across population groups. Among them, Smith and Naylor (2001) find that the 
probability of dropping out of university is positively affected by the general unemployment rate 
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in the country of origin and that the response is significantly higher for male students from a 
lower social class. In their analysis of post compulsory education choices in Spain, Casquel and 
Uriel (2009) find that family income positively affects the probability of staying in post 
compulsory education, while general unemployment reduces it. The authors also show that this 
response is statistically significant for young people from lower income families. 
In this paper we investigate the extent to which young people from different socio-economic 
backgrounds respond differently to changes in labour market conditions. Our results show that 
only young people from an economically disadvantaged background respond to changes in 
labour market conditions, while we do not find evidence of responses from young people from 
economically better-off families. In particular, consistent with the opportunity cost argument, we 
show that, among young people from home renting families, and in particular social tenants, an 
increase in the youth unemployment rate is associated with an increase in the demand for 
schooling. We also find evidence that the same young people are discouraged by increases in 
adult unemployment rates.  
Differences in unobserved factors associated with family resources are likely to be the main 
reason for such different behaviours. On the one hand, young people from wealthier families 
may be less sensitive to variations in incentives from the labour markets if factors associated 
with family socio-economic status, such as parental tastes for education, outweigh economic 
considerations in their schooling decisions (e.g., students from better off-families will study even 
if it is perceived as less profitable from an economic point of view). On the other hand, youths 
from worse off families might tend to assign more weight to economic considerations, thereby 
responding more to changes in labour market conditions.2 Misinformation and unawareness 
                                                 
2
 The finding is consistent with the sociological literature summarized in Brand and Xie (2010). The authors report 
that social norms make college enrolment a “socially expected outcome” for individuals from a higher socio-
economic group, while economic considerations play a more important role for youths from less advantaged groups.  
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about the real costs and benefits of education are possible causes of such differences (see 
Oreopoulos and Dunn, 2013 and papers cited therein).  
What about credit constrains? Cameron and Taber (2004) develop a theoretical model which 
allows to predict how young people from affluent and poorer families would react to changes in 
opportunity cost and direct cost of education if differences in family resources were only 
capturing heterogeneity in borrowing constraints but not in tastes for schooling. In particular, the 
model predicts that responses to changes in the opportunity cost will be the same across 
constrained and unconstrained individuals, while young people from constrained families display 
a greater response to changes in the direct costs associated with education (see also Lochner and 
Monge-Naranjo, 2011). The model does not allow to predict a priori whether young people from 
borrowing constrained families would respond more or less to changes in the expected return to 
schooling.3   
Since our results show no significant response from youths from better off families to changes in 
youth unemployment rates, while opportunity cost arguments significantly apply to youths from 
worse off families, we can infer that unobserved factors associated with family resources drive 
the different response to changes in labour market conditions across the two groups. However, 
we leave for future research further investigations into the role played by borrowing constraints 
as opposed to factors associated with family resources, as this lies outside the scope of this 
paper.  
A further point needs to be clarified here. Assuming that both young people from better-off and 
worse-off families respond to changes in labour market conditions, we expect for changes in the 
                                                 
3 The model predicts that both constrained and unconstrained individuals will respond to changes in the return to 
schooling, but there is uncertainty on which group experience the strongest response. For given values of the 
parameter measuring the utility curvature, and for a sufficiently low direct cost of education, it can be shown that 
response from unconstrained youth is smaller than the response from constrained youth. The opposite is otherwise 
true.   
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opportunity cost of education to increase the demand for schooling. But why should an increase 
in adult unemployment rate discourage post compulsory school enrolment among the less 
advantaged students? In the framework first proposed by Kodde (1988), increases in future 
unemployment expectations can enhance or discourage investments in education depending on 
whether more schooling is expected to enhance employability. Irrespective of whether borrowing 
constraints or factors associated with family resources drive differences in the demand for 
schooling, on average students from worse-off families will arguably expect to reach a lower 
level of education than students from richer families. Under the assumption that the enhancing 
effect of extra education on future employability increases with the years or quality of extra 
education (i.e., the difference in employment probability between studying for 11 against 10 
years is smaller than the one expected between 15 and 10 years) we can expect the “discouraged 
student effect” to prevail among students from worse off economic backgrounds, while the 
opposite could be true for students from more affluent backgrounds. 
The next section introduces the data and the variables used for the empirical analysis. 
1.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
We use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the UK Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) to disentangle the relationship between local labour market conditions and participation in 
non-compulsory education.4  
The BHPS is a panel survey launched in 1991 which surveyed people annually for 18 waves 
until 2008. Originally designed as a nationally representative random sample of the population of 
                                                 
4
 University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research (2010a), Office for National Statistics, Socio-
Economic Division and Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (2008a,b,c,d,e,f); Office for National 
Statistics, Social and Vital Statistics Division (2008a, b, 2010); Office for National Statistics, Social and Vital 
Statistics Division and Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (2008a,b,c,d,e, 2009, 2010a,b); Office of 
Population Censuses and Surveys, Social Survey Division (2004). 
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Great Britain living in private households, the original BHPS sample evolved over time through 
the incorporation of a sub-sample of the original UK European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP) sample from 1997-2001, of Scotland and Wales extension samples from 1999, and of a 
Northern Ireland sample in 2001. All household members aged 16 and over were usually 
(re)interviewed between September and December of each year, with information collected 
about their incomes, education, social and parental backgrounds, labour market status, job 
characteristics, housing tenure and other aspects of their life (Taylor et al., 2010). Since 1994 a 
module known as British Youth Panel collected information on youths aged 11-15 living in 
sampled households through a self-completion questionnaire. 
Together with a range of other individual and household characteristics, these data allow us to 
identify 16 year olds who, when interviewed in the autumn/winter of a particular year, had 
recently made the decision of whether or not to remain in post-compulsory education. We 
identify those who remain in post-compulsory education as those who were aged 16 in August of 
that year and who were in full-time education at the date of interview. Those who were aged 16 
in August of that year and were not in full-time education are defined as school leavers. 5 
Our focus is on the impact of labour market conditions on the school leaving decision. We 
capture labour market conditions using regional unemployment rates derived from the UK 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a nationally representative survey of households living 
at private addresses in the UK and collects data on a wide range of individual and household 
characteristics, with a particular focus on employment status, job characteristics and education. 
Conducted for the first time in 1973, the survey was carried out every two years until 1983, 
                                                 
5
 We identify young people who have recently made the choice using their month and year of birth. In Britain, 
children must remain in full-time education up until the last Friday in June in the academic year of their 16th 
birthday. Therefore BHPS respondents in wave 1, who were interviewed during the 1991/1992 academic school 
year, would have been making the school-leaving decision in June 1991 if born between September 1974 and 
August 1975. Those born before September 1974 would have already been aged 16 in June 1990 and so would have 
made the decision in the previous year, while those born after August 1975 would have made the decision in June 
1992. 
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annually between 1984 and 1991, and quarterly since 1992.6 We use these data to construct 
gender-specific ILO unemployment rates among 16-21 year olds and 40-64 year olds in each 
metropolitan region of the UK in the spring quarter of each year.7 We match these to the BHPS 
data by gender, region and year of interview. We use data for the spring of each year for two 
reasons. Firstly, this is likely to be the period of the year when pupils make decisions about their 
educational choices for the next academic year. Secondly, in the spring quarter the respondents 
are still in full time education and therefore the youth unemployment rate used in the analysis is 
not affected by the choices made by the relevant cohort. 
Figure 1.1 plots the school leaving rates for each year of the BHPS together with the average 
prevailing youth and adult unemployed rates. The school leaving rate is defined as the number of 
young people eligible to leave school in the preceding June and who were not enrolled in full 
time education at the time of the BHPS survey over those who were eligible to leave school. This 
highlights a clear downward trend since 1999, from a school leaving rate of 35 percent in 1999 
to approximately 20 percent since 2006, consistent with the increase in participation in post-
compulsory education in Britain. However, the school leaving rate is much less stable in earlier 
years, varying from 40 percent in 1991 to below 20 percent in 1995. This fluctuation between 
1991 and 1999 is likely to be caused by both the emergence from the recession of the early 
1990s, and also to relatively small sample sizes in years prior to 1999 when Scotland and Wales 
extension samples were introduced.  
The trend in the average regional and gender specific 16-21years old unemployment rate 
decreases between 1993 and 2004, and increases after that. A negative relationship seems to 
emerge when compared with the school leaving rate: when youth unemployment increases, the 
                                                 
6
 See ONS (2007) for more information. 
7
 Second quarter (Apr-June) since 2006, when calendar quarter replaced seasonal quarter. The exception is for 1991, 
when the data were collected on an annual basis rather than quarterly. The choice of using 16-21 is the consequence 
of a tradeoff between the strength of the “peer effect”, i.e., it would be better to use a more strict definition of youth 
unemployment rate, number of observations in the LFS and correlation with adult unemployment rate. 
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school leaving rate seems to decrease, and vice versa. If confirmed, this would be consistent with 
youth unemployment reducing the opportunity cost of education. The average regional and 
gender specific 40-64 years old unemployment rate faced by young people choosing whether to 
participate in further education shows a declining trend between 1993 and 2004 while it is stable 
until the end of the analysed period. 
In Table 1.1 we provide some descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis, both for 
the sample of interest and separately by whether or not the respondent was a school leaver or 
stayed in full-time education. The final column contains the p-value of the t-test for equality of 
means between those observed to leave education (leavers) and those staying in further full-time 
education (stayers). This shows that both youth and adult unemployment rates are positively 
correlated with leaving school at age 16. The average youth unemployment rate faced by school 
leavers is 15.8 percent, compared with 15.3 percent for those remaining in post-compulsory 
education, while the adult unemployment rates are 4.4 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively.  
Large differences between the two groups emerge in the proportions of young people living in 
renting households - 41 percent of those who leave education at the age of 16 live in renting 
households compared with 22 percent of those who remain in full-time education. This 
distinction is most apparent among social tenants – 35 percent of school leavers are social 
tenants compared with 17 percent of stayers. Young people who leave school at the age of 16 are 
also significantly more likely to be in lower income households. For example, the proportion of 
school leavers in the lowest quintile is 33 percent, while for stayers it is 22 percent. The opposite 
happens for the richest quintile: 14 percent of the stayers come from families who are in the top 
20 percent of the income distribution, while this applies to only 5 percent of the school leavers.8 
Families with higher incomes are more able to invest optimal amounts into the education of their 
                                                 
8
 Household Income is equivalised using the modified OECD scale, which assigns a weight of 1 to the household 
head, 0.5 to other adults and 0.3 to each child under the age of 14. 
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children or might provide them with a more appropriate learning environment (Carneiro and 
Heckman, 2002; Mayer, 1997). Moreover, previous studies show that parental income 
significantly affects educational attainment and explains the intergenerational transmission of 
disadvantage (Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993), while parental wealth and socioeconomic status is 
positively associated with higher educational aspirations and expectations among children 
(Chowdry et al., 2011; Ermisch et al., 2001; Gregg and Washbrook, 2011). 
Consistent with previous literature on the intergenerational transmission of cognitive abilities, 
there is a high correlation between parental education and young people’s decisions to participate 
in post-compulsory education (Anger and Heineck, 2010; Black et al., 2009; Bjorklund et al., 
2007). Among those observed to stay in further education, the proportion of people with parents 
with ISCED level smaller than 2 (Lower secondary or less) is significantly higher among leavers 
(67 percent) than among stayers (42percent).On the other hand, the proportion of stayers with 
maximum parental education higher than ISCED level 5a (Degree or more) is 19 percent, a level 
significantly higher than the 5 percent for school leavers.  
According to previous studies, girls exhibit more positive educational aspirations and attitudes 
than boys (Taylor and Rampino, 2014; Rampino and Taylor, 2013), and, consequently, will have 
higher staying-on rates. This is reflected in our data, with 57 percent of school leavers at age 16 
being boys, compared with 46 percent of those who remain in full-time education. Furthermore, 
we find that young people who drop out of school at age 16 are significantly more likely than 
those who remain in full-time education to have an unemployed parent (7.5 percent compared 
with 4.8 percent).  
We also find very large and statistically significant differences between leavers and stayers in the 
number of GCSEs obtained with grades A*-C or Scottish Standard Grade (STGR) obtained with 
grades 1 or 2 (Meschi et al., 2011; Rice, 1999). For example, the proportion of people with no 
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good passes in such examinations is 54 percent among school leavers and 19 percent among 
remainers. Of course, this strong relationship is at least partly endogenous, as young people who 
have already decided to leave full-time education have little incentive to do well in their exams. 
In light of the descriptive evidence presented in this section, three main advantages explain the 
choice the BHPS as the underlying dataset for our analysis.  First, as discussed, the wealth of 
information contained in the Survey allows to control for the main determinants of the school 
leaving decisions. Second, the length of the time period covered in a largely consistent manner 
by the BHPS represents a clear advantage for the study of the relationship between labour market 
conditions and demand for schooling. The identification of the effects of interest benefits, in fact, 
from the high degree of heterogeneity in the prevailing labour market conditions between 1991 
and 2008. Specifically, the early 90s crisis was followed by a period of favourable labour market 
conditions between the end of the 90s and the beginning of the 2000s, and by the early phase of 
the Great Recession in 2008. Third, the panel dimension of the BHPS and the British Youth 
Panel (BYP) allows retrieving information on the educational aspirations of the 16 years olds 
recorded at age 12. As explained in detail in section 1.5.3, we make use of educational aspiration 
to check the robustness of our findings.  
In this context, we argue that these advantages largely overcome the limitations of the Survey, 
namely i) a relatively small sample size, which does not allow to analyse males and female 
separately; ii) the lack of information on ability or schooling achievement measured at earlier 
stages than the GCSE/Scottish Standard Grades; iii) the lack of a school identifier, which could 
have allowed to control for school quality effects. 
In the remainder of the paper we examine within a multivariate framework the descriptive 
evidence reported in this section. 
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1.4 Estimation strategy and model specification 
The aim of this research is to identify how local labour market conditions affect the demand for 
post compulsory education, explicitly controlling for the role of family resources, and home 
ownership in particular. The dependent variable in our analysis is dichotomous, taking the value 
of one if the youth leaves full-time education at the age of 16, and zero if (s)he remains in 
education. As described in the data section, this is identified soon after the end of the final year 
of compulsory schooling.  We therefore estimate a series of binary dependent variable models of 
the following form: 
)0(),,1( 54321 >+×++++== iiiiiii URRUxprURxDpr εααααα  (1) 
where Di = 1 if the young person i left school at age 16, and = 0 if (s)he remained in full-time 
education, xi  is a vector of individual and household characteristics, Ui captures local labour 
market conditions, and the α are vectors of coefficients to be estimated. We assume that the error 
term εi is logistically distributed, and so estimate equation (1) using a logistic regression, 
although we also present estimates from a linear probability model for our preferred models 
specification.  
The key explanatory variables of interest are captured by Ui. We use quarter, gender and region-
specific unemployment rates to capture business cycle effects and the strength of the local labour 
market. We distinguish between youth unemployment rates (unemployment among 16-21 year 
olds) and adult unemployment rates (40-64 year olds). The former captures the immediate 
prospects of the young person gaining employment if exiting school at age 16, and the 
expectation is that high levels of current youth unemployment reduces the opportunity cost of 
remaining in education as it reduces the probability of finding a job. Hence, we expect this to 
have a negative impact on the probability of leaving education at age 16. We use the year, gender 
and region-specific adult unemployment rate to capture the expectation of future employability. 
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It is more difficult to predict the direction of the impact of adult unemployment. As reported by 
Kodde (1988) and Micklewright et al. (1990) among others, it is not possible to determine, a 
priori, the direction of the impact of adult unemployment. It is possible that a higher adult 
unemployment rate discourages investment in further education if the extra education is not 
expected to improve future employability, but it also possible for education to be seen as a way 
to escape future unemployment. In the former case, the return to education would be negatively 
affected by adult unemployment while in the latter case it would be positively affected.  
Ri measures family resources. In our base specification this is measured by the housing tenure of 
the family. If, on the one hand, home owners could be less affected by borrowing constraints, 
living in a home owning family is also associated with factors like higher permanent income, 
better home learning environment, better schooling, and higher family educational expectations 
(Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). In our base specification, we test the extent to which home 
ownership influences the way labour market incentives affect educational decisions by 
interacting the two measures of unemployment with housing tenure. We anticipate home 
ownership playing a key role in the school leaving decision, either due to credit constraints or 
other unobservable factors associated with parental assets and educational decisions. 
In a second model specification, we further distinguish between people living in privately rented 
accommodation and those in social housing, given that private tenants are likely to be different 
from social tenants. We also check the robustness of our findings to the use equivalised 
household income quintiles as the measure of family resources interacted with unemployment 
rates. Despite being more volatile than housing tenure and worse at capturing longer term socio-
economic status of the family (Nam and Huang, 2009), family income is the most widely used 
measure of family resources. Moreover, it is possible that some homeowner families could 
actually be credit constrained if they are paying for a mortgage, while family income does not 
suffer from this problem. 
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We include a range of other individual and household level characteristics into the models. These 
include parental education, current parental unemployment and household income, which are 
known to be strongly correlated with educational choices (Micklewright, 1989; Micklewright et 
al., 1990; Petrongolo and San Segundo, 2002; Blanden and Gregg, 2004). Other control variables 
include gender, whether or not the respondent has moved away from the parental home, and 
other indicators of family composition such as whether the respondent has younger or older 
siblings.  
We also include previous educational attainment, via the number of GCSEs obtained with grades 
A*-C or Scottish Standard Grades obtained with grades 1 or 2. As well as capturing academic 
ability, these are likely to be strongly correlated with family resources. In particular, existing 
evidence on the relationship between family resources and educational outcomes shows that 
better off families are able to raise more academically able children because they are able to 
invest more in education throughout the child’s life (i.e., Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Carneiro 
and Heckman, 2002). Also, educational attainment has been shown to play a key role in 
determining participation in non-compulsory education (Meschi et al., 2011; Rice, 1999), and 
evidence exists in the literature of a positive correlation between children’s educational attitudes, 
aspirations and expectations and their subsequent education-related attainments and behaviour 
(Andrews and Bradley, 1997; Chowdry et al., 2011; Duncan et al., 1972; Khoo and Ainley, 
2005; Sewell et al., 1980; Strand, 2007).  
Regional and year dummies are also included in the regressions to capture the effects that are 
fixed across years for a given region or across regions for a given year. All standard errors are 
clustered at the regional level. 
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1.5 Estimates 
In this section we present and discuss estimates from our models. First, we focus on differences 
between young people living in home-owning families and those living in renting families. We 
then further distinguish between social tenants and private renters as the latter are likely to be a 
very heterogeneous group, while those in social housing are likely to face the greatest borrowing 
constraints and have the fewest family resources.  
1.5.1 Home ownership 
Table 1.2 reports the estimated coefficients from logistic regressions where the dependent 
variable takes the value 1 if the young person left education at age 16, and 0 if (s)he remained in 
full-time education at the end of compulsory schooling. We estimate four different 
specifications. Model (1) includes unemployment rates and home ownership among the 
regressors, but it excludes their interaction terms. Model (2) augments Model (1) by including 
measures of previous education attainment of the child. As this is likely to be influenced by 
longer term family resources, by controlling for previous educational attainment we control 
whether housing tenure continues to play a role in educational choices (Cameron and Heckman, 
2001). In Model (3) we include interactions between unemployment rates and housing tenure, 
allowing for different responses to changes in unemployment rates between home owners and 
tenants. Model (4) contains the same specification as Model (3), but is estimated by a linear 
probability model.  
The coefficients reported in Column (1) of Table 1.2 show that both youth unemployment and 
adult unemployment rates have a negative but not statistically significant impact on the school 
leaving decision at age 16. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Micklewright et al., 1990), we 
find that young people living in families that do not own their home are significantly more likely 
to leave school. Children from higher income families are also less likely to leave school at age 
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16 (e.g., Blanden and Gregg, 2004). The estimates on the other controls are also consistent with 
previous research. We find, for example, that young men are more likely than young women to 
leave school at age 16 (Petrongolo and San Segundo, 2002). We also find strong, negative 
associations between parental education and the probability of leaving school at age 16, with 
children from less educated parents more likely to leave than those from highly educated parents 
(see also Micklewright, 1989).  
Average marginal effects from Model (1) are reported in the first panel of Table 1.3, and show 
that the effect on youth unemployment is negative and at the margin of statistical significance, 
with a 1 percentage point increase in youth unemployment rate reducing school dropout by 0.4 
percentage points. Although weekly significant, the result is consistent with youth 
unemployment capturing the opportunity cost of schooling. The marginal effect on adult 
unemployment is also negative, but it is not statistically different from zero. Finally, consistent 
with Micklewright et al. (1990) among others, young people from home-renting families are 9 
percentage points more likely to leave school at age 16 than young people from home-owning 
families.   
Model (2) introduces a control for previous educational attainment measured as the number of 
good passes in GCSE or Scottish Standard Grade exams. Analysing the estimated coefficients 
reported in Column (2) of Table 1.2, it emerges that school leaving probabilities are significantly 
correlated with previous education attainment, with the most successful students significantly 
more likely to enrol in further education than less successful ones (Meschi et al., 2011; Rice, 
1999). Moreover, compared with estimates relative to Model (1), it should be noted that the 
coefficient on housing tenure decreases in size and becomes statistically significant only at the 
10 percent level, while the coefficients on household income quintile lose their statistical 
significance.  
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Marginal effects reported in Panel 2 of Table 1.3 confirm the negative, although weekly 
significant, effect of youth unemployment rate on school leaving probabilities, with a one 
percentage point increase in youth unemployment leading to a 0.4 percentage points reduction in 
the probability of leaving school at age 16.  Average marginal effects also show that those with 1 
to 4 good passes at GCSE or Scottish Standard Grade are 11.6 percentage points less likely to 
leave school at the age of 16 than those with no passes. For those with 5 to 9 good passes the 
probability of leaving school at 16 is 30 percentage points lower, while those with 10 or more 
passes have a probability of leaving school that is 39 percentage points lower than those with no 
passes. More importantly for our analysis, the average marginal effect on renting falls from 9 
percentage points in Model (2) to 4 percentage points, and remains significant only at the 10 
percent level. This suggests that long term family resources more than short term credit 
constraints explain differences in educational investment between home owners and tenants 
(Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). 
Model (3), which represents our base specification, includes interaction terms between housing 
tenure and the unemployment rates. The estimates indicate that neither the youth unemployment 
rate nor the adult unemployment rate have a statistically significant impact on the school leaving 
decision when not interacted with housing tenure. The coefficient on renting, as well as those on 
household income, is not statistically different from zero. The coefficients on our measure of 
previous education attainment are large, negative and highly statistically significant, indicating 
that young people who attain more good GCSE/Scottish Standard Grade passes (and, hence, are 
more able) have a lower probability of leaving education at 16. Furthermore, we find that the 
prevailing unemployment rates have a statistically significant impact on school leaving decisions 
for young people living in rented accommodation. In particular, we find that a higher prevailing 
youth unemployment rate reduces the probability of leaving education at age 16, while a higher 
adult unemployment rate increases the probability.  
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Marginal effects after Model (3) are reported in Panel 3 of Table 1.3, and are in line with 
previous specifications. Panel 1 of Table 1.4 reports the marginal effects for the unemployment 
rates by housing tenure. These are computed by averaging the marginal effects on youth and 
adult unemployment rates among homeowners and renters separately. Results show that a one 
percentage point higher youth unemployment rate lowers the probability of leaving school by 1 
percentage point for young people in rented accommodation. This is consistent with the youth 
unemployment rate capturing the opportunity cost of education, and, thus, young people in 
rented accommodation remaining in education when the opportunity cost of doing so is low. A 
one percentage point higher adult unemployment rate raises the probability of leaving school at 
16 for young people in rented accommodation by 2.3 percentage points. Therefore, for those in 
rented accommodation, higher levels of adult unemployment reduce the expected returns of 
education, discouraging investments in schooling. The demand for schooling of young people 
from home owning families does not respond to changes in labour market conditions and for 
both youth and adult unemployment rates, the null hypothesis of equality of the marginal effects 
for home owners and tenants is rejected. Model (4) estimates Specification (3) using a linear 
probability model. The estimated coefficients and the reported marginal effects are highly 
consistent with those from our base specification and confirm our findings.  
As a further check, we also compute the marginal effects of youth and adult unemployment at 
the median of all the dependent variables, assuming students to belong to home-owning families 
first and renting families later. Results are reported in Table 1.5 and are highly consistent with 
those reported in Table 1.4.  
Consistent with previous studies, our results show that young people from tenant families invest 
less in education than home owners although long term family resources, through their effect on 
children’s academic ability, explain most of the differences in school leaving decisions between 
the two groups. Our findings also indicate that prevailing labour market conditions do have 
 37 
 
relatively large and statistically significant impacts on the decision to enrol in post-compulsory 
education in Britain. However, this only emerges for young people living in families that do not 
own their own home. For this group, a one percentage point increase in the youth unemployment 
rate is predicted to reduce the probability of leaving school at age 16 by 1 percentage point, 
while an increase of one percentage point in the adult unemployment rate is predicted to increase 
the probability by 2.3 percentage points. Young people from renting families thus invest more in 
post-compulsory education if the prevailing labour market conditions indicate that the net gains 
from education (the difference between the expected returns and the opportunity cost) are 
sufficiently large. On the other hand, young people from home owning families are not 
responsive to changes in labour market conditions. Differences in factors associated with family 
resources such as parental tastes for education or social norms are a possible explanation for this 
different behaviour. If young people from better off families might choose to study irrespective 
of labour market conditions, young people from worse off families tend to do so when it is 
economically beneficial. 
In the next sub-section we further investigate the role of housing tenure in affecting the response 
to local labour market conditions by distinguishing between young people living in home-
owning families, those in social housing, and private tenants. Private renters are in fact likely to 
be a very heterogeneous group, while young people from households who live in social housing 
are both more likely to be credit constrained and to have a permanently lower level of family 
resources.  
1.5.2 Social housing 
Models (5) to (8) extend the models presented in the previous subsection by differentiating 
between home owning, privately renting, and social tenant households. The estimated logit 
coefficients from this set of models are reported in Table 1.6, with average marginal effects in 
 38 
 
Table 1.7 and the marginal effects on unemployment rates for those living in social housing, 
private tenants and home owners reported in Table 1.8.  
The models estimated follow those presented in Table 1.2. Model (5) includes housing tenure 
and unemployment rates, but excludes their interaction, and the estimated coefficients show that 
young people from privately renting families and those in social housing are more likely than 
those in home owning families to leave school at age 16. The estimated coefficients on the youth 
and adult unemployment rates are negative and not statistically significant. Consistent with the 
opportunity cost argument and with findings from Model (2), average marginal effects show that 
an increase in youth unemployment has a negative and weakly significant negative effect on 
school leaving probabilities. The average marginal effect on adult unemployment is negative but 
not statistically significant, while both young people from private and social renting families are 
significantly more likely to leave school at age 16 than home owners.   
Consistent with findings from Model (3), the introduction in Model (6) of previous academic 
achievements as a control captures most of the effect of housing tenure, which becomes not 
statistically significant.  
Model (7) introduces the interaction between unemployment rates and housing tenure. They 
indicate that only young people from social housing respond to labour markets. In particular, and 
consistent with what we found for all renters in Section 1.5.1, a higher youth unemployment rate 
is associated with a lower probability of leaving school at age 16 for young people in social 
housing, while a higher adult unemployment rate is associated with a higher probability of 
leaving education. These results confirm the propensity of the most disadvantaged group, those 
living in social housing, to respond to incentives from the labour market.  
A comparison of the marginal effects of the youth and adult unemployment rates between young 
people from different housing tenures is reported in Table 1.8. These show that only those from 
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social housing significantly respond to the youth unemployment rate, with a 1 percentage point 
higher unemployment rate leading to a lower probability of leaving school at age 16 by 1.1 
percentage points. A test of the equality of the estimated marginal effects rejects the null 
hypothesis of equality between those living in social housing and home owners, while the null 
hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected when comparing the impact of youth unemployment on 
social tenants with private tenants. Young people from families in social housing are also the 
only group to respond to changes in adult unemployment, with an estimated marginal effect of 
3.1 percentage points for a 1 percentage point higher adult unemployment rate. A test of the 
equality of marginal effects between those in social housing and both home owners and private 
tenants is rejected at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. This suggests a different 
response between the most disadvantaged group, i.e., those living in social housing, and the rest 
of the population. 
Similarly to the previous section, in Table 1.9 we also report marginal effects on youth and adult 
unemployment rates at the median of all the dependent variables, assuming students to belong to 
the three housing tenure categories in turn. Results are highly consistent with those reported in 
Table 1.8.  
From this we conclude that renters are a highly heterogeneous group. Among them, social 
tenants are both more likely to leave school at age 16, although this is largely explained by a 
child’s academic ability, and are most responsive to labour market incentives. 
1.5.3 Robustness checks 
We conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we test the extent to which responses to labour 
market conditions vary across quintiles of the income distribution. Despite housing tenure being 
more likely than income to capture factors associated with the longer term socioeconomic status 
of the family, income is the most widely used measure of family resources and it does not suffer 
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from the problem that some home owners, who are expected to be less credit constrained than 
non-home owners, might, in fact, be constrained if still paying a mortgage. 
We modify our model by replacing the interaction terms between housing tenure and 
unemployment rates in Models (3) and (4) with interaction terms between unemployment rates 
and equivalised household income quintiles (M9 and M10-LPM). Estimated coefficients after 
the logit specification are reported in Column (1) of Table 1.A1, while estimates from the linear 
probability model are reported in Column (2). In both cases the coefficients on the non-interacted 
unemployment rates, which capture the response to local market conditions for the poorest 
quintile of the income distribution, are statistically significant. The sign is negative for youth 
unemployment rate, which is consistent with the opportunity cost argument, while the sign on 
the coefficient on adult unemployment is positive, which, within our theoretical framework, 
indicates that young people from the lowest quintiles of the income distribution tend to be 
discouraged by increases in unemployment expectations. The interaction terms between 
unemployment rates and household income quintiles are statistically significant too, at least for 
students from families belonging to the third quintiles or above, and they tend to counterbalance 
the effect on the non-interacted unemployment rates (i.e., they are positive for interactions with 
youth unemployment rates and negative for interactions with adult unemployment rates).  
Average marginal effects are reported in Table 1.A2, and are in line with those reported in Table 
1.3. Table 1.A3 reports the average marginal effects on youth and adult unemployment rates by 
quintile of household equivalised income. Consistent with the findings of previous sections, 
these results confirm that young people from the lowest quintile of the income distribution react 
to an increase in youth unemployment rates by increasing demand for education, while they react 
to an increase in adult unemployment rates by reducing that demand. 
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Secondly, thus far we have captured previous educational attainment by the number of good 
passes at GCSE level. However, this might be endogenous as the timing of the exams almost 
overlaps with decision of staying in further education. Consequently, pupils may choose the 
effort to put into studying for the exams depending on their perceived probability of accessing 
further education. Ideally, this endogeneity problem would be solved using a different measure 
of ability, with respect to the timing of the assessment (e.g., at age 11) and/or its nature (e.g., 
cognitive abilities measured in a context unrelated to school performance). Although neither of 
these is available in our data, we examine the robustness of our estimates by using another 
source of information that is likely to capture the effect of long term family resources on a 
child’s academic ability. Specifically, we use the preferences of the child towards further 
education as revealed at the age of 12. 
All young people aged 11-15 living in sampled households completed a self-completion 
questionnaire since 1994 known as the British Youth Panel (BYP). Similar to Taylor and 
Rampino (2014), we use the BYP to measure young people’s aspirations for participating in 
further or higher education through their responses to the question “Do you want to leave school 
when you are 16, or do you plan to go on to sixth form or college?”, which was asked of all 11-
15 year olds between wave 4 (1994) and wave 18 (2008). We use responses to this question 
when the young person was aged 12, chosen as a trade-off between sample sizes, awareness and 
endogeneity. The younger the age at which we use preferences, the less likely the response is to 
be endogenous to subsequent educational performance and decisions. At the same time, 
however, the less likely respondents are to be aware of the importance of future educational 
choices and the smaller the sample size for which we have data on actual school leaving 
decisions – as respondents need to remain in the sample for more years to have their actual 
behaviour observed. For example, twelve year olds will need to remain in the sample for four 
further years in order to observe whether or not they leave school at age 16, and we have 
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matched expectation/actual choice data only from 1998 onwards (e.g., when the 12 year olds in 
1994 decided whether to participate or not in further education). 
We therefore modify our preferred Model Specification (3) by replacing our measure of previous 
academic achievement with education expectation measured at the age of 12 (M11). Model 
estimates are reported in the first column of Table 1.A4, and average marginal by housing tenure 
in Table 1.A5. Estimates show that education expectations are strongly correlated with the 
school leaving probability, with those expecting to leave school at age 16 more likely to actually 
leave it. This is consistent with an extensive previous literature highlighting the association 
between preferences, attitudes and aspirations and subsequent outcomes (Andrews and Bradley 
1997; Chowdry et al., 2011; Duncan et al., 1972; Khoo and Ainley, 2005; Sewell et al., 1980; 
Strand, 2007). Despite a reduction in the significance level of our estimates caused by the loss in 
sample size due to not having data for waves 1-7, results confirm our main findings that an 
increase in youth unemployment rate is associated with an increase in the demand for schooling 
among young people from renting families, who are also discouraged by increases in adult 
unemployment rates.  
Thirdly, we re-estimate our baseline model specification excluding the boost samples and only 
focusing on the original Essex Sample (M12). Estimates and marginal effects are reported in 
Panel 2 of Tables 1.A4-1.A5 and are consistent with our main findings, although the average 
marginal effect on youth unemployment rate among non-home owners becomes slightly smaller 
and at the margin of statistical significance. The drop in estimation sample, which loses a third of 
the total number of observations, is likely to explain this.  
1.6 Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the relationship between the demand for post compulsory 
education and prevailing labour market conditions in Britain. This follows approaches adopted 
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by Petrongolo and San Segundo (2002), among others, and identifies the extent to which youth 
and adult unemployment rates affect school leaving decisions at age 16. It explicitly models the 
role of homeownership, a highly valuable and commonly held asset, in determining how young 
people respond to incentives from labour markets. Our estimates indicate that local labour 
market conditions matter, but only for young people from families living in rented 
accommodation, and in social housing in particular. For young people in rented accommodation, 
a one percentage point higher youth unemployment rate is associated with a one percentage point 
lower probability of leaving school at age 16, while a one percentage point higher adult 
unemployment rate raises the probability of leaving school at age 16 by 2.3 percentage points. 
These effects are concentrated among those in social housing.  
These findings are consistent with predictions from the human capital investment model (Becker, 
1962; Card and Lemieux, 2001) and can be explained by stronger preferences toward education 
among students from well-off families who, for factors such as different parental tastes for 
education or social norms, prefer to study even when it becomes less profitable from an 
economic perspective. On the other hand, young people from economically worse-off families 
take local labour market conditions into account when deciding whether or not to enrol in further 
education, and do so when the expected net gains are sufficiently high. 
The recent Great Recession has had a considerable effect on labour markets, and unemployment 
rates among young people in particular have increased significantly. Unemployment rates among 
16 to 21 year olds increased by 7.5 percentage points between 2008 and 2011, reaching levels 
exceeding 25 percent, while among people aged 40-64, unemployment increased from 3.2 
percent to 5 percent over the same period. Given this, and given our estimate of how these 
increases affect school leaving decisions, we can extrapolate the extent to which these increases 
in unemployment are likely to have affected school leaving rates. According to our estimates, the 
increase of 7.5 percentage points in the youth unemployment rate will, all else being equal, have 
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reduced the probability of young people in social housing leaving school at the age of 16 by 8.2 
percentage points. This is due to the lower opportunity cost associated with remaining in 
education during periods of high unemployment. The 1.8 percentage point increase in the adult 
unemployment rate will, all else being equal, have increased their propensity to leave school by 
5.6 percentage points due to the lower expected returns from investing in education. Hence, the 
net effect of these changes in the unemployment rates could be to reduce the probability of 
young people from social tenant families leaving school at age 16. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the Great Recession has potentially had a beneficial effect on 
the stock of human capital through increasing participation in post-compulsory education among 
the most disadvantaged group. However, this has to be considered in the wider political and 
economic climate, which, at the time of writing, is quite different from that prevailing over the 
period for which these data relate.  
We find that the young people who are, on average,  less likely to access further and higher 
education are also those more sensitive to prevailing labour market conditions and their impacts 
on the opportunity cost and the expected returns to education. This suggests that policies aimed 
at helping the economy recover from the recession should further seek to increase the expected 
net gains from education for young people, in particular those from lower socio-economic 
groups. Furthermore, to ensure that levels of skills and human capital in society continue to 
increase, policy makers need to ensure that as the economy recovers, labour demand strengthens 
and unemployment rates fall (particularly among young people), pursuing post-compulsory 
education remains an attractive prospect.  
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1.7 Tables and Figures 
Figure 1.1: Dropout rate over time: BHPS 1991-2008 
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Stayers Mean Leavers Mean p-value (stayers=leavers) 
Unemployment rate 16-21 yr-olds 4065 15.417 15.297 15.756 0.014 
Unemployment rate 40-64 yr-olds 4065 4.110 4.008 4.398 0.000 
Renters 3998 0.271 0.221 0.414 0.000 
Social Housing 3998 0.216 0.170 0.348 0.000 
Private Renters 3998 0.055 0.051 0.066 0.079 
Highest  observed parental education      
ISCED 0-2 / Lower secondary or less 3963 0.488 0.424 0.669 0.000 
ISCED 3c-5b / Higher secondary 3963 0.360 0.387 0.283 0.000 
ISCED 5a-6 / Degree or more 3963 0.152 0.189 0.048 0.000 
Male 4065 0.486 0.457 0.567 0.000 
Living alone 4065 0.030 0.015 0.072 0.000 
Unemployed Parent 3730 0.060 0.053 0.082 0.003 
GCSE A*-C / STGR 1-2 obtained      
0 3931 0.278 0.189 0.536 0.000 
1 to 4 3931 0.200 0.177 0.266 0.000 
5 to 9 3931 0.364 0.429 0.177 0.000 
10+ 3931 0.158 0.205 0.022 0.000 
Eq income quintile      
1st 3986 0.249 0.220 0.330 0.000 
2nd 3986 0.234 0.225 0.260 0.024 
3rd 3986 0.227 0.223 0.235 0.434 
4th 3986 0.173 0.193 0.117 0.000 
5th 3986 0.117 0.139 0.057 0.000 
Has younger sibling 4065 0.544 0.555 0.512 0.015 
Has older sibling 4065 0.379 0.376 0.387 0.543 
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Table 1.2: Determinants of leaving school at age 16 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4-LPM 
Youth unemployment rate -0.025 
(0.015) 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
Adult unemployment rate -0.007 
(0.034) 
0.036 
(0.037) 
-0.014 
(0.038) 
-0.000 
(0.005) 
Home owner (Ref.)     
Renter 0.524*** 
(0.133) 
0.234* 
(0.127) 
0.199 
(0.220) 
0.032 
(0.034) 
Renter:*Youth unemployment rate  
 
 
 
-0.035** 
(0.014) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
Renter:*Adult unemployment rate  
 
 
 
0.137*** 
(0.035) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
GCSEs grade A*-C / STGR : 0 (Ref.)     
1-4  
 
-0.542*** 
(0.087) 
-0.520*** 
(0.088) 
-0.123*** 
(0.023) 
5-9  
 
-1.706*** 
(0.107) 
-1.692*** 
(0.109) 
-0.313*** 
(0.020) 
10+  
 
-2.926*** 
(0.184) 
-2.934*** 
(0.184) 
-0.368*** 
(0.023) 
Household Income: 1st Quintile (Ref.)     
2nd -0.080 
(0.109) 
-0.014 
(0.117) 
-0.024 
(0.121) 
-0.003 
(0.021) 
3rd -0.000 
(0.132) 
0.151 
(0.131) 
0.140 
(0.131) 
0.021 
(0.021) 
4th -0.382** 
(0.173) 
-0.217 
(0.170) 
-0.217 
(0.168) 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
5th -0.519** 
(0.245) 
-0.211 
(0.241) 
-0.195 
(0.238) 
-0.020 
(0.031) 
Parental Education: less than lower secondary (Ref.)      
Higher secondary / Vocational -0.448*** 
(0.115) 
-0.266** 
(0.125) 
-0.269** 
(0.124) 
-0.051** 
(0.019) 
Degree or more -1.375*** 
(0.212) 
-0.852*** 
(0.236) 
-0.863*** 
(0.235) 
-0.098*** 
(0.027) 
Male 0.730*** 
(0.192) 
0.488** 
(0.214) 
0.482** 
(0.214) 
0.071** 
(0.031) 
Lives alone 1.158*** 
(0.248) 
0.957*** 
(0.339) 
0.942*** 
(0.342) 
0.207*** 
(0.068) 
Unemployed parent 0.133 
(0.238) 
0.025 
(0.261) 
0.016 
(0.261) 
0.004 
(0.049) 
Has older siblings 0.183** 
(0.081) 
0.111 
(0.078) 
0.116 
(0.079) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
Has younger siblings -0.146 
(0.119) 
-0.160 
(0.134) 
-0.164 
(0.132) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
_cons -1.038* 
(0.607) 
-0.551 
(0.691) 
-0.684 
(0.689) 
0.389*** 
(0.099) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wave dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3635 3556 3556 3556 
Estimates of M1- M3 are from logit models; estimates of M4 are from a linear probability model; standard errors in 
parentheses. Standard errors clustered by region.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
  
48
 
Table 1.3: Average Marginal Effects, M1 to M4-LPM 
 M1 M2 M3 M4-LPM 
 AME se pvalue AME se pvalue AME se pvalue AME se pvalue 
Youth unemployment rate -0.004 0.002 0.091 -0.004 0.002 0.066 -0.004 0.002 0.077 -0.004 0.002 0.099 
Adult unemployment rate -0.001 0.006 0.843 0.005 0.006 0.332 0.005 0.006 0.380 0.006 0.006 0.270 
Renter 0.093 0.025 0.000 0.036 0.020 0.079 0.038 0.020 0.057 0.047 0.023 0.061 
GCSE A*-C / STGR 1-2          
1-4 . . . -0.116 0.020 0.000 -0.111 0.020 0.000 -0.123 0.023 0.000 
5-9 . . . -0.301 0.019 0.000 -0.297 0.019 0.000 -0.313 0.020 0.000 
10+ . . . -0.392 0.023 0.000 -0.390 0.023 0.000 -0.368 0.023 0.000 
 
 
Table 1.4: Effects of unemployment rates by housing tenure, M3 and M4-LPM 
 M3 M4-LPM 
 AME se pvalue AME se pvalue 
Youth unemployment rate       
Home owner -0.002 0.002 0.351 -0.003 0.002 0.308 
Renter -0.010 0.003 0.005 -0.008 0.003 0.014 
Diff (R-HO) -0.007 0.003 0.003 -0.006 0.002 0.020 
Adult unemployment rate       
Home owner -0.002 0.005 0.705 -0.000 0.005 0.934 
Renter 0.023 0.009 0.009 0.025 0.009 0.016 
Diff (R-HO) 0.025 0.007 0.000 0.025 0.008 0.007 
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Table 1.5: Effects of unemployment rates by housing tenure at fixed values of covariates*, M3 
 M3 
 ME se pvalue 
Youth unemployment rate    
Home owner -0.003 0.003 0.366 
Renter -0.009 0.003 0.005 
Diff (R-HO) -0.007 . 0.005 
Adult unemployment rate    
Home owner -0.002 0.006 0.708 
Renter 0.022 0.009 0.010 
Diff (R-HO) 0.024 . 0.001 
*Covariates are fixed at the following values: 5 to 9 GCSE A*-C / STGR 1-2;female; living with her parents; max 
parental education=higher secondary; parents in employment; 3rd household income quintile; no older siblings living 
in the household; no younger siblings living in the household; residents in south Yorkshire; wave=11  
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Table 1.6: Determinants of leaving school at age 16, M5 to M8-LPM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 M5 M6 M7 M8-LPM 
Youth unemployment rate -0.025 
(0.015) 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Adult unemployment rate -0.007 
(0.034) 
0.037 
(0.037) 
-0.015 
(0.038) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Private renters 0.359** 
(0.162) 
0.277* 
(0.158) 
0.543 
(0.748) 
0.094 
(0.112) 
Private Renter: *Youth unemployment rate  
 
 
 
-0.007 
(0.061) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
Private renter: *Adult unemployment rate  
 
 
 
-0.045 
(0.108) 
-0.010 
(0.018) 
Social housing: *Youth unemployment rate  
 
 
 
-0.039*** 
(0.014) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
Social housing: *Adult unemployment rate  
 
 
 
0.173*** 
(0.038) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
GCSEs grade A*-C / STGR : 0 (Ref.)     
1-4  
 
-0.543*** 
(0.087) 
-0.520*** 
(0.090) 
-0.123*** 
(0.023) 
5-9  
 
-1.708*** 
(0.110) 
-1.693*** 
(0.117) 
-0.312*** 
(0.021) 
10+  
 
-2.928*** 
(0.186) 
-2.928*** 
(0.180) 
-0.366*** 
(0.024) 
Household Income: 1st Quintile (Ref.)     
2nd -0.074 
(0.106) 
-0.015 
(0.117) 
-0.024 
(0.122) 
-0.003 
(0.021) 
3rd 0.006 
(0.135) 
0.150 
(0.132) 
0.143 
(0.136) 
0.022 
(0.022) 
4th -0.378** 
(0.175) 
-0.217 
(0.170) 
-0.212 
(0.172) 
-0.025 
(0.024) 
5th -0.518** 
(0.244) 
-0.211 
(0.241) 
-0.198 
(0.238) 
-0.020 
(0.031) 
Parental Education: less than lower secondary (Ref.)      
Higher secondary / Vocational -0.442*** 
(0.113) 
-0.268** 
(0.122) 
-0.269** 
(0.123) 
-0.050** 
(0.019) 
Degree or more -1.354*** 
(0.211) 
-0.856*** 
(0.231) 
-0.852*** 
(0.232) 
-0.097*** 
(0.026) 
Male 0.729*** 
(0.194) 
0.488** 
(0.214) 
0.480** 
(0.212) 
0.071** 
(0.031) 
Lives alone 1.167*** 
(0.259) 
0.955*** 
(0.342) 
0.949*** 
(0.340) 
0.209*** 
(0.067) 
Unemployed parent 0.128 
(0.241) 
0.026 
(0.262) 
0.033 
(0.264) 
0.007 
(0.049) 
Has older siblings 0.180** 
(0.081) 
0.112 
(0.077) 
0.120 
(0.079) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
Has younger siblings -0.148 
(0.118) 
-0.159 
(0.134) 
-0.170 
(0.134) 
-0.024 
(0.019) 
Social housing 0.567*** 
(0.149) 
0.224 
(0.151) 
0.117 
(0.210) 
0.018 
(0.033) 
_cons -1.054* 
(0.612) 
-0.548 
(0.694) 
-0.721 
(0.719) 
0.381*** 
(0.103) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wave dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3635 3556 3556 3556 
Estimates of M5- M7 are from logit models; estimates of M8 are from a linear probability model; standard errors in 
parentheses. Standard errors clustered by region.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Marginal Effects M5 to M8-LPM 
 M5 M6 M7 M8-LPM 
 AME se pvalue AME se pvalue AME se pvalue AME se pvalue 
Youth UR -0.004 0.003 0.090 -0.004 0.002 0.066 -0.004 0.002 0.087 -0.004 0.002 0.112 
Adult UR -0.001 0.006 0.837 0.005 0.006 0.330 0.005 0.006 0.400 0.006 0.006 0.289 
Private renter 0.062 0.030 0.038 0.042 0.026 0.098 0.039 0.027 0.154 0.039 0.026 0.154 
Social Housing 0.102 0.028 0.000 0.034 0.024 0.154 0.038 0.024 0.110 0.049 0.029 0.112 
GCSE A*-C / STGR 1-2             
1-4 . . . -0.116 0.021 0.000 -0.111 0.021 0.000 -0.123 0.023 0.000 
5-9 . . . -0.301 0.020 0.000 -0.297 0.021 0.000 -0.312 0.021 0.000 
10+  . . . -0.392 0.023 0.000 -0.390 0.023 0.000 -0.366 0.024 0.000 
 
 
Table 1.8: Effects of unemployment rates by housing tenure, M7 and M8-LPM 
 M7 M8-LPM 
 AME se pvalue AME se pvalue 
Youth unemployment rate       
Home owner -0.002 0.002 0.372 -0.002 0.002 0.336 
Private Renters -0.003 0.009 0.698 -0.003 0.008 0.707 
Social Housing -0.011 0.004 0.010 -0.009 0.004 0.019 
Diff (HO-SH) 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.011 
Diff (PR-SH) 0.007 0.010 0.488 0.006 0.009 0.523 
Adult unemployment rate       
Home owner -0.002 0.005 0.689 -0.001 0.005 0.913 
Private Renters -0.010 0.018 0.590 -0.011 0.018 0.546 
Social Housing 0.031 0.009 0.001 0.033 0.009 0.003 
Diff (HO-SH) -0.033 0.007 0.000 -0.033 0.009 0.001 
Diff (PR-SH) -0.040 0.019 0.030 -0.044 0.019 0.030 
 
  
  
52
 
Table 1.9: Effects of unemployment rates by housing tenure at fixed values of covariates*, M7 
 M7 
 AME se pvalue 
Youth unemployment rate    
Home owner -0.002 0.003 0.388 
Private Renters -0.004 0.010 0.686 
Social Housing -0.010 0.004 0.015 
Diff (HO-SH) 0.007  0.004 
Diff (R-SH) 0.006  0.615 
Adult unemployment rate    
Home owner -0.002 0.006 0.694 
Private Renters -0.011 0.021 0.610 
Social Housing 0.028 0.009 0.002 
Diff (HO-SH) -0.031  0.000 
Diff (PR-SH) -0.039  0.106 
*Covariates are fixed at the following values: 5 to 9 GCSE A*-C / STGR 1-2; female; living with her parents; max parental education=higher secondary; parents in 
employment; 3rd household income quintile; no older siblings living in the household; no younger siblings living in the household; resident in south Yorkshire; wave=11
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1.8 Appendix: Complementary Tables 
Table 1.A1: Model estimates – M9 and M10-LPM 
 (1) (2) 
 M9 M10-LPM 
Youth unemployment rate -0.061*** 
(0.017) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Adult unemployment rate 0.133** 
(0.058) 
0.026** 
(0.010) 
GCSEs grade A*-C / STGR : 0 (Ref.)   
1-4 -0.538*** 
(0.086) 
-0.126*** 
(0.022) 
5-9 -1.708*** 
(0.103) 
-0.315*** 
(0.020) 
10+ -2.939*** 
(0.186) 
-0.367*** 
(0.023) 
Household Income: 1st Quintile (Ref.)   
2nd -0.061 
(0.331) 
-0.007 
(0.055) 
3rd -0.223 
(0.282) 
-0.022 
(0.047) 
4th 0.190 
(0.438) 
0.015 
(0.058) 
5th -0.507 
(0.746) 
-0.039 
(0.091) 
2st Quintile: *Youth Unemployment 0.037 
(0.027) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
2st Quintile: *Adult Unemployment -0.127 
(0.078) 
-0.022 
(0.014) 
3rd Quintile: *Youth Unemployment 0.054** 
(0.025) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
3rd Quintile: *Adult Unemployment -0.111* 
(0.064) 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
4th Quintile: *Youth Unemployment 0.023 
(0.033) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
4th Quintile: *Adult Unemployment -0.178** 
(0.086) 
-0.033** 
(0.012) 
5th Quintile: *Youth Unemployment 0.080** 
(0.036) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
5th Quintile: *Adult Unemployment -0.217** 
(0.085) 
-0.034*** 
(0.012) 
Home owner (Ref.)   
Renter 0.243* 
(0.129) 
0.046* 
(0.024) 
Parental Education: less than lower secondary (Ref.)    
Higher secondary / Vocational -0.268** 
(0.127) 
-0.050** 
(0.019) 
Degree or more -0.878*** 
(0.233) 
-0.101*** 
(0.027) 
Male 0.497** 
(0.211) 
0.074** 
(0.031) 
Lives alone 0.963*** 
(0.345) 
0.210*** 
(0.067) 
Unemployed parent 0.016 
(0.267) 
0.003 
(0.050) 
Has older siblings 0.119 
(0.079) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
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Has younger siblings -0.161 
(0.137) 
-0.023 
(0.020) 
_cons -0.559 
(0.624) 
0.406*** 
(0.095) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes 
Wave dummies  Yes Yes 
N 3556 3556 
Estimates of M9 are from a logit model; estimates of M10 are from a linear probability model; standard errors in 
parentheses. Standard error clustered by region. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 1.A2: Average marginal effects, M9 and M10-LPM 
 M9 M10-LPM 
 AME se pvalue AME se pvalue 
Youth UR -0.004 0.002 0.041 -0.005 0.002 0.067 
Adult UR 0.005 0.006 0.366 0.007 0.006 0.252 
2nd Quintile -0.006 0.018 0.754 -0.005 0.021 0.822 
3rd Quintile 0.020 0.018 0.264 0.020 0.020 0.315 
4th Quintile -0.033 0.024 0.177 -0.027 0.024 0.262 
5th Quintile -0.027 0.033 0.400 -0.018 0.029 0.541 
1-4 GCSE-STRGR -0.115 0.020 0.000 -0.126 0.022 0.000 
5-9 GCSE-STGR -0.300 0.019 0.000 -0.315 0.020 0.000 
10+ GCSE-STGR -0.392 0.023 0.000 -0.367 0.023 0.000 
 
Table 1.A3: Average marginal effects, M9 and M10-LPM, by income quintile 
 M9 M10-LPM 
 AME se pvalue AME se pvalue 
Youth unemployment rate       
1st Quintile -0.011 0.003 0.000 -0.010 0.003 0.004 
2nd Quintile -0.004 0.004 0.293 -0.004 0.004 0.284 
3rd Quintile -0.001 0.003 0.687 -0.002 0.003 0.451 
4th Quintile -0.004 0.003 0.159 -0.004 0.003 0.234 
5th Quintile 0.002 0.003 0.608 0.001 0.004 0.901 
Diff (2Q - 1Q) 0.007 0.005 0.126 0.006 0.004 0.174 
Diff (3Q - 1Q) 0.010 0.004 0.017 0.008 0.004 0.083 
Diff (4Q - 1Q) 0.006 0.004 0.127 0.006 0.004 0.148 
Diff (5Q - 1Q) 0.013 0.004 0.001 0.011 0.005 0.037 
Adult unemployment rate       
1st Quintile 0.024 0.010 0.019 0.026 0.010 0.020 
2nd Quintile 0.001 0.011 0.920 0.004 0.012 0.742 
3rd Quintile 0.003 0.006 0.590 0.008 0.007 0.273 
4th Quintile -0.005 0.009 0.563 -0.007 0.009 0.411 
5th Quintile -0.008 0.007 0.259 -0.008 0.008 0.326 
Diff (2Q - 1Q) -0.023 0.013 0.084 -0.022 0.014 0.141 
Diff (3Q - 1Q) -0.020 0.011 0.057 -0.018 0.012 0.136 
Diff (4Q - 1Q) -0.029 0.012 0.020 -0.033 0.012 0.012 
Diff (5Q - 1Q) -0.032 0.010 0.003 -0.034 0.012 0.009 
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Table 1.A4: Model estimates – M11 and M12 
 (1) (2) 
 M11 M12 
Youth unemployment rate -0.002 
(0.024) 
-0.006 
(0.021) 
Adult unemployment rate -0.095 
(0.112) 
-0.003 
(0.048) 
Home owner (Ref.)   
Renter 0.155 
(0.487) 
0.111 
(0.306) 
Renter:*Youth unemployment rate -0.045 
(0.042) 
-0.028 
(0.021) 
Renter:*Adult unemployment rate 0.270** 
(0.129) 
0.131*** 
(0.049) 
Expect to leave school at age 16: No (Ref.)    
Don't know 0.582*** 
(0.135) 
 
 
Yes 1.378*** 
(0.170) 
 
 
GCSEs grade A*-C / STGR : 0 (Ref.)   
1-4  
 
-0.685*** 
(0.097) 
5-9  
 
-1.859*** 
(0.126) 
10+  
 
-3.287*** 
(0.265) 
Household Income: 1st Quintile (Ref.)   
2nd 0.134 
(0.127) 
-0.105 
(0.155) 
3rd 0.289 
(0.193) 
0.287*** 
(0.100) 
4th 0.011 
(0.179) 
-0.174 
(0.163) 
5th -0.182 
(0.333) 
-0.308 
(0.242) 
Parental Education: less than lower secondary (Ref.)    
Higher secondary / Vocational -0.372*** 
(0.143) 
-0.213* 
(0.127) 
Degree or more -0.944*** 
(0.215) 
-0.649** 
(0.291) 
Male 0.605*** 
(0.184) 
0.304 
(0.204) 
Lives alone 1.400** 
(0.588) 
1.132*** 
(0.265) 
Unemployed parent 0.056 
(0.363) 
0.141 
(0.306) 
Has older siblings 0.308* 
(0.170) 
0.123 
(0.124) 
Has younger siblings 0.093 
(0.195) 
-0.085 
(0.134) 
_cons -1.151 
(1.013) 
-0.534 
(0.743) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes 
Wave dummies  Yes Yes 
N 1532 2336 
Estimates of M11 and M12 are from logit models; standard errors in parentheses. Standard error clustered by region. 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 1.A5: Average marginal effects, M11 and M12, by housing tenure 
 M11 M12 
 AME se pvalue AME se pvalue 
Youth unemployment rate       
Home owner -0.000 0.003 0.935 -0.001 0.003 0.766 
Renter -0.008 0.006 0.183 -0.006 0.004 0.099 
Diff (HO-R) -0.008 0.007 0.239 -0.005 0.003 0.112 
Adult unemployment rate       
Home owner -0.013 0.015 0.392 -0.000 0.006 0.959 
Renter 0.031 0.019 0.099 0.023 0.011 0.030 
Diff (HO-R) 0.045 0.020 0.028 0.024 0.009 0.006 
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Chapter 2  
 
 
The scarring effect of unemployment from the 
early ’90s to the Great Recession 
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2.1 Introduction 
Persistence in unemployment incidence is a well-documented phenomenon consisting in a higher 
propensity to experience unemployment at a given point in time if unemployment has occurred 
in the past. As pointed out by Heckman and Borjas (1980), evidence on persistence is likely to 
arise from two different channels. On the one hand, unemployment experiences can have a 
causal impact on future unemployment probability. The authors define this kind of relationship 
“true state dependence” and both labour supply factors, such as human capital depreciation, 
habituation effects or a fall in search intensity, and labour demand factors, such as negative 
signalling and crowding in the labour markets, are likely to be the underlying causes (Lockwood, 
1991; Pissarides, 1992; Blanchard and Diamond, 1994; Clark et. al., 2001; Biewen and Steffes, 
2010; Michaillat, 2012; Cockx and Picchio, 2013). On the other hand, individual characteristics, 
observed and/or unobserved, are likely to play a major role in explaining the propensity to 
experience unemployment, both at a given point in time and in the future. In that case, previous 
unemployment experiences would proxy such characteristics and any relationship between past 
and current unemployment status would therefore be spurious (Heckman and Borjas, 1980). 
In this work we explore the presence of persistence in unemployment incidence during the last 
two decades with a specific focus on the last recession. Our working definition of scarring effect, 
or true state dependence, hence underlies the existence of a causal relationship between previous 
unemployment experiences and current unemployment status. The existence of such a 
relationship is highly relevant for policy makers. As reported by Arulampalam et al. (2000), if 
true state dependence exists, short-term policies aimed at reducing unemployment will not only 
affect the short term unemployment rate but also the long-term equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. Hence, the study of unemployment persistence is of great interest in the current 
economic climate: the extent to which workers have been “scarred” by unemployment 
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experiences during the great recession is in fact relevant both to better understand the long 
lasting effect of the crisis and to design policies that are able to efficiently foster economic 
recovery. 
Since the ’80s a vast literature has explored the existence of state dependence, but its evidence is 
ambiguous. Heckman and Borjas (1980) describe four main forms of state dependence. The 
authors define as Markovian dependence the situation in which a difference exists between the 
probability of becoming unemployed for an employed worker and the probability of remaining in 
unemployment for an unemployed individual in a short time interval; occurrence dependence 
exists when the probability of becoming or remaining unemployed is influenced by the number 
of previous spells of unemployment; duration dependence occurs when the probability of 
remaining unemployed is influenced by the length of the current spell of unemployment. Finally, 
authors define lagged duration dependence as the situation in which the probability of remaining 
or becoming unemployed depends on the lengths of previous spells of unemployment. Using 
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men for the years 1969-1971, and 
focusing on the latter three forms of state dependence, the authors find no evidence of lagged 
duration dependence and occurrence dependence, while they find weak evidence for the 
existence of duration dependence.9 
Arulampalam et al. (2000) analyse Markovian unemployment persistence in the UK using 
Waves 1 to 5 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Focusing on the respondents’ 
labour market status measured at each consecutive interview, the authors find evidence in 
support of the “scarring” hypothesis, in particular for mature workers. Stewart (2007) models 
jointly persistence in low pay and persistence in unemployment, analysing their interrelations. 
                                                 
9
 For more US based literature see, among others, Mroz and Savage (2006). Using data from the 1979 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), the authors find evidence of short term persistence of unemployment for 
young people, while persistence tends to disappear in the long term.  
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Both low pay jobs and unemployment spells are in fact likely to negatively influence human 
capital accumulation and to provide adverse signals to potential employers. Using data from the 
BHPS for the years 1991-1996, the author shows that past low-wage employment is as important 
as past unemployment in reducing the probability of being employed at a given point in time. 
Moreover, the analysis provides evidence in support of a ‘no pay-low pay’ cycle as those 
entering low-wage employment after a spell of unemployment are significantly more likely to re-
enter unemployment than those entering in a higher paid employment after the unemployment 
spell. Consistent evidence also emerges from Böheim and Taylor (2002). 
Evidence on the longer term scarring effect of unemployment can be found in, among others, 
Gregg (2001) and Burgess et al. (2003).10 Gregg (2001) uses the National Child Development 
Study (NCDS) to measure the impact of unemployment experiences before the age of 23 on the 
probability of experiencing unemployment or inactivity between the ages of 28 and 33. The 
author provides evidence in favour of a significant scarring effect from youth unemployment, in 
particular for males. Burgess et al. (2003) use data from six waves of the Labour Force Survey 
between 1981 and 1996 to perform a pseudo-cohort analysis of the impact of the early career 
unemployment rate on future employment prospects. The authors find evidence of scarring only 
for the less skilled, while the more skilled seem to benefit from early career unemployment 
rates.11 Unemployment experiences are also shown to have a negative and long lasting impact on 
                                                 
10
 See also Kalwij (2004). Using UK administrative data, the author shows that a quarter of the sample of young 
men used in the analysis is not able to find stable employment by age 35, while this is the case for the rest of the 
sample. Those failing to enter into stable employment are mainly low-skilled individuals, and results suggest the 
presence of structural employment instability for this group. 
11
 See Eliason and Storrie (2006) and Nordström Skan (2004) for studies using Swedish administrative data. Eliason 
and Storrie (2006) analyse the impact of unemployment on wages and employment patterns for a sample of workers 
from plants which shut down in 1987 and 1988. The authors find evidence of a recovery both in terms of wages and 
employment in the years immediately following the plant dismissal. However, convergence stops at the onset of the 
1991 recession and a divergence trend occurs until 1993. The authors show that dismissed workers still suffer a 
penalty both in terms of unemployment incidence and wages 12 years later. They conclude that workers who 
experience unemployment are also more sensitive to the macroeconomic climate. Nordström Skan (2004) finds 
evidence of a long-term scarring effect from unemployment, exploiting the between-sibling variation to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
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outcomes such as salaries (Gregory and Jukes, 2001; Arulampalam, 2001; Mroz and Savage, 
2006; Eliason and Storrie, 2006) and wellbeing (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011a, b; Clark et al., 
2001). 
This work contributes to the rich literature on unemployment persistence in two ways. First, it 
addresses the extent to which unemployment experiences have scarred British workers during 
the Great Recession by analysing persistence in unemployment incidence between 2007 and 
2011. Second, the paper provides an insight on the dynamics of “true state dependence” over the 
business cycle by analysing the extent to which the scarring effect varies with local labour 
market conditions and by comparing estimates relative to the last recession with that of a period 
of falling unemployment, the early ’90s, and a period of relative stability in terms of 
unemployment rates such as the early 2000s (Figure 2.1).  
The sign of the association between true state dependence and business cycle cannot, in fact, be 
determined a priori, as it is closely related to the nature of the causes of unemployment scarring. 
Kroft et al. (2013) summarise four possibilities.12 First, models focusing on human capital 
depreciation (Pissarides, 1992; Acemoglu, 1995; Edin and Gustavsson, 2008) predict that true 
state dependence should be independent from labour market conditions as skill depreciation is 
assumed not to be affected by unemployment levels in the economy. Second, models focusing on 
search behaviour predict that discouragement, and hence a fall in search intensity, will occur 
when employment perspectives deteriorate, with a consequent positive relationship between 
scarring effect and unemployment cycle (e.g., Ayllón, 2013).Third, models which identify in the 
negative signalling of unemployment the main source of state dependence predict for 
unemployment to be less scarring in times of adverse labour market conditions, on the grounds 
that unemployment experiences are less informative about the unobserved characteristics of job 
                                                 
12
 Although the authors focus on the relationship between duration dependence and labour market conditions, the 
theoretical predictions are largely applicable to the case of state dependence in unemployment persistence.  
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applicants in periods of slack labour markets (Lockwood, 1991). Among others, Biewen and 
Steffes (2010) find supporting evidence analysing unemployment persistence in Germany, while 
Kroft et al. (2013) and Omori (1997) provide evidence for the US, with a focus respectively on 
duration dependence and lagged duration dependence.  
Fourth, a number of models focus on crowding in labour markets. Among them, Blanchard and 
Diamond (1994) predict that if the length of the current unemployment spell provides a negative 
signal to potential employers in the hiring process, then high levels of unemployment are 
expected to reduce the probability of finding a job as it is more likely that some other worker 
with a shorter spell of unemployment will apply. Michaillat (2012) proposes a search and 
matching model in which unemployment due to jobs rationing is likely to arise even in the 
absence of frictional unemployment. The author shows that rationing unemployment (i.e., 
unemployment due to a shortage of jobs) quantitatively outweighs frictional unemployment in 
times of slack labour markets, while the opposite is true in times of favourable labour market 
conditions. In both cases, the theoretical predictions are that scarring will be worse during 
adverse labour market conditions because of crowding. Evidence in support of job rationing and 
crowding in the labour market can be found in Crépon et al. (2013). Analysing the impact of a 
randomised labour market programme aimed at providing job placement assistance to skilled 
unemployed individuals in France, the authors find that the employability of non-treated workers 
is significantly worsened by the programme, especially in times of adverse labour market 
conditions. The authors identify in job rationing and crowding in the labour market the main 
source of this negative externality.      
Our analysis shows strong evidence in support of the presence of true state dependence during 
the Great Recession and, consistent with the crowding and job rationing models, it provides an 
indication of a negative relation between true state dependence and business cycle, both within 
and between the three time periods analysed. Policy interventions aimed at reducing 
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unemployment are, therefore, likely to have positive longer term effects on the unemployment 
risk, in particular during downturns. Our estimates are based on random effect dynamic probit 
models with Wooldridge’s (2005) solution for the initial condition problem and they make use of 
data from both the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and Understanding Society.13  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the data and the methods used for the 
analysis; results are presented and commented in Section 2.3; conclusions follow in Section 2.4. 
2.2 Data and methods 
2.2.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
Unobserved heterogeneity is a potential source of bias for estimates of true state dependence. To 
correctly disentangle the effect of unobserved individual characteristics, i.e. the individual 
propensity to be unemployed, from that of past unemployment incidence is a major identification 
challenge and panel data are powerful tools in achieving consistent estimates of the parameters 
of interest. For this reason, we make use of two rich sources of panel data collecting detailed 
information on household and individual circumstances during the last two decades: the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and Understanding Society.14 
In addition to their panel dimensions, the BHPS and Understanding Society surveys are well 
suited for our analysis for at least two reasons. First, the surveys collect a rich set of information 
which allows to control for the main determinants of unemployment risk. The reminder of the 
section describes them in details. Second, the length of the time period covered, and the across-
time consistency in the definitions of the variables used in the analysis, allows us to investigate 
                                                 
13
 The analysis relative to the early ’90s is closely related to Arulampalam et al. (2000). See Gregg and Wadsworth 
(2010) for an analysis of unemployment during the last two decades. 
14
 University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research (2010b); University of Essex, Institute for Social 
and Economic Research, NatCen Social Research (2014a); see Taylor et al. (2010) and 
<https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk> for info on the British Household Panel Survey and Understanding 
Society, respectively. 
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the existence of heterogeneity in true state dependence across different phases of the business 
cycle. 
The British Household Panel Survey started in autumn 1991 and ran for 18 annual waves. 
Interviews usually took place during autumn or winter and respondents were typically re-
interviewed in the same period each year. After Wave 18, BHPS respondents were reabsorbed 
into Understanding Society, a larger household survey lunched in 2009, and were re-interviewed 
in 2010/11 and 2011/12. Since we only use Understanding Society to follow former BHPS 
respondents, we refer to 2010/11 and 2011/12 data as Wave 19 and Wave 20, respectively. In our 
analysis  we use data from three non-overlapping sub-periods: we analyse data from Waves 16, 
starting in autumn 2006, to  20,  to estimate true state dependence during the Great Recession; 
Waves 9-13, covering the period from autumn 1999 to winter 2004, are used to evaluate the 
scarring effect of unemployment in a period of low and stable unemployment (see Figure 2.1); 
similar to Arulampalam et al. (2000), Waves 1-5 are used to study the persistence in 
unemployment incidence during a period of high but declining unemployment.  
As well as the original BHPS sample, various subsamples took part in the BHPS over time. In 
particular, a sample of respondents to the European Community Household Panel Survey 
(ECHP) was part of the study between Waves 7 and 11; the Wales and Scotland boost samples 
were included in Wave 9, and a Northern Ireland sample in Wave 11. With the aim of 
maximising the sample size, our study makes use of the original BHPS sample, present in all the 
sub-periods used, and the boost samples for Scotland and Wales, present in Waves 9-13 and 
Waves 16-20 but not in Waves 1-5. We did not include the ECHP subsample because it is not 
continuously present in any of the sub-periods used. Nor did we use the Northern Ireland 
subsample because it would be only part of the analysis related to Waves 16-20.  
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At the beginning of each of three sub-periods analysed, i.e., Waves 1, 9 and 16, we keep full 
respondent males, aged between 16 and 50, who are not in full-time education and are active in 
the labour market, i.e., either working or in unemployment. With respect to people in work, we 
classify as labour market active both employees and self-employed individuals who declared that 
they did paid work in the week before the interview or had a job which they were away from. 
We define as unemployed those respondents who were not in work and reported that they had 
looked for a job in the last 4 weeks. The rest are classified as inactive and, hence, not included in 
our estimation sample. It should be noted that the unemployed definition used in our analysis is 
consistent with the one of Arulampalam et al. (2000) and Stewart (2007), although an additional 
condition of immediate availability to start working is required in these papers. As a robustness 
check, we repeat the analysis with a less stringent definition of unemployment which includes 
also those defining themselves as unemployed even if the job search criteria are not met. Each 
respondent stays in our estimation sample until a full interview is missed, or the person becomes 
inactive, enters full-time education, or has a missing value in any of the other variables used in 
the analysis. Hence, our final sample is an unbalanced panel with complete information on the 
respondents until the end of the sub-period analysed or until the respondent is excluded. A 
sample of this sort can be defined as “compact” but unbalanced. 
Tables 2.1 to 2.3 report descriptive statistics for each of the sub-periods analysed. As shown by 
Table 2.1, the proportion of unemployed continuously falls between Wave 1 and Wave 5, being 
close to 10 percent and just below 4 percent in Wave 5. The average proportion over the period 
is 7 percent. The probability of being unemployed at a given point in time conditional on being 
unemployed in the previous wave is above 56 percent, while 2.8 percent of those employed in 
the previous wave are observed to be unemployed at the time of interview. These raw data 
estimates are in line with those reported by Arulampalam et al. (2000), and support the existence 
of persistence in unemployment incidence. 
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The majority of the UK based literature finds a positive effect of the local unemployment to 
vacancy ratio on the probability of being unemployed at a given point in time (e.g. Arulampalam 
et al., 2000, Arulampalam and Stewart, 2009) and Biewen and Steffes (2010) find evidence that 
the scarring effect is negatively related to the unemployment cycle in Germany. We control for 
local labour market conditions through the claimant proportion, a measure of the proportion of 
claimants of unemployment related benefits over the population aged 16-64 at the local authority 
district level.15 Consistent with the trend of the unemployment rate reported in Figure 2.1, the 
claimant proportion increases between Wave 1 and Wave 2, and starts to decrease in later waves.  
A higher incidence of full-time education among youths, as well as ageing and the fact that we 
do not allow new entries into our estimation sample, explains the lower and declining-over-time 
proportion of youths aged between 16 and 25 compared with other age groups. Arulampalam et 
al. (2000) show that youths have been less affected than adults by scarring in the early ‘90s; we 
test whether a similar pattern emerges during the Great Recession. 
On aggregate, the majority of respondents in our sample are above CSE education level, and 
22.8 percent report no qualifications among those listed. Following Arulampalam and Stewart 
(2009), the education variable is considered time invariant and measured at the beginning of the 
sub-period because, a) observations drop from our estimation sample as soon as they are 
observed in full-time education; and b) few changes in qualifications occur. The great majority 
of respondents in our sample are home owners, with a prevalence of social renters over private 
renters among non-home owners. The proportion of married people increases over time while the 
average number of children in the household ranges between 0.89 and 0.85 in the period 
analysed. Only 3 percent of respondents report to be in poor health while 3 percent are ethnically 
non-white. 
                                                 
15
 See NOMIS website for more information. Data downloaded in December 2014. 
 68 
 
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics for Waves 9 to 13. On average, 3.5 percent of the sample 
is observed to be in unemployment at the time of the survey and the proportion is declining over 
time. Evidence of persistence in unemployment incidence in the raw data emerges as the 
probability of being in unemployment conditional on being unemployed in the previous wave is 
about 45 percent. This represents a considerably higher value than the 1.6 percent probability 
faced by those employed in the previous wave. It should be noted that the claimant proportion 
shows a slowly declining trend across waves, consistent with the broadly stable unemployment 
rate in the same period. The use of a boost sample for Scotland and Wales explains the high 
proportion of people living in these two regions.16 
With respect to Waves 16-20, the number of observations is declining over time as expected. 
However, a significant drop occurs between Wave 18, the last wave of the BHPS, and Wave 19, 
the first wave in which former BHPS respondents were interviewed as part of Understanding 
Society. Table 2.3 shows that the proportion of unemployed declines between Wave 16 and 
Wave 18, reaching a minimum of 2.1 percent in Wave 18, i.e., during late 2008 and early 2009, 
and it rises considerably in Wave 19; the aggregate proportion of unemployed is approximately 3 
percent.17 On aggregate, the probability of being in unemployment at a given point, conditional 
on being unemployed in the previous wave, is close to 41 percent. The same probability amounts 
to 1.5 percent for those who were previously employed. Consistent with previous literature, this 
evidence confirms the existence of persistence in unemployment incidence in the raw data. 
                                                 
16
 The item measuring general heath is different in Waves 9, 19 and 20 compared with the other BHPS waves. 
Categories have been re-grouped in order to be as comparable as possible, but this is likely to explain the drop in the 
proportion of people in bad health that occurs in these waves.  
17
 A considerable drop in the proportion of unemployed occurs between Waves 1 and 2, 9 and 10, and 16 and 17. As 
well as a decline in the aggregate unemployment rate, also confirmed by Figure 1, the drop is likely to be caused to a 
certain extent by the way our sample is built, as incidences of inactivity and missing interviews seem to affect more 
the unemployed than the employed. Although endogenous selection into economic activity could be an issue, in 
their study on low-pay persistence Cappellari and Jenkins (2008) show that ignoring endogenous selection into 
employment does not introduce sizeable bias into estimates of covariate effects. Moreover, the robustness check in 
which we estimate our models by also defining as unemployed those inactive respondents who defined themselves 
as unemployed confirms our findings. 
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Comparing the descriptive statistics across sub-periods, it should be noted that, i) the levels of 
the claimant proportion are considerably higher in this first sub-period than they are during the 
Great Recession; ii) the age profile varies across sub-periods, with a higher proportion of youths 
and a lower proportion of adults in the early ‘90s, arguably because of the subsequent expansion 
in access to further education; and iii) the level of academic qualification is substantially lower in 
the Wave 1 to 5 sub-period, with 12.7 percent of respondents with a degree or more, and over 22 
percent of individuals having no qualifications. A further improvement in the education profile 
of respondents also arises when statistics relative to the Great Recession sub-period are 
compared to those relative to Waves 9-13.     
Descriptive statistics show the presence of persistence in unemployment incidence in all the sub-
samples used. However, controlling for observable and unobservable characteristics is necessary 
to assess the existence of true state dependence in the data. With respect to observables, for 
example, Tables 2.1-2.3 show a high degree of heterogeneity in characteristics of the 
respondents in the three sub-samples, with people who are in the “Great Recession sample” 
usually older and more educated than those in the early ‘90s sample. Similar considerations 
apply to the claimant proportion. The next sub-section introduces the identification strategy that 
we use to disentangle the effect of previous unemployment from those of observed and 
unobserved characteristics, and to estimate true state dependence. 
2.2.2 Methods 
Similarly to numerous previous works on persistence in unemployment incidence, we use a 
dynamic random effect probit to identify the presence of true state dependence in our data 
(Arulampalam et al., 2000; Biewen and Steffes, 2010; Stewart, 2007) and we adopt the 
Wooldridge (2005) solution for the initial conditions problem. See Arulampalam and Stewart 
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(2009) for an exhaustive description of the three most commonly used methods to deal with the 
initial condition problem, i.e., Heckman (1981a,b), Orme (1997; 2001) and Wooldridge (2005). 
An individual i at time of interview t is observed to be in unemployment if her unobserved 
propensity to be unemployed ∗  crosses a threshold of 0. The propensity to be unemployed is 
assumed to be a function of unemployment status at the time of the previous interview, , a 
row vector of observable characteristics,, an individual specific unobserved effect 	 and a 
random error term 
. 
∗ =  +  + 	 + 
 ,                      = 1, … ,   and  = 2, … ,                            (1)  
with  
~(0,1). Following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984), we allow for correlation 
between the unobserved heterogeneity term 	 and observed characteristics  by assuming a 
relationship of the form 	 =  +  !, where !~" (0, #$%) and independent of  and 
 
for all  and  (Stewart, 2007; Arulampalam et al., 2000). We are thus left with an equation of the 
form: 
∗ =  +  + ! +  +  
 ,                 = 1, … ,   and  = 2, … ,                   (2)  
The model in Equation (2) can be consistently estimated only if the initial condition  is 
exogenous. This would be the case, for example, if we had observed individuals since the 
beginning of the data generating process. In the presence of a correlation between initial 
condition and unobserved heterogeneity, however, the estimate of the parameter of interest  
would be biased upward because part of the effect of the unobserved heterogeneity would be 
captured by the coefficient on the lag dependent variable (Stewart, 2007). 
Following Wooldridge (2005), the problem of the initial condition is addressed in the spirit of 
Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984) by controlling for a linear relationship between 
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unobserved heterogeneity and initial condition and estimating the model conditional on the 
initial value of the variable of interest. In particular, it is assumed that: 
! = &' + & + (                                                                                                                       (3) 
where (~" *0, #+%,. Substituting (3) into (2) 
∗ =  +  + &' + & + ( +  + 
   = 1, … ,   and  = 2, … ,           (4) 
Equation (4) can be easily estimated using a random effect probit. 
The coefficient on the lagged unemployment status is our coefficient of interest. A positive and 
significant coefficient implies the presence of true state dependence since, controlling for 
observed characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity, past unemployment influences current 
unemployment status. Consistent with other studies on unemployment persistence, the vector  
contains variables such as age, highest academic qualification, marital status, general health, 
proportion of unemployment benefits claimants in the population aged 16-64 at the local 
authority district level, region of residence, and wave dummies.  contains the within-
individual average of time-varying covariates. Due to lack of variation in regional mobility, 
averages of region dummies are not included in the model. The variable age is assumed to be 
exogenous to the unobserved heterogeneity term, so average age is, similarly, not included. 
Following Wooldridge (2005, 2008), average partial affects (APE) are based on  
E/0( +  + &' + & + ( +  )1                                             (5) 
where the expectation is over the distribution of (, , ()  
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where N identifies the total number of individual-time observations in our sample. In order to 
evaluate the extent to which true state dependence varies within the three sub-periods analysed, 
we also compute wave specific APEs by averaging over the wave specific population. We follow 
the same strategy for the calculation of APEs by age and by level of local unemployment. 
Standard errors are computed through bootstrapping with replacement with 500 replications. 
In the spirit of Biewen and Steffes (2010) and Arulampalam et al., (2000), respectively, we also 
investigate whether true state dependence varies with age and levels of local unemployment. 
Since our model is non-linear, our base specification presented in equation (4) already allows the 
average partial effects on the lagged unemployment status to vary with the characteristics of the 
respondent. In this context, even if the inclusion of an interaction term allows more flexibility in 
analysing the relationship between true state dependence and individual characteristics, a lack of 
significance in the interaction term does not necessarily imply a zero gradient in true state 
dependence with respect to changes in such characteristics. Hence, when we analyse whether 
true state dependence varies between claimant proportion or age of the respondent, we act 
according to the following strategy. First, we augment our base specification by including an 
interaction term between the lagged unemployment status and the claimant proportion (Model 3) 
or age (Model 4). In Model 3 we also we include an interaction term between the unemployment 
status at first interview and the claimant proportion. If these interaction terms are statistically 
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significant, then we compute APEs using the model including the interactions. Otherwise we 
compute APEs from Model 2 in order to maximise statistical efficiency. 18 
2.3 Results 
In this section we present the results of our analysis. For each sub-period we estimate 4 different 
models. Model 1 is a pooled probit, which allows us to analyse the relationship between lagged 
and current unemployment status controlling for the observable characteristics of the 
respondents, but not for the unobservable ones. Model 2, which consists of a dynamic random 
effect probit with Wooldridge’s (2005) solution for the initial condition problem, is our baseline 
specification as it also allows us to control for unobserved time invariant characteristics of the 
individual. In Model 3 we extend our baseline specification by controlling for the interaction 
between lagged unemployment status and claimant proportion. The aim of this specification is to 
allow more flexibility in analysing possible relations between local labour market conditions and 
true state dependence (Biewen and Steffes, 2010). In Model 4 we add an interaction term 
between our lagged unemployment status and age of the respondent. Arulampalam et al. (2000) 
show that youths below 25 years old are less scarred by unemployment than adults during the 
early ‘90s, and we check if the finding is still valid during the early 2000s and the Great 
Recession.  
After analysing the three sub-periods on their own in subsections 1 to 3, we also report estimates 
of true state dependence for a hypothetical individual with fixed characteristics in each of the 
three sub-periods analysed. This exercise allows us to study the patterns of the scarring effect of 
unemployment across the three sub-periods analysed, holding constant the observable 
characteristics of the individual. The last subsection discusses a number of robustness checks. 
                                                 
18
 We also estimate a model including an interaction term between lagged unemployment status and wave dummies. 
We do not report estimates from this specification because interaction terms are never statistically significant. 
 74 
 
2.3.1 The early ’90s 
In this section we focus our analysis on the period ranging from 1991 to 1995, a period of 
declining unemployment after the early ’90s recession. We partly replicate Arulampalam et al. 
(2000), although we use slightly different regressors and a different solution to the initial 
condition problem to obtain estimates of state dependence that are consistent across the three 
sub-periods used. Our coefficient estimates are reported in Table 2.4, and APEs in Table 2.5. 
Consistent with previous research, the pooled probit estimates (Model 1) show a positive 
relationship between lagged and current unemployment status. This result implies that, 
controlling for a number of observed characteristics, those unemployed in the previous wave 
face a higher risk of current unemployment than those previously employed. However, since 
Model 1 does not control for individual unobserved heterogeneity, the finding is not to be 
interpreted as evidence of true state dependence. Among other regressors, estimates from Model 
1 show that the claimant proportion is positively associated with unemployment probability, 
while the sign of the association is negative for age and education, with older and more educated 
respondents less likely to experience unemployment at a given point in time. Estimated 
coefficients also show that, compared to private renters, home owners face a lower 
unemployment risk while social renters are more likely to be in unemployment. Finally, being 
married is associated with a lower unemployment probability, while number of children in the 
household is positively associated with unemployment risk. Among wave dummies, only the 
coefficient on Wave 5, correspondent to year 1995/96, is statistically significant. 
Average partial effects from Model 1 are reported in Table 2.5. Results show that after 
controlling for the observable characteristics of the respondent the average partial effect on the 
lagged unemployment status is close to 0.4, meaning that, on average, a person who was 
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unemployed last year is 40 percentage points more likely to be unemployed this year than a 
similar person who was employed last year. 
Estimates from Model 2 are based on a random effect dynamic probit with Wooldridge’s (2005) 
solution to the initial condition problem. Model 2 represents our preferred specification as it 
controls both for the effect of observed characteristics as well as unobserved time invariant 
characteristics. Consistent with previous literature (e.g., Arulampalam et al., 2000; Stewart, 
2007), the coefficient on the lagged unemployment status is positive and statistically significant. 
The result is consistent with the existence of true state dependence as past unemployment 
incidence significantly affects current unemployment probability. In particular, the APE of 
lagged unemployment is approximately 8.4 percentage points, while wave specific true state 
dependence is estimated to decline over time from about 10 percentage points in Wave 2 to 6.2 
percentage points in Wave 5. As expected, estimates of true state dependence from Model 2, 
which controls for individual unobserved heterogeneity, are considerably smaller than those 
from Model 1, and even smaller than raw data state dependence. 
With respect to other regressors, estimated coefficients confirm the importance of age and 
education in affecting unemployment risk. Also, the claimant proportion has a positive and 
significant coefficient, confirming that adverse labour market conditions increase the probability 
of being unemployed. 
APEs from Model 2 show a declining trend over time, a pattern similar to that followed by 
unemployment rate in the same period (Figure 2.1). With the aim of analysing the relationship 
between state dependence and labour market conditions, we include an interaction term between 
lagged unemployment status and claimant proportion (Model 3). Estimates show that the 
interaction term is not statistically significant. In a different specification (not reported) we 
interacted the cyclical component of claimant proportion in the spirit of Biewen and Steffes 
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(2010), but without finding any significant effect. APEs on lagged unemployment after Model 3, 
reported in Table 2.5, are consistent with those computed after our base specification and 
confirm the declining trend in true state dependence over time.  
As the interaction term between unemployment status at previous interview and claimant 
proportion is not statistically significant, for greater statistical efficiency we use estimates from 
Model 2 to evaluate to what extent the scarring effect of unemployment varies among 
individuals experiencing different labour market conditions. Thus, we evaluate average partial 
effects on lagged unemployment over the distribution of claimant proportion discretised in 2 
percentage point bands. Estimates reported in Table 2.6 show that those experiencing higher 
levels of local unemployment are more scarred by unemployment experiences. A t-test confirms 
that the scarring effect at each subsequent band of claimant proportion is statistically different 
from the one faced by individuals living in areas where the proportion of active population 
claiming unemployment related benefits ranges between 2 and 4 percentage points. Unlike the 
results presented by Biewen and Steffes (2010) for Germany, our findings suggest for state 
dependence to be higher in periods or areas of high unemployment and hence to be negatively 
correlated with the business cycle. 
Consistent with Arulampalam et al. (2000), the coefficients from Model 4 show that youths 
below the age of 26 are less affected by the scarring effect than other age groups. Arulampalam 
et al. (2000) impute this result to job shopping, i.e., a propensity to change job several times 
during the youth period. APEs after Model 4, reported in Table 2.5, are consistent with the 
findings of our base specification. APEs averaged across age groups after both Models 2 and 4 
are reported in Table 2.7.  Following our base specification, youths are the most scarred by 
unemployment experiences, while estimates of true state dependence for older workers are 
between 7.1 and 7.9 percentage points. APEs based on Model 4, which allows more flexibility in 
the relationship between age and the scarring effect of unemployment, show that youths are less 
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scarred by unemployment experiences than mature workers, although the differences are not 
statistically significant. Despite the interaction terms between unemployment status at previous 
wave and age bands are statistically significant, their introduction makes the estimates of APEs 
over age groups less precise. 
Our analysis hence strongly supports the existence of true state dependence in a period ranging 
from 1991 to 1995/96. Over the analysed period, the estimated average partial effect following 
our base model specification is close to 8.5 percentage points with a declining trend from about 
10 percentage points in Wave 2 to 6.2 percentage points in Wave 5. Our estimates show a 
counter-cyclical pattern of true state dependence as unemployment is less scarring if local labour 
market conditions are more favourable. 
The results are consistent with several UK-focused works based on early ’90 data, although the 
size of our estimates of true state dependence is smaller. In particular, using BHPS data covering 
1991-1995, Arulampalam et al. (2000) report APEs which decline from 11.7 to 7.9 percentage 
points for youths aged under-25 and from 22.6 percent to 13.9 percent for adult aged 25 or older.  
Using 1991-1996 BHPS data, Stewart (2007) estimate a true state dependence parameter of 15 
percentage points in the closest model specification to the one used in this work. The differences 
in the sizes of the estimated effects are likely to be due to differences in the model specification, 
in the variables definition and in methodology adopted to overcome the initial condition 
problem.  
In the following subsections we perform our estimations on two different sub-periods, the early 
2000’s and the Great Recession. As well as providing consistent estimates of true state 
dependence in those periods, the analysis will contribute to a better understanding of its 
relationship with the business cycle. 
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2.3.2 The early 2000s 
This section analyses state dependence in unemployment incidence in the early 2000s. As shown 
in Figure 2.1, between 1999 and 2003 unemployment was low and broadly stable. The 
macroeconomic scenario in this period is, therefore, radically different both from the one 
analysed above, characterised by declining unemployment rates, and from the one studied in the 
next subsection, characterised by a considerable increase in unemployment during the Great 
Recession. Model specifications are the same as in the previous section: Model 1 contains a 
pooled probit analysis; in Model 2 we estimate the dynamic random effect probit model with the 
Wooldridge (2005) solution for the initial condition problem; in Models 3 and 4, we modify our 
base specification by introducing interaction terms between the lagged unemployment status and, 
respectively, claimant proportion and age categories. 
Comparing the estimated coefficients, reported in Table 2.8, with those relative to the analysis of 
Waves 1-5, three main differences arise: i) a negative but not significant effect of claimant 
proportion on the probability of being unemployed in model specifications 2-4; ii) in all the 
model specifications the “none of these” education category becomes the only one with a 
statistically positive coefficient; iii) in Model 4, the coefficient on the interaction term between 
lagged unemployment status and age categories becomes not statistically significant with the 
exception of the 46-55 age category that is just on the margin of statistical significance. 
Focusing on the APEs reported in Table 2.9, for Model 1 we estimate an effect of 0.27 overall, 
with an irregular pattern between waves. According to APEs after Model 2, those previously 
unemployed have, on average, a 6 percentage points higher probability of being currently 
unemployed than those previously in employment. Despite being irregular, no particular pattern 
can be identified between waves. APEs from Models 3 and 4 show consistent results. In Table 
2.10 we report APEs after model (2) evaluated over the discretised distribution of claimant 
 79 
 
proportion. Estimates confirm that workers experiencing worse labour market conditions are 
more scarred than those experiencing lower levels of local unemployment.19 
Table 2.11 reports APEs by age group estimated after Model 2, showing that youths suffer the 
most from past unemployment experiences. Since the interaction term between lagged 
unemployment and age dummy is just at the margin of statistical significance in Model 4, we 
also report APEs by age group computed after Model 4. The results, reported in the second panel 
of Table 2.11, show a U-shaped trend of true state dependence with respect to age, although the 
lack of statistical significance of the interaction terms makes our APEs for the youngest 
population group not statistically different compared to those of older groups.  
Our analysis therefore shows the presence of true state dependence during the early 2000s, and 
its average over the time periods is smaller than the one estimated for the early ’90s. In Waves 9-
13, estimates of true state dependence show a slightly irregular but overall constant pattern and 
support a negative relationship between the business cycle and the scarring effect of 
unemployment. 
2.3.3 The Great Recession 
Table 2.12 reports the estimates of Models 1-4 for Waves 16-20, i.e., the sub-period of the Great 
Recession. Consistent with findings relative to the other sub-periods analysed, the coefficient on 
the lagged unemployment estimated by the pooled probit (Model 1) is positive and statistically 
                                                 
19
 As a robustness check, we also computed APEs on lagged unemployment status by fixing the values of claimant 
proportion at various increasing values. This method of computing APEs imposes to all the individuals in our 
sample to experience the same level of claimant proportion, leaving all the other variables at individual values. 
While we find consistent results with respect to the early ’90s and Great Recession sub-periods, i.e. APE increases 
with level of claimant proportion, this is not the case for the early 2000s sub-period. The result is arguably driven by 
the lack of precision with which the coefficients on the claimant proportion and on the average over time of the 
claimant proportion faced by the individual are estimated. Excluding the average over time of time varying 
covariates, which are jointly not statistically significant, produce consistent results with those presented in the main 
sections of the paper, and confirms a positive association between claimant proportion and scarring effect both 
averaging over the population of people experiencing different levels of unemployment and by exogenously fixing 
claimant proportion at different values of interest.     
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significant. Unlike the early ’90s sub-period, local labour market conditions seem not to 
significantly influence the unemployment risk as the coefficient on the claimant proportion is 
positive but not statistically significant. The lack of an effect can, however, be explained by a 
high degree of correlation between wave dummies and claimant ratio. Indeed, in all model 
specifications the exclusion of wave dummies from our estimated equation leads to larger in size 
and statistically significant coefficients on the claimant ratio. Among other regressors, estimates 
from Model 1 confirm both the negative association between age and unemployment risk found 
for the previous sub-periods and, similar to the Wave 9 to 13 sub-period, also the role played by 
lack of educational qualifications in increasing the unemployment probability. APEs after our 
pooled probit specification (Model 1), reported in Table 2.13, show that the effect on the lagged 
unemployment status is close to 0.2. Wave specific APEs show the presence of a shift in Wave 
19 and Wave 20. 
Model 2, which allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity as well as the observed 
characteristics of the individual, provides evidence in support of the existence of true state 
dependence during the Great Recession. The coefficient on lagged unemployment is, in fact, 
positive and statistically significant, while APEs (Table 2.13) show that those who were 
unemployed at a given wave experience a probability of being in unemployment at the following 
wave that is 7.9 percentage points higher than for those who were previously employed. The 
scarring effect of unemployment shows an increasing pattern by wave, as our estimates are close 
to 7 percentage points in 2007/08 and 2008/09 and peak at 9.9 and 8.4 percentage points in 
Waves 2010 and 2011, respectively. Among other regressors, the coefficient on the local 
claimant proportion is not statistically significant, arguably for collinearity with the wave 
dummies, while age, having no academic qualifications and the dummy relative to Wave 19 
significantly affect the unemployment risk. 
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In Models 3 and 4 we fail to find any significant interaction term between lagged unemployment 
status and, respectively, claimant proportion (Model 3) and age (Model 4). APEs relative to these 
specifications confirm the findings from Model 2. As for the previous sub-periods, we report in 
Tables 2.14 and 2.15, respectively, APEs by claimant proportions and by age after Model 2. The 
estimates confirm the positive association between local unemployment and state dependence, as 
the APE on lagged unemployment is significantly higher for those experiencing a high level of 
claimant proportion when compared with those experiencing tighter labour market conditions. 
Consistent with APEs following our base specification for the other sub-periods, the estimated 
APEs show a decreasing pattern in scarring by age group, with youths more affected by 
unemployment experiences than adults.  
Our analysis thus confirms that unemployment is also a scarring experience during the Great 
Recession. Moreover, our results suggest the existence of a negative association between 
business cycle and true state dependence in the years of the Great Recession as well as in the 
other sub-samples. 
Hence, comparing across sub-periods, our results show that: i) unemployment experiences have 
had a scarring effect on future employability in the last two decades; ii) workers experiencing 
worse local labour market conditions are significantly more scarred than those experiencing 
tighter labour markets; and iii) youths are those more at risk of being scarred by unemployment 
experiences, although allowing more flexibility in the relationship between unemployment status 
in previous wave and age shows that older workers have been scarred at least as much as youths 
in the early ’90s.  
Figure 2.2 reports our wave specific estimates of true state dependence after Model 2 for the 
three sub-periods analysed together with trends for male annual unemployment rates in Great 
Britain as reported in Figure 2.1. Similarly, Figure 2.3 provides a scatterplot of our estimates for 
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unemployment scarring and male unemployment rates. Point estimates are weighted by the 
inverse of their estimated variance. The plots provide descriptive evidence that the negative 
association between scarring effect of unemployment and business cycle holds not only within 
but also between sub-periods. If confirmed by future research, such results will be consistent 
with factors such as crowding in the labour markets (Michaillat, 2012; Blanchard and Diamond,  
1994) at least compensating the beneficial effect of the reduction in the stigma associated with 
unemployment during recessions.20  
In the next subsection we further develop the role of the business cycle in affecting 
unemployment experience by analysing the scarring effect of unemployment for a hypothetical 
person with fixed characteristics across the three sub-periods. 
2.3.4 Cross period analysis 
Previous sections have provided evidence in favour of true state dependence in the three sub-
periods analysed and have provided evidence supporting that unemployment scarring is basically 
counter-cyclical, as a positive association between true state dependence and unemployment 
cycle arises. 
In this subsection we report the estimates of true state dependence after Model 2 for a reference 
person across the three sub-periods. The reference person has the following characteristics: aged 
between 16 and 25 years; ‘O’ Level education; home owner; not married and with no children; 
not in poor health; from a white ethnic background; and living in the Midlands. Claimant 
proportion is fixed at the wave-specific average faced by people living in the Midlands. The 
exercise allows us to better appreciate the extent to which scarring effect has changed in the past 
                                                 
20While our estimates of true state dependence are wave specific, annual unemployment rates refers to calendar 
years. We matched the two measures by using the year in which wave-specific interviews officially started to take 
place (e.g., 1992 for Wave 2, etc.). This explains the missing estimate of true state dependence in Figure 2 for the 
year 2010, as we assigned the value of true state dependence relative to Wave 18 to the year 2008 and those relative 
to Wave 19 to the year 2010.   
 83 
 
two decades by holding constant the observed characteristics of the individual. As far as 
unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions are concerned, following Wooldridge (2005) we 
use the observation specific values. 
Tables 2.16-2.18 report APEs for the reference person across the three sub-periods analysed. 
Compared to Tables 2.5, 2.9 and 2.13, the estimates show that the APEs for the reference person 
are usually bigger and less precise than the APEs calculated for the sub-period populations. The 
results confirm the main findings of our analysis: evidence of true state dependence arises from 
the whole period analysed, despite being just at the margin of statistical significance for the 
Wave 9-13 sub-period. Furthermore, its magnitude is negatively correlated with the business 
cycle as wave specific APEs follow a decreasing pattern during the first sub-period, are stable 
during the late ’90s, and increase during the Great Recession. 
2.3.5 Robustness checks 
We perform a number of robustness checks. First, given that discouraged unemployed who do 
not meet the job search criterion would be classified as inactive and, hence, excluded from our 
estimation sample, we repeat the analysis using an alternative definition of unemployment which 
relaxes the job search criterion and classifies as unemployed all those who are not employed or 
self-employed and who classify themselves as unemployed.21 The results, reported in Column 1 
of Appendix Tables 2.A1, 2.A3 and 2.A5, show evidence of state dependence for all the periods 
analysed. APEs, reported in Column 1 of Tables 2.A2, 2.A4 and 2.A6, confirm that the scarring 
effect is negatively correlated with the business cycle. We also find evidence in support of true 
state dependence being present in all the sub-periods analysed, and of a pattern over time which 
is consistent with scarring effect being negatively correlated with the business cycle, when we 
                                                 
21
 See Arulampalam (2002) for a discussion on the implications of using different definitions of unemployment for 
the identification of true state dependence. 
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restrict our estimation sample to a balanced panel (Column 2) or exclude the Scotland and Wales 
boost samples (Column 3). 22 
A number of previous studies showed that the estimated true state dependence drops 
considerably when spells of unemployment lasting across two (or more) consecutive interviews 
are excluded from the estimation sample (Arulampalam et al., 2000; Stewart, 2007). The check 
is performed on the grounds that the coefficient on lagged unemployment status is likely to 
capture the effect of continuing spells rather than true state dependence (Jenkins, 2013). Column 
4 of Tables 2.A1-2.A5 reports estimated coefficients and APEs from Model 2 after excluding 
long spells of unemployment and re-compacting the panel. Consistent with previous literature, 
the size of the coefficients on lagged unemployment drops considerably and the same applies to 
APEs. Despite the reduced size, a negative association with the business cycle is still present. It 
should be noted, however, that the check is costly in terms of observation loss and likely to 
introduce a negative bias in our calculation. Dropping continuing spells of unemployment 
implies, in fact, excluding from the estimation sample not only the long spell of unemployment 
experienced by a respondent, but also all the observations following the long spell as the panel 
needs to be compact. Although the number of observations lost is not too large in absolute terms, 
it should be noted that the exclusion only affects those with at least two consecutive 
unemployment statuses in our estimation sample, i.e., those who contribute to our coefficient of 
interest.23 Moreover, from an intuitive point of view, the scarring effect of unemployment can 
manifest itself not only through an increase in the probability of being in a different 
                                                 
22
 The declining trend in scarring effect observed in the sub-period 1991-1995 is less regular using a balanced panel. 
It should also be noted that Scotland and Wales boost samples have been introduced only in 1999, and this explains 
why estimates for the early ’90s sub-period reported in Column 3 are the same as to those reported in the main result 
sub-section.   
23
 Consistent with Arulampalam et al. (2000), we consider a spell “long” if the respondent is in the same 
unemployment spell in two consecutive interviews. Stewart (2007) makes the definition stricter by excluding from 
the analysis all the observations who are unemployed in consecutive interviews and do not have at least one 
employment spell in between. This specification leads to a loss of statistical significance for the coefficients on 
lagged unemployment experience for Waves 1-5 and Waves 16-20, arguably because of the even higher number of 
observations with two or more consecutive unemployment spells excluded by the check. 
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unemployment spell in the future, but also through a lower probability of finding a job and 
ending the current unemployment spell. Hence, arguably, excluding from the estimation sample 
those with long spells of unemployment would introduce a negative bias in our estimates.24 
Finally, excluding long spells of unemployment would be most appropriate if the time between 
two consecutive interviews did not allow for a change in employment status. An example can 
clarify this point. If our models were applied to a study of prison convictions and the gap 
between interviews was smaller than the time that the respondent has to spend in prison, then we 
would artificially find a positive effect of a past prison experience on a current prison 
experience, while the prison experience would, in fact, be the same and the respondent would not 
have had any chance to change her status. In the context of this paper, respondents are allowed to 
change their labour market status between consecutive interviews and if they do not change it, it 
is because of individual characteristics, observable and/or unobservable, labour demand factors, 
and past unemployment experiences.  
To conclude, the checks performed confirm the robustness of our results and support the 
evidence on the existence of true state dependence in our data and on its negative correlation 
with the business cycle.25 
2.4 Conclusions 
In this paper we analyse the extent to which past unemployment experiences have affected 
current unemployment risk in the last two decades. 
In the spirit, among others, of Arulampalam et al. (2000) and Stewart (2007), we use data from 
the BHPS and Understanding Society to estimate a dynamic random effect probit with 
                                                 
24
 Elements of duration dependence, as well as state dependence, can influence the probability of staying in 
unemployment for two or more consecutive waves. However, explicitly disentangling the two sources of 
dependence goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
25
 We do not report p-values based on bootstrap for concerns relative to computational time.  
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Wooldridge’s (2005) solution to the initial condition problem for three sub periods: the early 
’90s, the early 2000s and the Great Recession.  
Our estimates provide evidence in favour of true state dependence in all the periods analysed, 
with youth affected the most during the early 2000s and the Great Recession. The age profile of 
unemployment scarring is less clear in the early 90s sub-period, as youths appear to be less 
affected than mature workers although the differences are not statistically significant. Consistent 
with theoretical predictions of job crowding models (Michaillat, 2012; Crépon et al., 2013), we 
also find a negative association between business cycle and true state dependence, as estimates 
increase when unemployment increases, and fall when unemployment falls. 
A number of studies have already documented that unemployment experiences leave significant 
and potentially long lasting scars on individual’s employability, wages and wellbeing. Both the 
incidence of unemployment and the duration of an unemployment spell has been shown to 
matter (see, among others, Arulampalam et al., 2000; Böheim and Taylor, 2002; Stewart, 2007; 
Bell and Blanchflower, 2011a, b; Clark et al., 2001; Gregory and Jukes, 2001; Arulampalam, 
2001). The existing UK based evidence on true state dependence in unemployment incidence is 
however mostly based on data from the ‘90s (Arulampalam et al., 2000; Stewart, 2007). Our 
work hence complements the existing literature not only by providing estimates for more recent 
years, but also doing so in a consistent and comparable manner across the sub-period analysed.      
Consistent with Arulampalam et al. (2000) and Stewart (2007), we find in particular that 
between 1991 and 1995, a period of declining unemployment, those unemployed at a given point 
in time were, on average, 8.4 percentage points more likely to experience unemployment in the 
following wave than those previously in employment. Our estimates show a declining pattern of 
true state dependence in the period analysed, as APEs decline from 9.8 to 6.2 percentage points. 
We also find evidence of true state dependence between 1999 and 2003/04, a period of low and 
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stable unemployment. In these years, APEs are, on average, equal to 6.2 percentage points, and 
the pattern of the estimates across waves is basically stable over time. Finally, between 2006 and 
2011/12, the period which includes the Great Recession, estimates of true state dependence 
amount to 7.9 percentage points, increasing over time from 6.9 percentage points in 2007, to 9.9 
percentage points in 2010/11, and reducing to 8.4 percentage points in 2011/12.  
Our analysis also suggests that unemployment experiences scars more if labour market 
conditions are less favourable. The finding add to the existing literature as previous UK based 
evidence on the relationship between unemployment scarring and business cycle is scarce and 
focused on duration dependence rather than state dependence. Kalwij (2010) show evidence of 
true duration dependence being negatively associated with the business cycle only if the model 
does not control for compositional effects in the unemployment inflows. The result is consistent 
with Turon (2003), which reports evidence on genuine duration dependence not varying 
significantly over the business cycle. Both papers employ proportional hazard models, and 
differences in the methodologies adopted to disentangle the role “true” state dependence from 
that of observed and unobserved heterogeneity, as well as in the data used, are a likely 
explanation for the different result found in our analysis. 
Our findings therefore support the existence of a scarring effect of unemployment during the 
Great Recession, and a positive association arises with levels of unemployment. The Great 
Recession has, therefore, not only increased the current stock of unemployed, but also negatively 
influenced the future employment chances of those experiencing unemployment. Thus, short-
term interventions aimed at reducing the number of unemployed are likely to have beneficial 
effects both in the short and in the medium-long term.   
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2.5 Tables and Figures 
 Source: ONS Labour market statistics 
Figure 2.2: Unemployment rate and True state dependence, 1992-2011 
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Figure 2.1: Unemployment Rate in Great Britain, males only, 1992-2011 
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Figure 2.3: Unemployment Rate and True state dependence, scatterplot 
 
Note: Point estimates are weighted by the inverse of their estimated variance  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics, Waves 1-5 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Unemployed 0.096 0.079 0.066 0.058 0.038 0.071 
Unemployed (t-1) . 0.077 0.066 0.058 0.048 0.064 
Unemployed | Unemployed t-1 . 0.556 0.587 0.600 0.507 0.566 
Unemployed | Employed t-1 . 0.039 0.029 0.025 0.014 0.028 
Age 16-25 0.235 0.175 0.145 0.113 0.090 0.162 
Age 26-35 0.338 0.349 0.345 0.330 0.313 0.337 
Age 36-45 0.298 0.323 0.311 0.319 0.328 0.314 
Age 46-55 0.128 0.153 0.199 0.237 0.269 0.188 
Claimant proportion 6.360 7.332 7.271 6.331 5.624 6.622 
Degree or higher 0.116 0.121 0.131 0.137 0.137 0.127 
Other high 0.067 0.069 0.072 0.074 0.075 0.071 
A level 0.223 0.229 0.226 0.227 0.230 0.227 
O level 0.273 0.269 0.268 0.267 0.269 0.269 
CSE level 0.077 0.077 0.080 0.078 0.077 0.078 
None of these 0.244 0.235 0.224 0.217 0.211 0.228 
Home owner 0.753 0.787 0.791 0.812 0.831 0.790 
Social renter 0.144 0.131 0.125 0.107 0.089 0.123 
Private renter 0.104 0.081 0.085 0.081 0.080 0.088 
Married 0.588 0.640 0.666 0.677 0.694 0.646 
Number of children in HH 0.855 0.888 0.889 0.886 0.876 0.877 
Poor health 0.033 0.037 0.035 0.034 0.030 0.034 
Non white 0.041 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.027 0.033 
London and SE 0.242 0.231 0.235 0.233 0.232 0.235 
South West 0.089 0.093 0.094 0.093 0.092 0.092 
East of England 0.084 0.087 0.089 0.090 0.092 0.088 
Midlands 0.177 0.182 0.182 0.185 0.188 0.182 
North, Yorkshire and the Humber 0.272 0.271 0.262 0.263 0.267 0.267 
Wales 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.053 0.050 0.051 
Scotland 0.087 0.085 0.087 0.083 0.080 0.085 
N 2705 2186 1895 1727 1571 10084 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics, Waves 9-13 
 9 10 11 12 13 Total 
Unemployed 0.057 0.038 0.024 0.027 0.019 0.035 
Unemployed (t-1) . 0.041 0.028 0.017 0.022 0.028 
Unemployed | Unemployed t-1 . 0.496 0.429 0.538 0.304 0.452 
Unemployed | Employed t-1 . 0.019 0.013 0.018 0.012 0.016 
Age 16-25 0.212 0.159 0.111 0.091 0.063 0.136 
Age 26-35 0.339 0.338 0.328 0.305 0.285 0.322 
Age 36-45 0.332 0.351 0.373 0.378 0.379 0.360 
Age 46-55 0.117 0.152 0.189 0.226 0.273 0.183 
Claimant proportion 3.170 2.709 2.428 2.325 2.226 2.626 
Degree or higher 0.171 0.175 0.180 0.186 0.192 0.180 
Other high 0.086 0.091 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.091 
A level 0.251 0.254 0.252 0.255 0.256 0.253 
O level 0.269 0.271 0.270 0.270 0.269 0.270 
CSE level 0.081 0.076 0.075 0.074 0.072 0.076 
None of these 0.143 0.133 0.128 0.123 0.118 0.131 
Home owner 0.760 0.794 0.816 0.836 0.852 0.806 
Social renter 0.143 0.124 0.109 0.098 0.082 0.114 
Private renter 0.098 0.081 0.076 0.066 0.065 0.079 
Married 0.511 0.557 0.593 0.617 0.636 0.576 
Number of children in HH 0.835 0.886 0.898 0.901 0.890 0.879 
Poor health 0.012 0.041 0.037 0.041 0.039 0.033 
Non white 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.030 0.030 0.031 
London and SE 0.161 0.162 0.165 0.160 0.160 0.162 
South West 0.063 0.065 0.065 0.071 0.070 0.066 
East of England 0.063 0.067 0.066 0.069 0.073 0.067 
Midlands 0.124 0.129 0.131 0.136 0.138 0.131 
North, Yorkshire and the Humber 0.181 0.188 0.192 0.193 0.192 0.188 
Wales 0.190 0.175 0.174 0.167 0.160 0.175 
Scotland 0.218 0.214 0.208 0.205 0.208 0.211 
N 3287 2835 2540 2290 2081 13033 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics, Waves 16-20 
 16 17 18 19 20 Total 
Unemployed 0.046 0.025 0.021 0.028 0.025 0.031 
Unemployed t-1 . 0.035 0.020 0.017 0.026 0.025 
Unemployed | Unemployed t-1 . 0.381 0.442 0.407 0.429 0.407 
Unemployed | Employed t-1 . 0.012 0.013 0.022 0.014 0.015 
Age 16-25 0.189 0.138 0.103 0.052 0.026 0.116 
Age 26-35 0.311 0.299 0.289 0.252 0.222 0.282 
Age 36-45 0.347 0.368 0.368 0.381 0.384 0.366 
Age 46-55 0.153 0.195 0.241 0.315 0.368 0.235 
Claimant proportion 2.259 1.896 2.327 3.503 3.569 2.557 
Degree or higher 0.204 0.216 0.225 0.245 0.258 0.225 
Other high 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.087 0.088 0.085 
A level 0.261 0.256 0.257 0.262 0.253 0.258 
O level 0.278 0.277 0.271 0.254 0.252 0.269 
CSE level 0.080 0.077 0.077 0.071 0.076 0.077 
None of these 0.092 0.089 0.087 0.079 0.073 0.086 
Home owner 0.775 0.798 0.808 0.820 0.830 0.802 
Social renter 0.117 0.108 0.094 0.089 0.076 0.100 
Private renter 0.108 0.094 0.098 0.091 0.094 0.098 
Married 0.480 0.528 0.564 0.608 0.645 0.551 
Number of children in HH 0.826 0.836 0.845 0.880 0.891 0.849 
Poor health 0.034 0.034 0.037 0.011 0.012 0.028 
Non white 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.034 0.035 0.033 
London and SE 0.154 0.155 0.157 0.163 0.166 0.158 
South West 0.067 0.068 0.068 0.070 0.076 0.069 
East of England 0.066 0.068 0.069 0.071 0.072 0.069 
Midlands 0.125 0.125 0.126 0.127 0.128 0.126 
North, Yorkshire and the Humber 0.203 0.200 0.207 0.201 0.197 0.202 
Wales 0.184 0.183 0.176 0.171 0.171 0.178 
Scotland 0.202 0.200 0.198 0.196 0.190 0.198 
N 2739 2375 2144 1581 1363 10202 
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Table 2.4: Model estimates, Waves 1-5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled probit Wooldridge Unempl inter Age inter 
Unemployed t-1 1.788*** 
(0.071) 
0.909*** 
(0.153) 
0.425 
(0.384) 
0.571** 
(0.224) 
Claimant proportion 0.038*** 
(0.013) 
0.167** 
(0.067) 
0.156** 
(0.067) 
0.175*** 
(0.067) 
Unemployed t-1 * Claimant proportion  
 
 
 
0.067 
(0.048) 
 
 
Age 26-35 -0.281*** 
(0.087) 
-0.392*** 
(0.135) 
-0.393*** 
(0.136) 
-0.520*** 
(0.150) 
Age 35-45 -0.299*** 
(0.096) 
-0.432*** 
(0.153) 
-0.431*** 
(0.155) 
-0.524*** 
(0.163) 
Age 46-55 -0.067 
(0.106) 
-0.087 
(0.170) 
-0.085 
(0.172) 
-0.248 
(0.181) 
Unemployed t-1* Age 26-35  
 
 
 
 
 
0.450* 
(0.238) 
Unemployed t-1* Age 36-45  
 
 
 
 
 
0.280 
(0.259) 
Unemployed t-1* Age 46-55  
 
 
 
 
 
0.762** 
(0.301) 
Wave 2 (Ref.)     
Wave 3 -0.064 
(0.073) 
-0.101 
(0.090) 
-0.099 
(0.091) 
-0.086 
(0.090) 
Wave 4 -0.070 
(0.079) 
0.007 
(0.113) 
0.006 
(0.114) 
0.015 
(0.114) 
Wave 5 -0.250*** 
(0.092) 
-0.129 
(0.150) 
-0.120 
(0.151) 
-0.130 
(0.150) 
Degree or higher (Ref)      
Other high 0.093 
(0.185) 
0.080 
(0.288) 
0.080 
(0.292) 
0.080 
(0.288) 
A level 0.338*** 
(0.131) 
0.522** 
(0.209) 
0.522** 
(0.212) 
0.503** 
(0.210) 
O level 0.350*** 
(0.129) 
0.462** 
(0.204) 
0.468** 
(0.207) 
0.441** 
(0.205) 
CSE level 0.453*** 
(0.149) 
0.624*** 
(0.241) 
0.627** 
(0.245) 
0.616** 
(0.242) 
None of these 0.509*** 
(0.128) 
0.693*** 
(0.208) 
0.698*** 
(0.211) 
0.690*** 
(0.209) 
Private renters (Ref)     
Home owner -0.218** 
(0.099) 
-0.313 
(0.278) 
-0.320 
(0.280) 
-0.335 
(0.278) 
Social renter 0.273** 
(0.111) 
0.076 
(0.320) 
0.062 
(0.323) 
0.036 
(0.320) 
Married -0.292*** 
(0.078) 
-0.248 
(0.284) 
-0.255 
(0.286) 
-0.229 
(0.283) 
Number of children in HH 0.134*** 
(0.030) 
-0.009 
(0.101) 
-0.011 
(0.102) 
-0.006 
(0.102) 
Poor-V poor health 0.180 
(0.144) 
0.012 
(0.257) 
0.011 
(0.259) 
0.014 
(0.258) 
Non white 0.110 
(0.156) 
0.183 
(0.255) 
0.172 
(0.262) 
0.171 
(0.256) 
Initial condition  
 
1.309*** 
(0.246) 
1.348*** 
(0.518) 
1.333*** 
(0.249) 
Initial condition * Avg. Claimant prop   
 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.065) 
 
 
_cons -2.123*** 
(0.197) 
-3.033*** 
(0.379) 
-2.984*** 
(0.388) 
-2.953*** 
(0.380) 
lnsig2u  
 
-0.080 
(0.290) 
-0.038 
(0.286) 
-0.076 
(0.293) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Averages of time varying covariates  No Yes Yes Yes 
N 7379 7379 7379 7379 
Standard errors in parentheses;* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.5: APEs on lagged unemployment, Waves 1-5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 APE pvalue* APE pvalue** APE pvalue** APE pvalue** 
Wave 2 0.425 0.000 0.098 0.001 0.101 0.000 0.100 0.001 
Wave 3 0.401 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.095 0.001 
Wave 4 0.383 0.000 0.082 0.001 0.077 0.001 0.091 0.001 
Wave 5 0.314 0.000 0.062 0.001 0.055 0.002 0.071 0.001 
Total 0.385 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.090 0.001 
Note: *standard errors based on delta methods; **Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications 
 
Table 2.6: APEs on lagged unemployment by claimant proportion, Waves 1-5 
 (2) 
 APE pvalue* 
Claimant proportion %   
2-4 0.057 0.002 
4-6 0.073 0.001 
6-8 0.088 0.000 
8-10 0.098 0.000 
10-12 0.107 0.000 
12-14 0.115 0.000 
14+ 0.124 0.001 
Test 4-6 vs 2-4 0.016 0.004 
Test 6-8 vs 2-4 0.031 0.001 
Test 8-10 vs 2-4 0.041 0.001 
Test 10-12 vs 2-4 0.051 0.001 
Test 12-14 vs 2-4 0.058 0.003 
Test 14+ vs 2-4 0.067 0.008 
*Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications 
 
Table 2.7: APEs on lagged unemployment by age, Waves 1-5 
 (2) (4) 
 APE pvalue* APE pvalue* 
Age 16-25 0.138 0.000 0.082 0.047 
Age 26-35 0.079 0.001 0.091 0.001 
Age 36-45 0.070 0.001 0.064 0.013 
Age 46-55 0.078 0.002 0.134 0.010 
Test 26-35 vs 16-25 -0.059 0.000 0.009 0.801 
Test 36-45 vs 16-25 -0.068 0.000 -0.018 0.633 
Test 46-55 vs 16-25 -0.060 0.000 0.052 0.329 
* Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications   
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Table 2.8: Model estimates, Waves 9-13 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled probit Wooldridge Unempl inter Age inter 
Unemployed t-1 1.712*** 
(0.090) 
0.894*** 
(0.187) 
0.843** 
(0.389) 
0.821*** 
(0.245) 
Claimant proportion 0.071** 
(0.030) 
-0.092 
(0.119) 
-0.095 
(0.120) 
-0.101 
(0.118) 
Unemployed t-1 * Claimant proportion  
 
 
 
0.018 
(0.121) 
 
 
Age 26-35 -0.285*** 
(0.092) 
-0.361*** 
(0.124) 
-0.362*** 
(0.124) 
-0.367*** 
(0.131) 
Age 35-45 -0.273*** 
(0.098) 
-0.305** 
(0.130) 
-0.306** 
(0.131) 
-0.303** 
(0.136) 
Age 46-55 -0.233** 
(0.113) 
-0.239 
(0.149) 
-0.239 
(0.150) 
-0.306* 
(0.158) 
Unemployed t-1* Age 26-35  
 
 
 
 
 
0.052 
(0.275) 
Unemployed t-1* Age 36-45  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.037 
(0.292) 
Unemployed t-1* Age 46-55  
 
 
 
 
 
0.535 
(0.333) 
Wave 10 (Ref.)     
Wave 11 -0.124 
(0.086) 
-0.199* 
(0.104) 
-0.200* 
(0.104) 
-0.203* 
(0.104) 
Wave 12 0.089 
(0.085) 
0.028 
(0.105) 
0.028 
(0.105) 
0.031 
(0.104) 
Wave 13 -0.085 
(0.096) 
-0.152 
(0.122) 
-0.152 
(0.122) 
-0.163 
(0.122) 
Degree or higher (Ref)      
Other high 0.124 
(0.132) 
0.173 
(0.173) 
0.173 
(0.173) 
0.165 
(0.171) 
A level -0.143 
(0.114) 
-0.136 
(0.147) 
-0.137 
(0.148) 
-0.133 
(0.145) 
O level 0.021 
(0.106) 
0.039 
(0.138) 
0.038 
(0.139) 
0.041 
(0.137) 
CSE level 0.061 
(0.142) 
0.075 
(0.188) 
0.075 
(0.189) 
0.074 
(0.185) 
None of these 0.305*** 
(0.113) 
0.366** 
(0.153) 
0.367** 
(0.154) 
0.356** 
(0.152) 
Private renters (Ref)     
Home owner -0.203* 
(0.108) 
0.058 
(0.250) 
0.061 
(0.251) 
0.047 
(0.247) 
Social renter 0.290** 
(0.120) 
-0.018 
(0.293) 
-0.016 
(0.293) 
-0.036 
(0.291) 
Married -0.326*** 
(0.079) 
-0.158 
(0.270) 
-0.156 
(0.271) 
-0.167 
(0.269) 
Number of children in HH -0.048 
(0.036) 
0.059 
(0.115) 
0.059 
(0.115) 
0.059 
(0.114) 
Poor-V poor health 0.180 
(0.137) 
0.191 
(0.241) 
0.190 
(0.241) 
0.195 
(0.239) 
Non white 0.299* 
(0.163) 
0.370* 
(0.217) 
0.372* 
(0.217) 
0.364* 
(0.214) 
Initial condition  
 
1.146*** 
(0.252) 
1.160*** 
(0.450) 
1.126*** 
(0.250) 
Initial condition * Avg. Claimant prop   
 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.134) 
 
 
_cons -2.008*** 
(0.175) 
-2.504*** 
(0.292) 
-2.503*** 
(0.293) 
-2.478*** 
(0.290) 
lnsig2u  
 
-0.817* 
(0.442) 
-0.804* 
(0.446) 
-0.888* 
(0.461) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Averages of time varying covariates  No Yes Yes Yes 
N 9746 9746 9746 9746 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.9: APEs on lagged unemployment, Waves 9-13 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 APE pvalue* APE pvalue** APE pvalue** APE pvalue** 
Wave 10 0.300 0.000 0.071 0.025 0.071 0.031 0.075 0.026 
Wave 11 0.249 0.000 0.053 0.056 0.053 0.075 0.059 0.055 
Wave 12 0.300 0.000 0.068 0.044 0.067 0.065 0.078 0.039 
Wave 13 0.242 0.000 0.052 0.048 0.052 0.075 0.062 0.044 
Total 0.274 0.000 0.062 0.037 0.061 0.052 0.069 0.035 
Note: *standard errors based on delta methods; **Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications 
 
Table 2.10: APEs on lagged unemployment by claimant proportion, Waves 9-13 
 (2) 
 APE pvalue* 
Claimant proportion %   
0-2 0.047 0.056 
2-4 0.067 0.034 
4-6 0.089 0.023 
6+ 0.102 0.033 
Test 2-4 vs 0-2 0.020 0.026 
Test 4-6 vs 0-2 0.042 0.017 
Test 6+ vs 0-2 0.054 0.079 
*Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications 
 
Table 2.11: APEs on lagged unemployment by age, Waves 9-13 
 (2) (4) 
 APE pvalue* APE pvalue* 
Age 16-25 0.122 0.015 0.112 0.045 
Age 26-35 0.056 0.043 0.055 0.121 
Age 36-45 0.051 0.059 0.042 0.130 
Age 46-55 0.058 0.048 0.115 0.042 
Test 26-35 vs 16-25 -0.066 0.009 -0.056 0.194 
Test 36-45 vs 16-25 -0.072 0.005 -0.069 0.116 
Test 46-55 vs 16-25 -0.065 0.009 0.003 0.949 
* Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications 
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Table 2.12: Model estimates, Waves 16-20 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled probit Wooldridge Unempl inter Age inter 
Unemployed t-1 1.506*** 
(0.110) 
1.016*** 
(0.206) 
1.111*** 
(0.373) 
0.944*** 
(0.258) 
Claimant proportion 0.054 
(0.038) 
0.020 
(0.097) 
0.031 
(0.099) 
0.021 
(0.096) 
Unemployed t-1 * Claimant proportion  
 
 
 
-0.035 
(0.112) 
 
 
Age 26-35 -0.231** 
(0.114) 
-0.242* 
(0.131) 
-0.244* 
(0.132) 
-0.275* 
(0.143) 
Age 35-45 -0.384*** 
(0.120) 
-0.409*** 
(0.143) 
-0.417*** 
(0.144) 
-0.431*** 
(0.152) 
Age 46-55 -0.373*** 
(0.136) 
-0.386** 
(0.160) 
-0.395** 
(0.161) 
-0.410** 
(0.168) 
Unemployed t-1* Age 26-35  
 
 
 
 
 
0.159 
(0.305) 
Unemployed t-1* Age 36-45  
 
 
 
 
 
0.096 
(0.330) 
Unemployed t-1* Age 46-55  
 
 
 
 
 
0.108 
(0.397) 
Wave 17 (Ref.)     
Wave 18 0.075 
(0.104) 
0.096 
(0.120) 
0.093 
(0.120) 
0.096 
(0.120) 
Wave 19 0.285** 
(0.125) 
0.381** 
(0.188) 
0.373** 
(0.188) 
0.380** 
(0.187) 
Wave 20 0.190 
(0.137) 
0.305 
(0.202) 
0.304 
(0.202) 
0.304 
(0.202) 
Degree or higher (Ref)      
Other high 0.049 
(0.187) 
0.079 
(0.211) 
0.087 
(0.211) 
0.076 
(0.209) 
A level 0.089 
(0.129) 
0.071 
(0.149) 
0.076 
(0.149) 
0.069 
(0.147) 
O level 0.110 
(0.126) 
0.106 
(0.144) 
0.114 
(0.145) 
0.102 
(0.143) 
CSE level -0.013 
(0.177) 
-0.019 
(0.203) 
-0.018 
(0.205) 
-0.023 
(0.201) 
None of these 0.464*** 
(0.143) 
0.494*** 
(0.169) 
0.509*** 
(0.170) 
0.487*** 
(0.168) 
Private renters (Ref)     
Home owner -0.193* 
(0.117) 
0.084 
(0.246) 
0.083 
(0.247) 
0.082 
(0.245) 
Social renter 0.419*** 
(0.128) 
0.135 
(0.320) 
0.145 
(0.321) 
0.144 
(0.319) 
Married -0.462*** 
(0.098) 
-0.395 
(0.318) 
-0.409 
(0.318) 
-0.393 
(0.317) 
Number of children in HH 0.103*** 
(0.039) 
0.041 
(0.106) 
0.044 
(0.107) 
0.045 
(0.106) 
Poor-V poor health 0.395** 
(0.179) 
0.151 
(0.276) 
0.153 
(0.275) 
0.146 
(0.275) 
Non white 0.217 
(0.198) 
0.220 
(0.229) 
0.231 
(0.231) 
0.219 
(0.228) 
Initial condition  
 
0.710*** 
(0.243) 
0.046 
(0.496) 
0.698*** 
(0.242) 
Initial condition * Avg. Claimant prop   
 
 
 
0.233 
(0.158) 
 
 
_cons -2.267*** 
(0.209) 
-2.516*** 
(0.312) 
-2.453*** 
(0.315) 
-2.477*** 
(0.318) 
lnsig2u  
 
-1.567** 
(0.756) 
-1.539** 
(0.751) 
-1.652** 
(0.826) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Averages of time varying covariates  No Yes Yes Yes 
N 7463 7463 7463 7463 
Standard errors in parentheses;* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.13: APEs on lagged unemployment, Waves 16-20 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 APE pvalue* APE pvalue** APE pvalue** APE pvalue** 
Wave 17 0.175 0.000 0.069 0.020 0.071 0.031 0.072 0.023 
Wave 18 0.187 0.000 0.073 0.034 0.074 0.038 0.077 0.043 
Wave 19 0.237 0.000 0.099 0.023 0.094 0.026 0.106 0.033 
Wave 20 0.205 0.000 0.084 0.022 0.080 0.029 0.091 0.040 
Total 0.197 0.000 0.079 0.021 0.078 0.022 0.084 0.029 
Note: *standard errors based on delta methods; **Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications  
 
Table 2.14: APEs on lagged unemployment by claimant proportion, Waves 16-20 
 (2) 
 APE pvalue* 
Claimant proportion %   
0-2 0.063 0.034 
2-4 0.082 0.020 
4-6 0.102 0.016 
6+ 0.114 0.020 
Test 2-4 vs 0-2 0.019 0.021 
Test 4-6 vs 0-2 0.039 0.026 
Test 6+ vs 0-2 0.051 0.056 
*Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications 
 
Table 2.15: APEs on lagged unemployment by age, Waves 16-20 
 (2) (4) 
 APE pvalue* APE pvalue* 
Age 16-25 0.159 0.008 0.147 0.021 
Age 26-35 0.092 0.018 0.106 0.066 
Age 36-45 0.064 0.036 0.068 0.123 
Age 46-55 0.060 0.046 0.065 0.273 
Test 26-35 vs 16-25 -0.067 0.015 -0.041 0.503 
Test 36-45 vs 16-25 -0.095 0.004 -0.079 0.213 
Test 46-55 vs 16-25 -0.099 0.005 -0.082 0.255 
* Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications  
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Table 2.16: APEs at fixed values of covariates after Model 2, Waves 1-5 
 State Dependence Pvalue 
Wave 2 0.117 0.007 
Wave 3 0.106 0.009 
Wave 4 0.101 0.011 
Wave 5 0.079 0.019 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications. Covariates are fixed at the following values: aged between 16 
and 25; O-level education; home owners; non married and with no children; not in poor health; from a white ethnic 
background, and living in the Midlands. Claimant proportion is fixed at the wave specific average faced by people 
living in the Midlands.  
Table 2.17: APEs at fixed values of covariates after Model 2, Waves 9-13 
 State Dependence Pvalue 
Wave 10 0.080 0.092 
Wave 11 0.065 0.137 
Wave 12 0.087 0.103 
Wave 13 0.071 0.116 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications. Covariates are fixed at the following values: aged between 16 
and 25; O-level education; home owners; non married and with no children; not in poor health; from a white ethnic 
background, and living in the Midlands. Claimant proportion is fixed at the wave specific average faced by people 
living in the Midlands.  
Table 2.18: APEs at fixed values of covariates after Model 2, Waves 16-20 
 State Dependence Pvalue 
Wave 17 0.111 0.068 
Wave 18 0.126 0.076 
Wave 19 0.176 0.035 
Wave 20 0.163 0.037 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications. Covariates are fixed at the following values: aged between 16 
and 25; O-level education; home owners; non married and with no children; not in poor health; from a white ethnic 
background, and living in the Midlands. Claimant proportion is fixed at the wave specific average faced by people 
living in the Midlands.  
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2.6 Appendix: Complementary Tables 
Table 2.A1: Robustness checks, Model 2, Waves 1-5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Alternative active definition Balanced panel Essex sample No long spell 
Unemployed t-1 0.982*** 
(0.136) 
0.853*** 
(0.170) 
0.909*** 
(0.153) 
0.422** 
(0.194) 
Claimant proportion 0.148** 
(0.060) 
0.206*** 
(0.077) 
0.167** 
(0.067) 
0.077 
(0.071) 
Age 26-35 -0.276** 
(0.123) 
-0.315* 
(0.163) 
-0.392*** 
(0.135) 
-0.442*** 
(0.134) 
Age 35-45 -0.252* 
(0.139) 
-0.570*** 
(0.195) 
-0.432*** 
(0.153) 
-0.469*** 
(0.148) 
Age 46-55 0.068 
(0.157) 
-0.113 
(0.206) 
-0.087 
(0.170) 
-0.158 
(0.162) 
Wave 2 (Ref.)     
Wave 3 -0.071 
(0.083) 
-0.058 
(0.115) 
-0.101 
(0.090) 
-0.068 
(0.091) 
Wave 4 -0.012 
(0.103) 
0.212 
(0.136) 
0.007 
(0.113) 
-0.107 
(0.120) 
Wave 5 -0.117 
(0.135) 
0.113 
(0.172) 
-0.129 
(0.150) 
-0.339** 
(0.162) 
Degree or higher (Ref)      
Other high 0.068 
(0.254) 
0.029 
(0.377) 
0.080 
(0.288) 
0.056 
(0.255) 
A level 0.399** 
(0.185) 
0.766*** 
(0.261) 
0.522** 
(0.209) 
0.407** 
(0.186) 
O level 0.362** 
(0.181) 
0.572** 
(0.256) 
0.462** 
(0.204) 
0.350* 
(0.182) 
CSE level 0.495** 
(0.219) 
0.702** 
(0.296) 
0.624*** 
(0.241) 
0.401* 
(0.222) 
None of these 0.621*** 
(0.184) 
0.950*** 
(0.265) 
0.693*** 
(0.208) 
0.461** 
(0.187) 
Private renters (Ref)     
Home owner -0.402 
(0.259) 
-0.507* 
(0.306) 
-0.313 
(0.278) 
-0.344 
(0.289) 
Social renter 0.009 
(0.295) 
-0.031 
(0.366) 
0.076 
(0.320) 
-0.069 
(0.338) 
Married -0.158 
(0.241) 
-0.334 
(0.318) 
-0.248 
(0.284) 
-0.287 
(0.289) 
Number of children in HH 0.028 
(0.093) 
0.141 
(0.121) 
-0.009 
(0.101) 
-0.044 
(0.107) 
Poor-V poor health 0.258 
(0.220) 
-0.044 
(0.319) 
0.012 
(0.257) 
0.079 
(0.270) 
Non white 0.277 
(0.220) 
-0.151 
(0.368) 
0.183 
(0.255) 
0.151 
(0.245) 
Initial condition 1.321*** 
(0.221) 
1.194*** 
(0.249) 
1.309*** 
(0.246) 
0.716*** 
(0.226) 
_cons -2.792*** 
(0.326) 
-3.297*** 
(0.446) 
-3.033*** 
(0.379) 
-2.735*** 
(0.367) 
lnsig2u -0.119 
(0.257) 
-0.147 
(0.309) 
-0.080 
(0.290) 
-0.529 
(0.412) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Averages of time varying covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7585 6284 7379 7110 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.A2: APEs after robustness checks, Waves 1-5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 APE APE APE APE 
Wave 2 0.121 0.069 0.098 0.037 
Wave 3 0.113 0.064 0.088 0.033 
Wave 4 0.104 0.069 0.082 0.028 
Wave 5 0.085 0.054 0.062 0.018 
Total 0.107 0.064 0.084 0.030 
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Table 2.A3: Robustness checks, Model 2, Waves 9-13 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Alternative active definition Balanced panel Essex sample No long spell 
Unemployed t-1 0.881*** 
(0.159) 
0.919*** 
(0.217) 
0.920*** 
(0.237) 
0.444** 
(0.218) 
Claimant proportion 0.001 
(0.113) 
0.084 
(0.151) 
-0.092 
(0.139) 
-0.189 
(0.125) 
Age 26-35 -0.290** 
(0.124) 
-0.344** 
(0.155) 
-0.198 
(0.152) 
-0.415*** 
(0.131) 
Age 35-45 -0.259* 
(0.134) 
-0.266 
(0.163) 
-0.285* 
(0.170) 
-0.342** 
(0.138) 
Age 46-55 -0.153 
(0.154) 
-0.154 
(0.181) 
-0.137 
(0.186) 
-0.323** 
(0.160) 
Wave 10 (Ref.)     
Wave 11 -0.094 
(0.098) 
-0.309** 
(0.153) 
0.007 
(0.130) 
-0.224** 
(0.110) 
Wave 12 0.078 
(0.103) 
0.239* 
(0.133) 
0.132 
(0.133) 
0.018 
(0.111) 
Wave 13 -0.033 
(0.116) 
0.084 
(0.147) 
-0.009 
(0.148) 
-0.167 
(0.129) 
Degree or higher (Ref)      
Other high 0.159 
(0.187) 
0.209 
(0.194) 
0.351 
(0.213) 
0.152 
(0.183) 
A level -0.033 
(0.153) 
-0.117 
(0.167) 
-0.154 
(0.188) 
-0.107 
(0.153) 
O level 0.070 
(0.148) 
-0.103 
(0.163) 
0.032 
(0.173) 
0.034 
(0.146) 
CSE level 0.189 
(0.196) 
-0.099 
(0.237) 
0.194 
(0.217) 
0.105 
(0.196) 
None of these 0.445*** 
(0.161) 
0.206 
(0.184) 
0.427** 
(0.197) 
0.338** 
(0.163) 
Private renters (Ref)     
Home owner 0.088 
(0.247) 
0.179 
(0.297) 
0.163 
(0.311) 
-0.030 
(0.273) 
Social renter -0.149 
(0.278) 
0.668* 
(0.380) 
0.344 
(0.367) 
-0.057 
(0.331) 
Married 0.227 
(0.239) 
-0.130 
(0.313) 
0.023 
(0.309) 
-0.213 
(0.280) 
Number of children in HH 0.017 
(0.101) 
-0.248* 
(0.141) 
0.137 
(0.143) 
0.045 
(0.122) 
Poor-V poor health 0.226 
(0.208) 
0.275 
(0.305) 
0.344 
(0.299) 
0.097 
(0.255) 
Non white 0.451** 
(0.218) 
-0.017 
(0.334) 
0.205 
(0.250) 
0.407* 
(0.224) 
Initial condition 1.461*** 
(0.240) 
1.124*** 
(0.264) 
1.090*** 
(0.311) 
0.982*** 
(0.260) 
_cons -2.901*** 
(0.307) 
-2.435*** 
(0.326) 
-2.753*** 
(0.371) 
-2.685*** 
(0.329) 
lnsig2u -0.357 
(0.309) 
-0.912* 
(0.483) 
-0.844 
(0.569) 
-0.725 
(0.465) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Averages of time varying covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9948 8324 7002 9640 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.A4: APEs after robustness checks, Waves 9-13 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 APE APE APE APE 
Wave 10 0.068 0.051 0.057 0.024 
Wave 11 0.059 0.031 0.056 0.017 
Wave 12 0.067 0.066 0.065 0.023 
Wave 13 0.058 0.053 0.052 0.018 
Total 0.063 0.050 0.058 0.021 
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Table 2.A5: Robustness checks, Model 2, Waves 16-20 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Alternative active definition Balanced panel Essex sample No long spell 
Unemployed t-1 0.858*** 
(0.178) 
1.029*** 
(0.261) 
1.248*** 
(0.259) 
0.550** 
(0.231) 
Claimant proportion 0.010 
(0.092) 
-0.080 
(0.135) 
0.095 
(0.118) 
0.106 
(0.093) 
Age 26-35 -0.173 
(0.134) 
-0.195 
(0.190) 
-0.183 
(0.161) 
-0.334*** 
(0.126) 
Age 35-45 -0.276* 
(0.143) 
-0.308 
(0.195) 
-0.238 
(0.168) 
-0.482*** 
(0.136) 
Age 46-55 -0.355** 
(0.164) 
-0.320 
(0.210) 
-0.282 
(0.190) 
-0.511*** 
(0.154) 
Wave 17 (Ref.)     
Wave 18 0.121 
(0.112) 
0.234 
(0.175) 
0.152 
(0.142) 
-0.001 
(0.120) 
Wave 19 0.416** 
(0.182) 
0.599** 
(0.279) 
0.274 
(0.217) 
0.222 
(0.181) 
Wave 20 0.341* 
(0.195) 
0.550* 
(0.293) 
0.027 
(0.241) 
0.125 
(0.194) 
Degree or higher (Ref)      
Other high 0.125 
(0.214) 
0.269 
(0.228) 
0.386* 
(0.230) 
0.035 
(0.195) 
A level 0.107 
(0.153) 
0.068 
(0.182) 
0.178 
(0.182) 
0.016 
(0.137) 
O level 0.135 
(0.149) 
0.222 
(0.170) 
0.268 
(0.173) 
0.070 
(0.133) 
CSE level 0.041 
(0.207) 
0.125 
(0.241) 
-0.051 
(0.252) 
-0.107 
(0.195) 
None of these 0.542*** 
(0.177) 
0.482** 
(0.212) 
0.474** 
(0.210) 
0.446*** 
(0.156) 
Private renters (Ref)     
Home owner -0.020 
(0.233) 
0.143 
(0.286) 
0.096 
(0.279) 
0.032 
(0.237) 
Social renter -0.054 
(0.272) 
0.129 
(0.424) 
0.327 
(0.373) 
0.171 
(0.328) 
Married -0.376 
(0.306) 
-0.172 
(0.347) 
-0.482 
(0.380) 
-0.543* 
(0.311) 
Number of children in HH 0.013 
(0.100) 
-0.066 
(0.128) 
0.110 
(0.132) 
-0.007 
(0.108) 
Poor-V poor health -0.058 
(0.241) 
-0.310 
(0.372) 
0.218 
(0.361) 
0.128 
(0.287) 
Non white 0.401* 
(0.223) 
0.342 
(0.260) 
0.079 
(0.257) 
0.234 
(0.215) 
Initial condition 1.281*** 
(0.245) 
0.773*** 
(0.286) 
0.562* 
(0.294) 
0.427* 
(0.228) 
_cons -2.781*** 
(0.324) 
-2.715*** 
(0.424) 
-2.278*** 
(0.344) 
-2.081*** 
(0.282) 
lnsig2u -0.702* 
(0.397) 
-1.686* 
(0.949) 
-2.433 
(1.893) 
-2.811 
(2.096) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Averages of time varying covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7637 5452 5256 7397 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.A6: APEs after robustness checks, Waves 16-20 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 APE APE APE APE 
Wave 17 0.056 0.052 0.099 0.028 
Wave 18 0.060 0.068 0.121 0.027 
Wave 19 0.078 0.096 0.149 0.041 
Wave 20 0.068 0.088 0.103 0.032 
Total 0.064 0.076 0.117 0.031 
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Chapter 3  
 
 
Retirement and Cognitive Abilities 
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3.1 Introduction 
In a context within which extending working life is a priority in the UK policy agenda, with the 
state pension age (SPA) gradually rising to 67 and potentially 68 for men and women 
(Department for Work and Pension 2013), a study of the consequences of retirement on 
cognitive capital is relevant for at least three reasons. First, there is an association between the 
process of accumulation and deterioration of human capital with that of cognitive capital 
(Rohwedder and Willis, 2010). Studying the extent to which retirement affects the deterioration 
of cognitive capital is therefore important in order to understand and potentially contrast human 
capital depreciation during various phases of old age (Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2012). Second, 
there is evidence that cognitive abilities, in particular numeracy, are strongly related to financial 
literacy. Although causation is still under debate, the relevance of this relationship is enhanced 
by a context in which social provisions shrink and private pensions and savings become 
increasingly important sources of income for the elderly (Banks and Oldfield, 2007). Third, 
cognitive measures are shown to be significantly correlated with health outcomes.  Reviewing 
previous studies, Deary (2012) reports that cognitive capital is inversely associated with different 
causes of mortality such as cardiovascular disease, suicide, homicide and accidents, while 
Salthouse (2012) highlights a significant association between cognitive functioning and the 
ability of elderly people to live independently, experiencing a lower risk of depression and facing 
better general health. 
In this paper we analyse the extent to which retirement influences the cognitive performances of 
older workers in Britain, and explore the existence of heterogeneous effects across gender, 
education level and job type. The analysis makes use of data from Wave 3 of Understanding 
Society and, following the approach proposed by Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012), estimates the 
relationship between time spent in retirement and cognitive decline using an Instrumental 
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Variable (IV) approach. The contribution of this paper to the limited UK-based literature is 
twofold. First, we employ a novel dataset in an area of research which mainly uses data from the 
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). Second, we add to existing UK evidence by 
analysing men and women separately and exploring the heterogeneity of the retirement-induced 
cognitive decline across various levels of education and type of work performed.  
We find that retirement worsens cognitive decline for both men and women, although the 
estimated coefficients indicate smaller effects among females. In particular, depending on the 
cognitive measure analysed, an extra year in retirement is predicted to generate a decline of 
between 0.035 and 0.089 of a standard deviation for men and between 0.015 and 0.048 for 
women. We also find that, among the latter, those employed in routine occupations face a lower 
retirement-induced cognitive decline and could potentially benefit from it. 
Given that postponing retirement is predicted to be potentially beneficial for the cognitive capital 
of older workers, our results advocate the importance of keeping an active and mentally 
stimulating lifestyle following retirement. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the theoretical background and reviews 
a number of relevant studies on the relationship between retirement and cognitive decline. 
Section 3.3 briefly introduces the UK system of public support for older people. Data and 
methodology are described in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5 we report the results of our analysis and 
carry out robustness checks. Conclusions follow. 
3.2 Background and review of the literature 
According to the model proposed by Cattell and Horn (Horn and Cattell, 1966), what is 
commonly known as general intelligence can be considered to be the result of the interaction of 
different factors. Among these factors, fluid intelligence and crystallised intelligence are the 
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main ones. Fluid intelligence is the ability to deal logically with new and/or unfamiliar 
situations. It usually involves processes of abstraction, categorization and placing objects/events 
in relation to one another. Fluid intelligence is assumed to work independently from previously 
held knowledge. Crystallised intelligence is the ability to employ previously acquired knowledge 
and experiences and it is relevant for tasks such as those involving vocabulary (Gustafsson, 
1984; Salthouse, 2010; Horn and Cattell, 1966). 
Although ageing is correlated with cognitive decline, a consensus exists in the psychology 
literature on different cognitive functions evolving heterogeneously with age.  In particular, 
Salthouse (2010) shows that the decline of cognitive functions related to fluid intelligence starts 
in early adulthood, while crystallised intelligence tends to increase well into adulthood and 
begins to decline after the age of 60.  
Rohwedder and Willis (2010) develop a parallelism between the process of the development of 
human capital as modelled by Ben-Porath (1967) and the development of fluid and crystallised 
intelligence over time. In particular, the authors argue that the main inputs of the human capital 
production function, which are ability, current stock of human capital, and other purchased 
inputs, can be seen, respectively, as fluid intelligence, crystallised intelligence, and involvement 
in activities which facilitate human capital formation such as schooling and on-the-job training. 
In this context, the stock of human capital evolves according to the rates of investment and 
depreciation of human capital, where the latter can be interpreted as losing crystallised 
knowledge. Investments in human capital formation and involvement in activities that stimulate 
cognitive processes are therefore expected to counterbalance the ageing related human capital 
depreciation. 26  
                                                 
26
 See also Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) for a formalised model of the formation of cognitive capital. 
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Within this framework, Rohwedder and Willis (2010) predict that retirement may negatively 
influence the process of depreciation of cognitive capital for two reasons. First, according to the 
“unengaged lifestyle” or “use it or lose it” hypothesis, retirement might provide a less 
cognitively stimulating environment than working, with the consequent worsening of the 
cognitive capital ageing profile. Second, if returns to work-related cognitive capital fall as 
retirement age approaches, it is also possible for workers to start reducing investments in 
cognitive capital while still working. The authors call this hypothesis “on the job retirement”.  
From an empirical point of view, the endogeneity of retirement decisions with respect to 
cognitive performances represents the main challenge for the identification of the causal effect of 
retirement on cognitive abilities. The issue is often solved using retirement eligibility rules as 
instruments for the retirement decision. A number of papers have applied this strategy to pooled 
cross-country data, relying on cross-country variations in early and standard retirement age to 
address the endogeneity. The results are mixed, with evidence in favour of both negative and 
non-significant effects of retirement on cognitive performance (Rohwedder and Willis, 2010; 
Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2012; Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2014; Coe and Zamarro, 2011).  
Rohwedder and Willis (2010) pool 2004 data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement 
in Europe (SHARE) which contains data from 11 EU countries27; the US Health and Retirement 
Survey (HRS); and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). They find evidence that 
retirement negatively impacts cognitive abilities measured as the combined result of an 
immediate and delayed word recall test. Using the same SHARE data, Mazzonna and Peracchi 
(2012) employ a similar identification strategy although retirement is now allowed to change the 
slope of the cognitive capital age profile rather than shifting it. While in Rohwedder and Willis 
(2010) retirement enters the analysis as a binary indicator variable, which implies that retirement 
                                                 
27
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. 
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generates a shift in the age profile of cognitive decline, in Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) a 
continuous measure of time since retirement is used as an endogenous regressor and time elapsed 
since eligibility for early and standard pensions as instrumental variables. Moreover, the study 
conducts separated analysis by gender and uses five different measures of cognitive abilities. The 
authors show evidence that retirement worsens the rate of decline of cognitive capital, although 
the effects are heterogeneous across gender. The authors also find that the level of education 
influences cognitive performances at older ages and that low educated women tend to experience 
a stronger decline in cognitive performance after retirement than more highly educated women. 
Mazzonna and Peracchi (2014) extend their previous analysis by modelling the effect of 
retirement both as a binary treatment and as a slope effect and, exploiting the longitudinal 
dimension of SHARE, by estimating a first difference instrumental variable model. The results 
confirm the existence of a negative effect of retirement on cognitive decline, while a beneficial 
immediate effect of retirement is identified only for manual workers. By contrast, using 2004 
SHARE data, and focusing on men only, Coe and Zamarro (2011) find evidence of retirement 
improving general health but not cognitive measures, measured by immediate and delayed recall 
tests and a verbal fluency test.  
However, as reported in Bonsang et al. (2012), country specific cultural and institutional 
characteristics are likely to influence both the age profile of cognitive abilities and the settings 
governing retirement rules. The authors report that citizens from northern countries tend to 
perform better than their southern counterparts in various health outcomes and that they face 
higher retirement ages. If differences in the eligibility ages for retirement failed to explain such 
patterns across countries then the exclusion restrictions would be invalid and the effects of 
retirement on cognitive abilities over-estimated. In this sense, although the use of country-fixed 
effects is likely to mitigate the problem, single country studies are likely to be more suitable than 
cross-country ones for this kind of analysis. 
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US-based evidence provides mixed results. On the one hand, using HRS data, Coe et al. (2012) 
show a limited impact of retirement on cognitive outcomes, and highlight the heterogeneity of 
such effects between typologies of workers. In particular, the authors show that the cognitive 
performances of white collars are not significantly affected by retirement once the endogeneity 
of retirement decision is accounted for, while retirement emerges to be positive for blue collar 
workers. Within the “use it or lose it” hypothesis, the authors interpret the finding as blue collar 
workers being able to access more cognitively stimulating activities during retirement than 
whilst still working, while white collars do not experience a significant reduction in the exposure 
to such activities. On the other hand, basing their analysis on a panel dataset of American 
respondents to the HRS, Bonsang et al. (2012) estimate a fixed effect model with instrumental 
variables, where the issue of endogeneity of retirement decisions is accounted for by using two 
indicator variables for having reached the age of 62 and of 65 as instruments. The authors 
account for a delayed effect of retirement on cognitive abilities by defining the endogenous 
independent variable as being retired for at least one year, and in different specifications also use 
time since retirement as endogenous variable, and time since the age 62/65 thresholds as 
instruments. The analysis shows evidence in favour of a worsening of the age profile of 
cognitive measures after retirement. 
UK-based studies suggest the presence of negative effects of retirement on cognitive measures, 
although the evidence is quite limited. Adam et al. (2007) apply a stochastic frontier approach 
for 2004 data from ELSA for the UK, HRS for the US and SHARE, separately. The results 
indicate a worsening in cognitive efficiency with time spent in retirement. Behncke (2012) 
applies non parametrical IV and matching techniques to ELSA data in order to analyse the health 
effects of retirement. Modelling retirement effects as discrete shifts, the author finds evidence 
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that retirement increases the probability of experiencing a cognitive functioning problem 
measured through the word recall test and awareness of current date.28 
Using data from Understanding Society, this paper analyses the role of retirement in influencing 
the cognitive performances of older workers in Britain. Additionally, we explore the existence of 
heterogeneous effects across gender, education level and job type. Following Mazzonna and 
Peracchi (2012), we adopt an IV approach and use time elapsed since state pension age as 
instrumental variable for the time spent in retirement. The next section briefly describes the 
functioning and evolution of the system of public support for older people in the UK. 
3.3 Retirement age and state pension age in the UK 
State pension age is the age at which the basic state pension and a number of other benefits 
become available for older people. Introduced in 1946 and effective from 1948, the UK basic 
state pension has been designed as a flat rate benefit aimed at providing a basic level of resources 
to pensioners. Eligibility is based on both age and contribution history, with female state pension 
age (SPA) originally set at 60 and male SPA at 65. Earnings-related pensions, flat rate non-
contributory benefits and a number of means-tested benefits complete the public system of 
support for pensioners. 
A process of reform of the system of public support of elderly people is ongoing. Over the years, 
budgetary considerations have not only prevented the full development of earnings related 
pensions, but also eroded the capacity of the basic state pension to guarantee minimum 
subsistence levels to all pensioners, with the consequent increase of the relevance of means-
tested benefits aimed at older people. Current reforms, such as the phasing in of the New State 
                                                 
28Focusing on different health outcomes, Johnston and Lee (2009) apply a regression discontinuity analysis around 
age 65 to a pooled data of the 1997-2005 Health Survey for England (HSE). The authors find evidence that 
retirement has a beneficial effect on mental health, measured by the GHQ-12 questionnaire.  
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Pension in April 2016, aim at re-establishing the Beveridgean nature of the state pension system 
(see Bozio et al., 2010 for further details on the development of the public system of support for 
pensioners).  
The process of reform has also involved an increase in the state pension age. In particular, under 
the provisions of the 1995 Pension Act, female state pension age is currently increasing from 60 
to 63 years of age. Women born between 6th April and 5th May 1950 have been the first to be 
affected by the reform, reaching eligibility on the 6th May 2010, with the state pension age 
spanning from 60 years and a day to 60 years and a month. Women born on each following 
month have faced a further one month increase in the state pension age, until a state pension age 
of 63 is reached by women born between 6th March and 5th April 1953 who gained eligibility on 
6th March 2016. Under the provision of the 2011 Pension Act, female state pension age will 
increase faster for those born after the 6th April 1953, until catching-up with male state pension 
age of 65. The state pension age for men and women is then due to reach 66 for those born 
between 6th October 1954 and 5th April 1950, and to further increase to 67 under the Pension 
Act 2014, and to the age of 68 under the 2007 Pension Act (Department for Work and Pension 
2013).  Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of state pension ages over time. 
It should be noted that no compulsory retirement is attached to the state pension age. Although 
until 2006 employers had the possibility to set retirement ages for their employees, the adoption 
of a Framework Directive of the European Commission led to the 2006 Employment Equality 
(Age) Regulations, which prohibited any unjustified direct and indirect age discrimination. As a 
consequence, employers lost their ability to set retirement ages for their employees below a 
default retirement age of 65, except if objectively justified. Different from a compulsory 
retirement age, workers could work past the default retirement age if in agreement with the 
employer. The default retirement age was abolished in 2011, prohibiting employers from forcing 
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employees into retirement on the ground of age, although this included the provision of 
objectively justified exceptions (Pyper, 2013). 
State pension age is, hence, the age at which state retirement benefits become available and 
traditionally represents the age at which an important part of the labour force enters retirement 
(Bound and Waidmann, 2007). In our analysis we use state pension age as an instrumental 
variable for retirement decisions, and its relevance is further discussed in Section 3.4.3. 
3.4 Data and methods 
3.4.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
In this paper we analyse the extent to which retirement influences cognitive decline in the UK. 
The analysis makes use of Wave 3 data from Understanding Society, the UK Household 
Longitudinal Study (UKHLS)29. Starting in January 2009, Understanding Society is a large 
household panel survey which annually re-interviews adult (16 and older) and young (10-15) 
household members, collecting information on a great variety of household and individual 
circumstances and on their evolution over time. The General Population Sample (GPS) used in 
this analysis is based on a proportionally stratified clustered sample of addresses for England, 
Scotland and Wales and on a systematic, unclustered, random sample of addresses for Northern 
Ireland. The GPS sample contained just over 26 thousand households in wave 1, with above 43 
thousand individuals giving full or proxy interviews.  
A cognitive ability module was issued in the third wave of Understanding Society. The module 
contains a number of cognitive tests administered consistently with other surveys such as the 
English Longitudinal Survey of Aging (ELSA). Wave 3 fieldwork spanned from January 2011 to 
July 2013, with a household response rate of 75.3 percent in Great Britain and 79.1 percent in 
                                                 
29
 University of Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research, NatCen Social Research. (2014b). 
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Northern Ireland and more than 33 thousand adult individuals with a full or a proxy interviews 
(see Knies, 2014 for further details).  
Despite the cross-sectional nature of the data used in this paper might represent a potential 
limitation, the use of data from Understanding Society is one of the novelties of this work in an 
area of research in which the scarce UK-based evidence is mainly based on data from ELSA. 
Although the panel dimension is available in ELSA, it should be noted that the use of panel data 
in this field of research is complicated by evidence on a positive learning effects when the same 
test is administered to the same individuals over time (Mazzonna and Peracchi 2012). 
In our estimation sample we include fully respondent individuals aged between 50 and 70 (both 
included) reporting to have ever worked and to be either active in the labour market or retired.30 
We exclude unusually early retired individuals by dropping those whose retirement started 
before the age of 50. Labour market status is defined by combining the information on whether 
the respondent was in work or temporarily out of work in the week before the interview and that 
on the self-reported current labour market status. Any respondent with a contradictory status is 
excluded from the estimation sample. We also exclude from our sample individuals whose 
retirement date is either missing or inconsistent with the information on labour market status 
provided in previous waves, or those who have missing values on any of the variables used in the 
analysis.  
Panel A of Table 3.1 summarises the characteristics of the resulting sample. The average age is 
close to 60, with retired averaging 66-years-old and non-retired 57-years-old, respectively. Males 
account for 47 percent of our estimation sample, while about one third of our respondents are 
retired. The proportion of retired respondents is slightly higher among females than males, 
arguably because females are subject to a lower state pension age. Years since retirement and 
                                                 
30
 As a robustness check we extended the sample by including people up to the age of 80, see Section 3.5.3. 
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years since the state pension age measure the number of years elapsed since retirement occurred 
or the state pension age was reached. Both variables are originally measured in months and 
divided by 12. The variables take value of 0 if respondents are respectively non retired or 
younger than the state pension age. Data from annual history questions in Waves 1 to 3 are used 
to retrieve information on the retirement age.31 
One quarter of our sample is low qualified, measured as having no-qualifications or other 
qualification as opposed to highly qualified respondents, defined as those with GCSEs or above. 
Such proportions are similar across genders but not across retirement statuses, with 36 percent of 
retired people reporting to be low qualified as opposed to 23 percent of non-retired respondents. 
Controlling for heterogeneity in cognitive decline with respect to education might be important 
as Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) show evidence of less educated women experiencing a 
stronger decline than the rest of their sample.  
The proportion of individuals performing, or who performed in the last job, a routine task is 11 
percent. The Job National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) is used to classify 
a job as “routine” as opposite to non-routine. While the proportion of people employed in routine 
jobs is constant across retirement statuses, a higher proportion of males enter in this category 
compared to females – 14 percent versus 9 percent, respectively. Occupation type is shown to 
affect retirement induced cognitive decline, with Coe et al. (2012) reporting evidence of 
                                                 
31
 The date on which the respondent left their last job is used to measure retirement for respondents who were 
interviewed for the first time in wave 2 or wave 3 of Understanding Society. Also, being the day of birth not 
available and day of retirement either not available if someone retired before wave 1 or often missing if someone 
retired after that we choose to measure both variables in months. Finally, as explained in section 3.3, reforms in state 
pension age are implemented according to the date of birth, with cut-off points set on the 6th day of each month. 
Being the day of birth not available we apply state pension age rules relative to those born between, say, 6th April 
and 6th May of a given year to all those born in April of that year, while those born between 1st and 5th May of that 
year will follow state pension age rules related to those born between 6th May and 5th June. Consequently, if rules 
state that respondents become eligible on the 6th day of a given month, we apply that month as the one in which 
state pension age is reached. These assumptions, which are entirely data driven, are equivalent to implying that all 
women born in April 1950 will reach state pension age at the age of 60 and one month; those born in May 1950 will 
reach state pension age at the age of 60 and two months, and so on. Being the misclassification driven by the day of 
birth in a given month, we can assume this to be random and hence not biasing our estimates. Moreover, the 
consequences of misclassification should not be relevant in size, as the differences in state pension age for people 
born in consecutive months are usually contained to one or two months.  
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heterogeneity between blue collar and white collar workers in the US, and Mazzonna and 
Peracchi (2014) showing that cognitive decline affect workers from manual occupations 
differently.32 
Three quarters of our sample live with a partner, with a higher prevalence among males than 
females (81 percent versus 71 percent). Living with a partner is expected to mitigate cognitive 
decline as it could arguably encourage individuals to maintain active cognitive functioning 
(Mazzuco et al. 2013). 81 percent of our sample reports to be in good general health although the 
prevalence is higher among non-retired than retired individuals (83 percent versus 77 percent). 
If, on the one hand, general health is likely to suffer endogeneity issues, its introduction might 
help in disentangling the role of age related health decline. Finally, Table 3.1 also contains the 
proportion of respondents living in each of the countries of the UK. Specifically, 83 percent of 
the respondents live in England, 8 percent in Scotland, while the rests are equally split between 
Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Following Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012), we use four measures of cognitive ability throughout 
our analysis. (i) Immediate recall and (ii) delayed recall tests measure the number of correct 
answers to a test consisting of a computer reading a list of 10 words and the respondent having to 
remember as many of them as possible. While in the immediate recall test the respondent is 
asked to lists the words immediately after hearing them, in the delayed recall test the respondent 
is asked to do so after other cognitive tests have been performed. Both immediate and delayed 
recall tests are expected to assess episodic memory. (iii) Numeric ability is assessed by a test 
requiring the respondent to perform some simple numerical operations related to the use of 
numbers in everyday life. In particular, a set of three questions is submitted to all respondents. In 
the event that the respondent makes one or more mistakes in answering these three questions, an 
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 Including the workers employed in semi-routine occupations in the routine category does not significantly affect 
the results of the paper. Results are available on demand from the author. 
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extra question is asked in a second round. If the respondent gives three correct answers, a fourth 
and eventually a fifth question are asked. We use the number of correct answers to measure 
numeric ability. This measure is expected to be related to wealth and financial literacy. (iv) 
Verbal fluency is measured by the number of correct answers in a test consisting of respondents 
naming as many animals as possible in one minute. Verbal fluency measures aspects of 
executive functioning, and it requires mental flexibility, organization and abstract abilities (see 
McFall, 2013 and papers cited therein). 
Panel B of Table 3.1 shows that male respondents perform better than females in numeric ability 
(3.99 versus 3.54 in raw scores) and, to a lesser extent, in verbal fluency (22.50 versus 22.18 in 
raw scores). By contrast, females outperform males in both immediate and delayed recall, with a 
raw score of 6.40 versus 6.10, and 5.32 versus 4.90, respectively. Important differences also 
emerge when we compare cognitive performances of retired and non-retired respondents, with 
the latter outperforming retired people in all the cognitive tests considered. 
Figure 3.2 shows the presence of a negative age profile in cognitive measures, with gender 
differences holding across the age distribution. A negative relationship also emerges by plotting 
cognitive performances against years spent in retirement (Figure 3.3). 
Since years in retirement is positively correlated with age, this evidence is expected. Similarly to 
Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012), we therefore further investigate the relationship between age, 
retirement, and cognitive performance by differentiating the age-profile of the cognitive tests 
between retired and non-retired individuals. For both males (Figure 3.4) and females (Figure 
3.5), we observe that at later ages retired individuals tend to perform worse than non-retired 
ones, whilst the opposite is true at earlier ages. In particular, whilst for men the cut-off point is 
close to the age of 65, for women this happens at approximately 60 years of age, with the 
exception of numeric ability. This evidence suggests that people who are already retired at ages 
 120 
 
below the state pension age outperform those of a similar age who are active in the labour 
market, whilst the opposite applies to people who are above the SPA. Figure 3.6, where we plot 
the age profile of cognitive performances by retirement status and duration of retirement, 
confirms this finding.  
The graphical evidence reveals that retired individuals experience a sharper decline in their 
cognitive scores over time than similarly aged people who are active in the labour market. This 
evidence is, however, partly in contrast with Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) who show that 
retired people perform worse than working people across the age distribution. A positive 
selection into early retirement in the UK might entail better performances of early retired 
individuals compared with active individuals of a similar age. Supportive evidence is provided in 
Table 3.2 where we summarise individual characteristics and test performances by gender, 
retirement status, and whether the respondent is above or below the state pension age. For both 
males and females it emerges that individuals who are retired and below the SPA perform better 
than any other group in all the cognitive measures, showing also the lowest prevalence of low 
qualification and routine jobs. In the UK, early-retirement therefore appears to be a status in 
which better off people tend to select. The finding is consistent with Blundell et al. (2002), who 
show how the incentives embedded in occupational pensions increase the probability that 
eligible people retire earlier than the state pension age. The positive selection into early 
retirement is likely to introduce an attenuation bias in our naïve OLS estimates since intuitively 
early retirees have a positive number of months in retirement and score highly in cognitive 
measures.  
Although the descriptive evidence is consistent with the existence of a cognitive decline induced 
by retirement, the phenomenon could also be driven by reverse causality issues – people retire 
when cognitive abilities decline. Furthermore, another driver could be the correlation between 
retirement and ageing – retired individuals are, on average, older than non-retired individuals and 
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have therefore experienced a greater cognitive decline. In the remainder of the analysis we 
employ an instrumental variable approach to mitigate the confounding effects described above 
and to identify the causal effect of retirement on cognitive performances. 
3.4.2 Identification strategy 
In this paper, we study how retirement influences cognitive decline in the UK. The endogeneity 
of retirement with respect to cognitive decline represents the main identification issue in 
determining the causal effect of retirement on cognitive capital. Whilst retirement can influence 
the cognitive decline through “use it or lose it” or “on the job retirement” arguments (Rohwedder 
and Willis, 2010), it is also possible for people who experience cognitive decline to be pushed 
into retirement. Consistent with previous literature, we employ eligibility rules for state pension 
age as an instrument for retirement decisions (e.g., Rohwedder and Willis, 2010; Mazzonna and 
Peracchi, 2012; Coe and Zamarro, 2011).  
First, following Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) in particular, for each cognitive measure used we 
estimate an OLS regression of the form described in equation (1): 
J = K' + K 3L
 + K% M
N +  OP  + Q         = 1, … ,                               (1) 
where J measures the standardised test score for the individual , 3L
 is the age at the time of 
the interview, M
N measures the number of years elapsed since retirement and O is a vector of 
individual characteristics. Years spent in retirement are set to 0 if the respondent is not yet 
retired, such that M
N = R&S(0, 3L
 − M
3L
). Both age and years since retirement are 
originally measured in months and divided by 12. We estimate different sets of regressions for 
men and women. 
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Second, since the OLS estimates are likely to suffer from the endogeneity of retirement with 
respect to cognitive decline, we then use the time elapsed since state pension age as an 
instrumental variable for years spent in retirement. In particular we define the instrument as 
TU&N = R&S(0, 3L
 − T43)                                                                              (2) 
where T43 captures the state pension age of the -th individual. While the coefficient on age 
(K) is expected to capture the age-related cognitive decline in the absence of retirement, the 
coefficient on years since retirement (K%) – instrumented by years elapsed since SPA – measures 
the additional cognitive decline which is imputable to retirement. Given the positive selection 
into early retirement observed in our data, we expect the OLS estimates to be affected by 
attenuation bias, and, hence, for the coefficient on years since retirement estimated using OLS to 
be smaller in size (less negative) than the one estimated using IV. 33  
Following previous literature (Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2014), our identification strategy 
assumes linearity of age-related cognitive decline. This is a reasonable assumption given the age 
range in our analysis, 50 to 70 years, and results from previous studies (Coe and Zamarro, 2011). 
However, we perform robustness checks of the linearity assumption in Section 3.5.3.  
3.4.3 Instrument validity 
As previously mentioned, we deal with the potential endogeneity of retirement using the time 
elapsed since the state pension age as an instrument.  
                                                 
33
 Our interest lies in analysing the extent to which retirement determines changes in age-related cognitive decline. 
A pure regression discontinuity approach which compares individuals who are just above or just below the state 
pension age threshold is therefore not informative in our setting. A different approach could consist in exploiting the 
increase in SPA for women and, hence, comparing two women of the same age with different elapsed time periods 
since SPA. Given the cross sectional nature of our dataset and that the SPA reform maps age, this could only be 
done by exploiting the fact that wave 3 interviews spanned over two years. Hence, it is possible for some women 
born in two consecutive years to report the same age at the date of interview and different elapsed time since SPA if 
affected by the reform. The number of women falling into this category is, however, small and, given the smooth 
implementation of the SPA increase, the differences in time elapsed since SPA only amounts to a few months. 
Moreover, all the women affected by the reform in our data are recently retired. We therefore considered the IV 
approach the most suitable for our analysis. 
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State pension ages are currently being reformed in the UK for both men and women according to 
the description provided in Section 3.3. Since the data used in this analysis is collected between 
2011 and 2013, no men in our sample actually reached state pension age with the modified rules 
yet. Only men born since December 1953 are in fact affected by the increase in SPA, with the 
first cohort reaching SPA in March 2019. Hence, although men who will retire with an increased 
SPA are part of our sample, our identification strategy for men relies on the changes in 
retirement probabilities before and after the age of 65, on the grounds that nothing else 
specifically related to cognitive decline happens at that age (Johnston and Lee, 2009).  
Among all women, 60 percent are born on or after April 1950 and are therefore affected by the 
reform. Among those affected by the reform, close to 13 percent - and just below 8 percent of all 
women in our sample – are over the age of 60 but face a higher state pension age. These women 
would have already reached the state pension age if the reform was not in place but, instead, they 
either have not reached it yet or reached it with some delay. Hence, although limited, our 
analysis includes variations in the state pension age for women.  
 Figures 3.7 and 3.8 graphically assess the validity of our instrument, confirming that the state 
pension age is a suitable instrument for retirement decisions. In particular, Figure 3.7 reports the 
distribution of retirement age for individuals who are retired at the time of the interview. The 
chart includes both the probability density function (p.d.f.) and the cumulative density function 
(c.d.f.) for males and females separately. While the former describes the proportion of retired 
individuals who retired at each point of the age distribution, the latter shows the proportion of 
retired individuals who retired by a certain age. Both in terms of c.d.f. and p.d.f., the figures 
show discontinuities at the age of 65 for males, with 20 percent retiring at this age, and at the age 
of 60 for females, with 25 percent retiring at this age. In both cases there is a strong 
correspondence between retirement age and state pension age. In Figure 3.8 we report a local 
polynomial fit of being retired on age. For both men and women, the fit is performed separately 
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for people who are above and below their state pension age. The chart shows the presence of a 
discontinuity of between 0.2 and 0.3 in what can be interpreted as the probability of being retired 
in correspondence to the relevant state pension age. In the next section we report the first-stage 
estimates to support this evidence.34 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Baseline 
In Table 3.3 we report OLS estimates for our baseline model specification, where the dependent 
variables are the standardised test scores and the independent variables of interest are (i) age, and 
(ii) years spent in retirement. We also control for the individual characteristics described in the 
previous section. The estimates should be treated as naïve because of the endogeneity issues 
discussed in previous sections. Consistent with previous findings and theoretical considerations, 
estimates show a negative relationship between age and three out of the four cognitive measures 
analysed.35 Numeric ability represents the exception, showing a positive association with age for 
both men and women. Arguably, these positive correlations may be the consequence of a cohort-
effect for which we cannot control given the cross-sectional nature of the data (Schaie et al., 
2004). In contrast with Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012), after having controlled for age, the naïve 
OLS results do not show any significant effect of years since retirement on cognitive measures.  
Amongst other regressors, having low academic qualifications and having performed a routine 
job are associated with a worse performance in the cognitive tests, while having a partner is 
associated with better outcomes for males at the immediate word recall test and for both males 
and females at the numeric ability and verbal fluency tests. As expected, good general health is 
                                                 
34
 A graphical inspection reveals similar discontinuities in correspondence of the SPA if we only focus our analysis 
on people who reached state pension age from 2006 onwards. 
35
 The variable age has been modified such that a value of 0 indicates age 50, the minimum value in our sample. 
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related to a better cognitive performance, although the relationship is possibly endogenous as 
general health is likely to be correlated with retirement decisions and with cognitive measures. 
Country dummies are sometimes statistically significant, in particular living in Wales is 
associated with lower cognitive scores, arguably because of language related issues. 
In Table 3.4 we report the first stage estimate of the IV. The table shows that the number of years 
elapsed since state pension age is a valid instrument for years spent in retirement. The coefficient 
on the variable of interest is, in fact, positive and highly statistically significant, indicating that a 
one extra year since state pension age has been reached is associated with a 9 months increase in 
time since retirement. For both males and females, the F-statistic is well above the conventional 
value of 10. 
In Table 3.5 we report the IV estimates of our base model, where years elapsed since state 
pension age is used as an instrumental variable for years spent in retirement. First, the coefficient 
on age loses statistical significance in most of the regressions but remains positive and relatively 
high in the regression for numeric ability for both men and women. Although puzzling, this 
result can be explained by the fact that the cognitive functions belonging to the broad category of 
crystallised intelligence tend to improve until adulthood and only start to decline from the age of 
60 (Salthouse, 2010).  
The estimates show a negative and statistically significant effect of years since retirement on all 
the cognitive measures, with the exception of verbal fluency for females, where the effect is 
negative but insignificant. An increase in time spent in retirement is therefore predicted to 
negatively affect cognitive development both for males and females. The size of the effect varies 
across genders and cognitive measures, with an extra year of retirement associated with a decline 
of between 0.035 and 0.089 of a standard deviation for males, and between 0.015 and 0.048 of a 
standard deviation for females. These results are consistent with previous findings and with the 
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prediction of the “use it or lose it” argument (Bonsang et al., 2012; Mazzonna and Peracchi, 
2012; Rohwedder and Willis, 2010).  
With respect to other regressors, the estimated coefficients are in line with the OLS estimates 
reported in Table 3.3. The results of the reduced form model are reported in Table 3.6 and are 
highly consistent with the IV estimates. 
Hence, we find evidence that retirement negatively influences cognitive decline, with the 
depreciation rate of cognitive capital for retired individuals being higher than for working 
individuals. In the next subsection we explore the heterogeneity of such a decline with respect to 
education and type of job performed.  
3.5.2 Heterogeneity in cognitive decline: the role of education and job type 
In this sub-section we extend our baseline analysis by studying whether retirement affects the 
cognitive decline of various groups of respondents differently from one another. In particular, 
following Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) we first study whether retirement related cognitive 
decline differs between low qualified individuals and the rest of the population. Second, in the 
spirit of Coe et al. (2012) and Mazzonna and Peracchi (2014), we analyse heterogeneity in 
retirement-induced cognitive decline between routine and non-routine workers. It should be 
noted that in our estimation sample the proportion of low qualified individuals is similar across 
genders (26 percent for men and 28 percent for women), while considerable differences arise 
with respect to performing routine occupations as 14 percent of men fall into this category as 
opposed to 9 percent of women.  
Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 show the results after modifying our baseline specification by adding 
interaction terms between the low qualifications dummy variable and both age and years since 
retirement. The first stage regressions are reported in Table 3.7 and second stage IV estimates are 
reported in Table 3.8. Our results do not show evidence of heterogeneity in retirement-induced 
 127 
 
cognitive decline across levels of education as none of the interaction terms between being lowly 
qualified and years since retirement are statistically significant.36 These results are in contrast to 
Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) who find evidence that low educated women face a steeper 
cognitive decline than highly educated ones. 
Coe et al. (2012) explore whether heterogeneity in retirement-induced cognitive decline arises 
between blue and white collar workers in the United States, The authors find no evidence of 
retirement-induced cognitive decline for white collars workers, while the cognitive abilities of 
blue collar workers tends to improve following retirement. Consistently, Mazzonna and Peracchi 
(2014) find evidence of a relevant, immediate positive effect of retirement on the cognitive 
performances of the workers employed in physically demanding occupations. Our evidence, 
reported in Tables 3.9 and 3.10, shows no significant differences in the effect of retirement on 
cognitive decline between men with routine jobs and the rest of the male population. However, 
we find evidence of women who had routine jobs experiencing a less steep cognitive decline 
after retirement than the rest of the female population. Analysing the size of the interaction 
coefficient, the cognitive measures of women from routine job could, in fact, benefit from 
retirement. This result is partly consistent with the findings of Coe et al. (2012) and Mazzonna 
and Peracchi (2014) and, within the “use it or lose it” interpretation of retirement-induced 
cognitive decline, it can be explained with routine workers suffering less, or even benefiting, as a 
result of the changes to cognitive engagement associated with retirement.  
3.5.3 Robustness checks  
In this section we discuss a number of checks to verify the robustness of our results.  
                                                 
36
 In different specifications we have modified our model by including GCSE and equivalent in the low qualification 
category as well as by replacing the low qualification category with being highly qualified, i.e. having a degree or 
more. In both cases the results are highly consistent with those here reported.     
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First, we test the fit of different placebo models in which cognitive decline is assumed to start 
either before or after the official retirement age. We do so with the aim of showing whether the 
base model presented in the previous section provides the best fit for the data. Since the variable 
measuring years since retirement is left censored, this means that we cannot observe when the 
non-retired individuals will actually retire. Thus, we are forced to perform these placebo tests 
using the reduced form model rather than the full IV specification.  
An example may clarify this point. Say that a respondent is observed at age 64 and is not yet 
retired. For him/her the variable measuring the time elapsed since retirement would take a value 
of zero in our baseline specification. Suppose now that we want to test whether their retirement-
induced cognitive decline starts before actual retirement, say 2 years before. If we knew that the 
respondent would retire at the age of 65, that is, in one year’s time, then we could test whether 
his or her retirement-induced cognitive decline had started at the age of 63 and therefore assign a 
value of one year to the variable of interest. However, this would only be possible if we knew 
when non-retired respondents would actually retire. Since this information is not available to us, 
we circumvent the problem using the reduced form model, where we can easily modify the 
variable measuring the years elapsed since state pension age according to the hypothesis that we 
want to test. In the example above, we would test the fit of a model in which the variable of 
interests measures the time elapsed from two years prior the state pension age, i.e., since the age 
of 63 for men. 
Table 3.A1 reports the Akaike’s information criterion for our baseline specification and for 
different specifications in which cognitive decline is assumed to start from between 2 to 10 years 
prior to the state pension age. At each model specification we therefore modify our time “at risk” 
and assume a 2 year increase in the number of years passed since the start of the retirement-
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induced cognitive decline. For each cognitive measure used, and for both males and females, the 
table shows that our baseline specification produces the best Akaike’s criterion.37 
In Table 3.A2 we repeat the exercises by assuming that cognitive decline starts from between 1 
to 5 years after retirement (captured by the state pension age). Although it is possible to perform 
this test using IV, we choose to use the reduced form model for consistency and because it is 
possible to retrieve goodness of fit statistics using OLS. The results confirm that the baseline 
model is the one that best fits the data, with the only exception of the one year lead specification 
for males on the numeric ability and verbal fluency tests.  
In the second robustness check, we repeat our IV estimates excluding from our analysis the 
individuals who entered retirement before state pension age was reached. In Table 3.2 we have 
already shown that individuals who retired early are a positively selected group and, although we 
already control both for level of education and job type, this might bias our estimates if 
unobserved characteristics make some individuals both more likely to be retired early, and hence 
have a positive number of years since retirement, and also to have better cognitive measures. 
Results reported in Table 3.A3 show that our findings hold if the early retired individuals are 
excluded from our estimation sample, with the exception of immediate word recall and delayed 
word recall for males. It should also be noted that coefficients on age gain statistical significance 
for most of the cognitive measures when the early retired are excluded from the estimation 
sample.  
Third, we follow the modelling strategy of Mazzonna and Peracchi (2014) and estimate a model 
which controls for both the intercept and slope effects of retirement. The estimated model 
employs a binary variable for having passed the state pension age and the time elapsed since 
                                                 
37
 Used to compare the fit of models on the same data, the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) provides an index 
of the goodness of the fit and of the complexity of the model. Smaller values of AIC identify better models.  
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SPA as instrumental variables for the retirement indicator and the time elapsed since retirement. 
Table 3.A4 reports the IV estimates for males and females, while in Table 3.A5 we estimate the 
model separately for routine and non-routine workers but pooling together males and females for 
issues related to sample size. In both cases the results show no significant evidence of an 
intercept effect of retirement on cognitive capital. Table 3.A4 confirms the existence of the effect 
of retirement on cognitive decline, while Table 3.A5 shows that the effect is prevalent among 
workers employed in non-routine occupations. The pooling of data from men and women is 
likely to explain the differences between Tables 3.A4 and 3.A5, respectively, and Table 3.10. 
Fourth, we estimate our baseline specification increasing the upper age-limit of our sample to 80. 
Although being more likely to be influenced by mortality bias, the results reported in Table 3.A6 
confirm the main findings of our model. The estimated coefficients of interest for men are, 
however, smaller than those estimated using our baseline specification. 
In Table 3.A7 we also report the estimates of our baseline specification after excluding general 
health from the list of controls included in the regression. Although the rationale for including it 
is to control for the effect of health conditions in cognitive decline, general health is likely to 
cause endogeneity problems in the data. We show that its exclusion does not significantly alter 
our estimates.    
Finally, our identification strategy relies strongly on a linear functional form for the age-related 
cognitive decline. We therefore check the robustness of our results using different functional 
forms for age. In this regard, first, we test for a quadratic form and then redefine age as a 
categorical variable with 3-year bands. Table 3.A8 reports IV estimates for men, while Table 
3.A9 reports these estimates for women. The bottom of each column reports the corresponding 
Akaike’s criterion, estimated using the reduced form model. Column (1) reports the baseline 
estimate. The introduction of a quadratic age term (Column 2) results in an increase in the size of 
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the estimated coefficients on years since retirement for men, where both age and quadratic age 
are statistically significant. Although not statistically significant, the introduction of the quadratic 
age term leads to a reduction in both the size and significance of the coefficients of interest. It 
should be noted however that for females both age and age squared are statistically non-
significant and that for both males and females the introduction of the quadratic age worsens the 
model fit according to the Akaike’s information criterion. 
Controlling for age using 3-year age dummies (Column 3) results in an increase in the size of 
most of the coefficients of interest, while the Akaike’s criterion based on the reduced form 
model continues to identify the linear age regression as the best one. Consistent with previous 
studies, and in agreement with the non-parametric profile of cognitive ability with respect to age 
and years of retirement which arises from a visual inspection of Figures 3.3 to 3.6, we therefore 
conclude that the linear age specification is the one which best fits the data.  
3.6 Conclusions 
In this paper we have analysed to what extent retirement affects cognitive abilities in Britain and 
our results indicate that retirement worsens age-related cognitive decline for both males and 
females.  
The existing evidence on the relationship between retirement and cognitive functioning in the 
UK is scarce and its findings support the existence of a negative impact of ceasing working life 
on the cognitive capital of the individuals. Among the UK based studies, Adam et al. (2007) 
applies a stochastic frontier approach to 2004 data from ELSA and find evidence of a worsening 
in cognitive efficiency with time spent in retirement. Consistent findings are reported in Behncke 
(2012), who finds that retirement increases the chances of experiencing cognitive functioning 
problems. The analysis uses data from the first three waves ELSA and models the retirement 
effects as discrete shifts. 
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Our paper contributes to the existing UK based literature in various ways. First, following 
Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012), we model the effects of retirement as a factor which influence 
the slope of the cognitive decline process rather than causing a sharp shift. Second, we study 
males and females separately and explore the presence of heterogeneous retirement effects across 
levels of education and job types. Third, we do so by using data from Understanding Society, a 
novel dataset in an area of research predominantly based on data from ELSA. 
Using four different measures of cognitive abilities, we find in particular that one year of 
retirement generates a decline in cognitive measures of between 0.035 and 0.089 of a standard 
deviation for men, and between 0.015 and 0.048 of a standard deviation for women. We have 
also found evidence of heterogeneity of response with respect to job type, with retirement-
induced cognitive decline being significantly smaller, and potentially beneficial, for women who 
had routine jobs. 
During a period in which extending the length of working life represents a priority in the UK 
policy agenda, our results indicate that postponing retirement could potentially have a positive 
effect on the cognitive capital of older workers, although women performing routine tasks will 
benefit less, or potentially suffer, from it. Focusing on cognitive capital only, it should be noted 
that our analysis leaves aside the effects of retirement on a number of other physical and mental 
health outcomes, which might well overturn the positive effect on cognitive capital identified 
here. Within the “use it or lose it” hypothesis, what should be emphasised is the importance of 
maintaining a healthy and cognitively engaging lifestyle following retirement from work as a 
way to maintain healthy cognitive functions.  
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3.7 Tables and Figures 
Figure 3.1: State pension age by date of birth 
 
Note: Vertical lines identify the range of our estimation sample 
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Figure 3.2: Cognitive measures by age and gender 
 
Note: the scatterplot identifies the age and gender specific averages computed by pooling observations in 1 year 
bands. The line is a local polynomial smoothed line fitted on actual observations. Vertical lines identify typical 
SPAs for males and females. 
Figure 3.3: Cognitive measures of retired respondents by gender and years since retirement 
 
Note: the scatterplot identifies the averages by years in retirement computed by pooling observations in 1 year 
bands. The line is a local polynomial smoothed line fitted on actual observations. 
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Figure 3.4: Cognitive measures by age and retirement status, males 
 
Note: the scatterplot identifies the age-specific averages computed by pooling observations in 1 year bands. The 
line is a local polynomial smoothed line fitted on actual observations. 
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Figure 3.5: Cognitive measures by age and retirement status, females 
 
Note: the scatterplot identifies the age specific averages computed by pooling observations in 1 year bands. The 
line is a local polynomial smoothed line fitted on actual observations. 
Figure 3.6: Cognitive measures by age and years since retirement 
 
Note: local polynomial smoothed line fitted on actual observations. 
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Figure 3.7: Retirement age distribution 
 
Note: Retirement age is only observed for retired respondents.  
Figure 3.8: Retirement probability by age 
 
Note: local polynomial smoothed line fitted on actual observations.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 All (N=7936) Male (N=3746) Female (N=4190) Retired (N=2553) Non-retired (N=5383) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
PANEL A           
Age 59.85 6.03 60.03 6.08 59.69 5.99 65.71 3.48 57.07 4.89 
Male 0.47 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Retired 0.32 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.47 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Years since retirement 1.81 3.60 1.57 3.31 2.03 3.84 5.63 4.34 0.00 0.00 
Years since state pension age 1.63 2.76 0.74 1.53 2.43 3.32 4.01 3.19 0.50 1.58 
Low qualification 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.23 0.42 
Routine job 0.11 0.32 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31 
Lives with partner 0.75 0.43 0.81 0.39 0.71 0.46 0.74 0.44 0.76 0.43 
Good general health 0.81 0.39 0.80 0.40 0.82 0.38 0.77 0.42 0.83 0.37 
England 0.83 0.38 0.83 0.38 0.83 0.38 0.83 0.38 0.83 0.38 
Wales 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 
Scotland 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 
Northern Ireland 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 
PANEL B           
Immediate word recall           
Raw 6.26 1.52 6.10 1.54 6.40 1.50 6.03 1.58 6.37 1.48 
Standardised -0.00 1.00 -0.10 1.01 0.09 0.98 -0.15 1.04 0.07 0.97 
Delayed word recall           
Raw 5.13 1.88 4.90 1.85 5.32 1.89 4.84 1.90 5.26 1.86 
Standardised -0.00 1.00 -0.12 0.98 0.11 1.00 -0.15 1.01 0.07 0.99 
Numeric ability           
Raw 3.75 1.04 3.99 1.01 3.54 1.03 3.70 1.07 3.78 1.03 
Standardised -0.00 1.00 0.23 0.97 -0.20 0.99 -0.05 1.02 0.02 0.99 
Verbal fluency           
Raw 22.33 6.55 22.50 6.63 22.18 6.47 21.40 6.37 22.77 6.58 
Standardised -0.00 1.00 0.03 1.01 -0.02 0.99 -0.14 0.97 0.07 1.01 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics by gender, retirement status and whether the respondent is above or below State Pension Age (SPA) 
 Male Female 
 Below SPA   Above SPA   Below SPA   Above SPA   
 Non-retired  Retired  Non-retired  Retired  Non-retired  Retired  Non-retired  Retired 
 (N=2390) (N=375) (N=215) (N=766) (N=2249) (N=107) (N=529) (N=1305) 
Immediate word recall -0.01 0.07 -0.34 -0.40 0.22 0.39 -0.02 -0.12 
Delayed word recall -0.04 -0.01 -0.31 -0.37 0.23 0.46 0.05 -0.12 
Numeric ability 0.24 0.47 0.23 0.08 -0.17 0.20 -0.20 -0.29 
Verbal fluency 0.10 0.19 -0.08 -0.24 0.08 0.22 -0.04 -0.21 
Age 56.55 61.76 67.21 68.02 54.95 58.33 64.32 66.10 
Low qualification 0.24 0.15 0.33 0.38 0.20 0.07 0.31 0.44 
Routine job 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.11 
Lives with partner 0.80 0.81 0.84 0.81 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.69 
Good general health 0.82 0.79 0.83 0.75 0.84 0.88 0.87 0.77 
England 0.83 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.80 0.84 0.83 
Wales 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 
Scotland 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.09 
Northern Ireland 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Note: Standardised cognitive measures. 
  
  
140
 
Table 3.3: OLS results 
 MALES FEMALES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
Age -0.022*** 
(0.003) 
-0.022*** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Years since retirement -0.003 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
Low qualification -0.470*** 
(0.038) 
-0.377*** 
(0.037) 
-0.628*** 
(0.037) 
-0.292*** 
(0.039) 
-0.464*** 
(0.034) 
-0.404*** 
(0.034) 
-0.569*** 
(0.032) 
-0.413*** 
(0.034) 
Routine job -0.214*** 
(0.046) 
-0.179*** 
(0.044) 
-0.374*** 
(0.047) 
-0.234*** 
(0.046) 
-0.358*** 
(0.058) 
-0.287*** 
(0.057) 
-0.527*** 
(0.054) 
-0.310*** 
(0.050) 
Lives with partner 0.077* 
(0.041) 
0.039 
(0.039) 
0.193*** 
(0.039) 
0.166*** 
(0.041) 
0.032 
(0.032) 
0.050 
(0.033) 
0.101*** 
(0.032) 
0.087*** 
(0.033) 
Good health 0.261*** 
(0.041) 
0.210*** 
(0.039) 
0.243*** 
(0.041) 
0.214*** 
(0.041) 
0.222*** 
(0.040) 
0.239*** 
(0.040) 
0.220*** 
(0.040) 
0.163*** 
(0.037) 
Northern Ireland -0.134 
(0.087) 
0.046 
(0.080) 
0.180** 
(0.076) 
-0.289*** 
(0.092) 
-0.037 
(0.080) 
0.060 
(0.083) 
0.163** 
(0.074) 
-0.370*** 
(0.084) 
Wales 0.021 
(0.062) 
-0.124* 
(0.070) 
-0.078 
(0.070) 
-0.248*** 
(0.063) 
-0.184*** 
(0.066) 
-0.242*** 
(0.064) 
-0.146** 
(0.068) 
-0.290*** 
(0.056) 
Scotland -0.031 
(0.054) 
0.010 
(0.052) 
0.007 
(0.052) 
-0.004 
(0.059) 
-0.058 
(0.054) 
-0.002 
(0.054) 
0.121** 
(0.053) 
-0.202*** 
(0.052) 
_cons 0.012 
(0.057) 
0.030 
(0.054) 
0.068 
(0.056) 
0.035 
(0.056) 
0.243*** 
(0.049) 
0.196*** 
(0.050) 
-0.300*** 
(0.050) 
0.096** 
(0.049) 
N 3746 3746 3746 3746 4190 4190 4190 4190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.4: IV First stage 
 MALES FEMALES 
 (1) (2) 
 Years since retirement Years since retirement 
Age 0.155*** 
(0.009) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
Years since SPA 0.768*** 
(0.058) 
0.752*** 
(0.030) 
Low qualification -0.255** 
(0.105) 
0.342*** 
(0.116) 
Routine job -0.343*** 
(0.124) 
-0.323* 
(0.167) 
Lives with partner 0.043 
(0.110) 
0.040 
(0.096) 
Good health -0.311*** 
(0.119) 
-0.539*** 
(0.121) 
Northern Ireland 0.215 
(0.237) 
0.001 
(0.193) 
Wales -0.276* 
(0.163) 
0.231 
(0.220) 
Scotland 0.109 
(0.161) 
0.254 
(0.165) 
_cons -0.231 
(0.144) 
0.309** 
(0.123) 
N 3746 4190 
Fstat 173.959 641.567 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.5: IV-Second stage 
 MALES FEMALES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
Age -0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.012* 
(0.006) 
0.028*** 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Years since retirement -0.070*** 
(0.020) 
-0.035* 
(0.019) 
-0.089*** 
(0.019) 
-0.078*** 
(0.019) 
-0.041*** 
(0.013) 
-0.048*** 
(0.013) 
-0.040*** 
(0.013) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
Low qualification -0.485*** 
(0.039) 
-0.385*** 
(0.037) 
-0.647*** 
(0.038) 
-0.309*** 
(0.040) 
-0.444*** 
(0.035) 
-0.383*** 
(0.035) 
-0.552*** 
(0.033) 
-0.408*** 
(0.034) 
Routine job -0.233*** 
(0.047) 
-0.189*** 
(0.045) 
-0.398*** 
(0.048) 
-0.255*** 
(0.047) 
-0.367*** 
(0.058) 
-0.296*** 
(0.058) 
-0.535*** 
(0.054) 
-0.313*** 
(0.050) 
Lives with partner 0.080* 
(0.042) 
0.040 
(0.039) 
0.196*** 
(0.040) 
0.169*** 
(0.041) 
0.031 
(0.032) 
0.050 
(0.033) 
0.100*** 
(0.032) 
0.087*** 
(0.033) 
Good health 0.240*** 
(0.043) 
0.198*** 
(0.040) 
0.216*** 
(0.043) 
0.190*** 
(0.042) 
0.199*** 
(0.040) 
0.214*** 
(0.040) 
0.200*** 
(0.040) 
0.157*** 
(0.037) 
Northern Ireland -0.114 
(0.089) 
0.057 
(0.080) 
0.205*** 
(0.073) 
-0.267*** 
(0.091) 
-0.034 
(0.081) 
0.063 
(0.084) 
0.166** 
(0.074) 
-0.369*** 
(0.085) 
Wales 0.004 
(0.062) 
-0.133* 
(0.070) 
-0.099 
(0.070) 
-0.267*** 
(0.063) 
-0.177*** 
(0.067) 
-0.234*** 
(0.065) 
-0.139** 
(0.069) 
-0.288*** 
(0.056) 
Scotland -0.024 
(0.054) 
0.014 
(0.053) 
0.015 
(0.053) 
0.004 
(0.061) 
-0.048 
(0.054) 
0.009 
(0.054) 
0.129** 
(0.053) 
-0.199*** 
(0.052) 
_cons -0.056 
(0.061) 
-0.006 
(0.057) 
-0.019 
(0.059) 
-0.043 
(0.061) 
0.186*** 
(0.052) 
0.134** 
(0.053) 
-0.349*** 
(0.053) 
0.080 
(0.052) 
N 3746 3746 3746 3746 4190 4190 4190 4190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.6: Reduced form estimates 
 MALES FEMALES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
Age -0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
Years since SPA -0.053*** 
(0.015) 
-0.027* 
(0.014) 
-0.068*** 
(0.014) 
-0.060*** 
(0.014) 
-0.031*** 
(0.010) 
-0.036*** 
(0.010) 
-0.030*** 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
Low qualification -0.467*** 
(0.038) 
-0.376*** 
(0.037) 
-0.625*** 
(0.037) 
-0.289*** 
(0.039) 
-0.458*** 
(0.034) 
-0.399*** 
(0.034) 
-0.566*** 
(0.032) 
-0.413*** 
(0.034) 
Routine job -0.209*** 
(0.046) 
-0.177*** 
(0.044) 
-0.368*** 
(0.047) 
-0.229*** 
(0.046) 
-0.354*** 
(0.058) 
-0.281*** 
(0.057) 
-0.522*** 
(0.054) 
-0.308*** 
(0.050) 
Lives with partner 0.077* 
(0.041) 
0.039 
(0.039) 
0.192*** 
(0.039) 
0.166*** 
(0.041) 
0.030 
(0.032) 
0.048 
(0.033) 
0.098*** 
(0.032) 
0.087*** 
(0.033) 
Good health 0.262*** 
(0.041) 
0.209*** 
(0.039) 
0.244*** 
(0.041) 
0.214*** 
(0.041) 
0.221*** 
(0.040) 
0.240*** 
(0.040) 
0.221*** 
(0.040) 
0.165*** 
(0.037) 
Northern Ireland -0.129 
(0.087) 
0.049 
(0.080) 
0.186** 
(0.075) 
-0.283*** 
(0.091) 
-0.034 
(0.080) 
0.063 
(0.083) 
0.166** 
(0.074) 
-0.369*** 
(0.085) 
Wales 0.024 
(0.062) 
-0.123* 
(0.070) 
-0.074 
(0.069) 
-0.246*** 
(0.062) 
-0.186*** 
(0.066) 
-0.245*** 
(0.065) 
-0.148** 
(0.068) 
-0.292*** 
(0.056) 
Scotland -0.031 
(0.053) 
0.010 
(0.053) 
0.006 
(0.052) 
-0.005 
(0.060) 
-0.059 
(0.054) 
-0.004 
(0.054) 
0.119** 
(0.052) 
-0.203*** 
(0.052) 
_cons -0.040 
(0.058) 
0.002 
(0.056) 
0.002 
(0.056) 
-0.024 
(0.058) 
0.174*** 
(0.053) 
0.119** 
(0.054) 
-0.361*** 
(0.055) 
0.076 
(0.054) 
N 3746 3746 3746 3746 4190 4190 4190 4190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.7: Interaction with low level of qualifications, 1st Stage 
 MALES FEMALES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Years since retirement Low qualification * Years since retirement Years since retirement Low qualification * Years since retirement 
Age 0.164*** 
(0.011) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.029*** 
(0.011) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Years since SPA 0.731*** 
(0.071) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.697*** 
(0.037) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Low qualification 0.033 
(0.116) 
-0.587*** 
(0.103) 
-0.002 
(0.085) 
-0.075 
(0.074) 
Low qualification *     
Age -0.037* 
(0.022) 
0.129*** 
(0.019) 
-0.004 
(0.023) 
0.026 
(0.020) 
Years since SPA 0.132 
(0.127) 
0.860*** 
(0.105) 
0.126* 
(0.065) 
0.823*** 
(0.054) 
Routine job -0.344*** 
(0.124) 
-0.027 
(0.096) 
-0.320* 
(0.167) 
-0.181 
(0.153) 
Lives with partner 0.046 
(0.110) 
-0.020 
(0.064) 
0.041 
(0.096) 
-0.049 
(0.062) 
Good health -0.316*** 
(0.119) 
-0.227*** 
(0.075) 
-0.535*** 
(0.121) 
-0.260*** 
(0.086) 
Northern Ireland 0.198 
(0.236) 
0.205 
(0.165) 
-0.013 
(0.191) 
0.209* 
(0.127) 
Wales -0.273* 
(0.163) 
-0.060 
(0.101) 
0.214 
(0.220) 
0.120 
(0.155) 
Scotland 0.103 
(0.162) 
0.070 
(0.085) 
0.253 
(0.163) 
0.289*** 
(0.106) 
_cons -0.290** 
(0.144) 
0.199** 
(0.084) 
0.346*** 
(0.121) 
0.229*** 
(0.081) 
N 3746 3746 4190 4190 
Fstat 87.046 33.437 295.966 117.533 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.8: Interaction with low level of qualifications, 2nd stage 
 MALES FEMALES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
Age -0.000 
(0.008) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
0.028*** 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
Years since retirement -0.079*** 
(0.025) 
-0.031 
(0.023) 
-0.092*** 
(0.023) 
-0.094*** 
(0.024) 
-0.043*** 
(0.016) 
-0.053*** 
(0.017) 
-0.041** 
(0.016) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
Low qualification -0.457*** 
(0.100) 
-0.477*** 
(0.101) 
-0.678*** 
(0.104) 
-0.449*** 
(0.105) 
-0.406*** 
(0.087) 
-0.343*** 
(0.093) 
-0.560*** 
(0.088) 
-0.295*** 
(0.095) 
Low qualification *         
Age -0.007 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.008 
(0.014) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
Years since retirement 0.027 
(0.042) 
-0.018 
(0.039) 
0.004 
(0.042) 
0.026 
(0.040) 
0.011 
(0.028) 
0.018 
(0.028) 
0.003 
(0.028) 
0.027 
(0.027) 
Routine job -0.236*** 
(0.047) 
-0.187*** 
(0.045) 
-0.399*** 
(0.049) 
-0.258*** 
(0.048) 
-0.366*** 
(0.058) 
-0.295*** 
(0.058) 
-0.535*** 
(0.054) 
-0.310*** 
(0.050) 
Lives with partner 0.081* 
(0.042) 
0.039 
(0.039) 
0.196*** 
(0.040) 
0.169*** 
(0.042) 
0.032 
(0.032) 
0.051 
(0.033) 
0.100*** 
(0.032) 
0.090*** 
(0.033) 
Good health 0.243*** 
(0.043) 
0.197*** 
(0.040) 
0.217*** 
(0.043) 
0.195*** 
(0.043) 
0.200*** 
(0.040) 
0.216*** 
(0.040) 
0.200*** 
(0.040) 
0.160*** 
(0.038) 
Northern Ireland -0.120 
(0.089) 
0.061 
(0.081) 
0.204*** 
(0.073) 
-0.272*** 
(0.092) 
-0.036 
(0.081) 
0.059 
(0.084) 
0.165** 
(0.075) 
-0.375*** 
(0.085) 
Wales 0.004 
(0.062) 
-0.134* 
(0.070) 
-0.100 
(0.070) 
-0.270*** 
(0.063) 
-0.178*** 
(0.067) 
-0.236*** 
(0.065) 
-0.139** 
(0.069) 
-0.292*** 
(0.056) 
Scotland -0.026 
(0.055) 
0.015 
(0.053) 
0.015 
(0.053) 
0.001 
(0.061) 
-0.051 
(0.055) 
0.005 
(0.054) 
0.129** 
(0.053) 
-0.205*** 
(0.052) 
_cons -0.068 
(0.065) 
0.014 
(0.063) 
-0.015 
(0.063) 
-0.025 
(0.066) 
0.178*** 
(0.055) 
0.124** 
(0.057) 
-0.348*** 
(0.057) 
0.056 
(0.056) 
N 3746 3746 3746 3746 4190 4190 4190 4190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
  
146
 
Table 3.9: Interaction with routine job, 1st Stage 
 MALES FEMALES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Years since retirement Routine x Years since retirement Years since retirement Routine x Years since retirement 
Age 0.157*** 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
0.023** 
(0.010) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Years since SPA 0.813*** 
(0.064) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.750*** 
(0.032) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Low qualification -0.254** 
(0.105) 
0.061 
(0.041) 
0.344*** 
(0.116) 
0.039 
(0.027) 
Routine job 0.010 
(0.145) 
-0.600*** 
(0.131) 
-0.178* 
(0.107) 
-0.056 
(0.084) 
Routine job *     
Age -0.012 
(0.029) 
0.141*** 
(0.027) 
-0.023 
(0.030) 
0.005 
(0.028) 
Years since SPA -0.257* 
(0.154) 
0.561*** 
(0.140) 
0.034 
(0.087) 
0.788*** 
(0.081) 
Lives with partner 0.047 
(0.110) 
-0.101** 
(0.049) 
0.039 
(0.096) 
-0.010 
(0.030) 
Good health -0.307** 
(0.119) 
-0.054 
(0.048) 
-0.537*** 
(0.121) 
-0.146*** 
(0.046) 
Northern Ireland 0.187 
(0.236) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.193) 
0.144* 
(0.082) 
Wales -0.285* 
(0.160) 
-0.090* 
(0.050) 
0.231 
(0.220) 
-0.064 
(0.071) 
Scotland 0.090 
(0.161) 
0.080 
(0.067) 
0.254 
(0.165) 
0.048 
(0.059) 
_cons -0.282* 
(0.146) 
0.119** 
(0.054) 
0.297** 
(0.124) 
0.119*** 
(0.043) 
N 3746 3746 4190 4190 
Fstat 88.101 8.146 324.505 47.137 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.10: Interaction with routine job, 2nd Stage 
 MALES FEMALES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
Age -0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Years since retirement -0.069*** 
(0.020) 
-0.031* 
(0.019) 
-0.081*** 
(0.019) 
-0.089*** 
(0.020) 
-0.048*** 
(0.013) 
-0.056*** 
(0.014) 
-0.048*** 
(0.013) 
-0.022* 
(0.013) 
Low qualification -0.485*** 
(0.039) 
-0.383*** 
(0.038) 
-0.641*** 
(0.039) 
-0.317*** 
(0.041) 
-0.443*** 
(0.035) 
-0.381*** 
(0.035) 
-0.551*** 
(0.033) 
-0.406*** 
(0.034) 
Routine job -0.378*** 
(0.121) 
-0.387*** 
(0.121) 
-0.488*** 
(0.134) 
-0.266** 
(0.126) 
-0.269** 
(0.134) 
-0.198 
(0.147) 
-0.437*** 
(0.136) 
-0.375*** 
(0.135) 
Routine job *         
Age 0.017 
(0.020) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
0.019 
(0.022) 
-0.010 
(0.019) 
-0.028 
(0.021) 
-0.029 
(0.021) 
-0.029 
(0.022) 
-0.009 
(0.020) 
Years since retirement -0.020 
(0.072) 
-0.046 
(0.070) 
-0.076 
(0.083) 
0.084 
(0.068) 
0.082* 
(0.048) 
0.085* 
(0.046) 
0.084* 
(0.048) 
0.062 
(0.042) 
Lives with partner 0.077* 
(0.043) 
0.034 
(0.041) 
0.188*** 
(0.042) 
0.177*** 
(0.042) 
0.032 
(0.032) 
0.051 
(0.033) 
0.101*** 
(0.032) 
0.089*** 
(0.033) 
Good health 0.238*** 
(0.043) 
0.195*** 
(0.040) 
0.214*** 
(0.043) 
0.190*** 
(0.043) 
0.209*** 
(0.041) 
0.224*** 
(0.041) 
0.210*** 
(0.040) 
0.163*** 
(0.038) 
Northern Ireland -0.108 
(0.089) 
0.063 
(0.080) 
0.203*** 
(0.073) 
-0.259*** 
(0.091) 
-0.048 
(0.082) 
0.048 
(0.085) 
0.151** 
(0.076) 
-0.382*** 
(0.085) 
Wales 0.006 
(0.062) 
-0.133* 
(0.070) 
-0.103 
(0.070) 
-0.261*** 
(0.063) 
-0.170** 
(0.067) 
-0.227*** 
(0.066) 
-0.132* 
(0.070) 
-0.283*** 
(0.056) 
Scotland -0.019 
(0.054) 
0.021 
(0.054) 
0.020 
(0.054) 
0.001 
(0.061) 
-0.050 
(0.054) 
0.007 
(0.054) 
0.127** 
(0.053) 
-0.199*** 
(0.052) 
_cons -0.035 
(0.064) 
0.024 
(0.061) 
-0.001 
(0.062) 
-0.047 
(0.065) 
0.169*** 
(0.053) 
0.117** 
(0.054) 
-0.366*** 
(0.055) 
0.077 
(0.054) 
N 3746 3746 3746 3746 4190 4190 4190 4190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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3.8 Appendix: Complementary Tables 
Table 3.A1: Akaike’s information criterion after reduced form, anticipation of SPA, placebo 
 MALES FEMALES 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
Years since SPA 10285.084 10201.892 9768.525 10462.664 11262.491 11531.770 11176.614 11398.528 
Years since SPA-2 10286.599 10202.684 9769.247 10463.321 11263.305 11533.202 11179.668 11398.850 
Years since SPA-4 10290.163 10204.053 9770.209 10467.633 11265.363 11535.901 11183.302 11399.202 
Years since SPA-6 10294.292 10205.094 9771.049 10471.927 11267.581 11537.914 11186.161 11399.761 
Years since SPA-8 10296.845 10205.420 9777.469 10476.310 11270.040 11540.714 11187.025 11399.970 
Years since SPA-10 10298.541 10205.015 9783.792 10478.965 11272.020 11543.251 11186.639 11399.952 
 
Table 3.A2: Akaike’s information criterion after reduced form, posticipation of SPA, placebo 
 MALES FEMALES 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
Years since SPA 10285.084 10201.892 9768.525 10462.664 11262.491 11531.770 11176.614 11398.528 
Years since SPA+1 10285.434 10202.033 9768.041 10462.459 11262.837 11532.272 11177.998 11398.689 
Years since SPA+2 10286.599 10202.684 9769.247 10463.321 11263.305 11533.202 11179.668 11398.850 
Years since SPA+3 10287.956 10203.076 9769.887 10465.479 11264.180 11534.439 11181.483 11398.997 
Years since SPA+4 10290.163 10204.053 9770.209 10467.633 11265.363 11535.901 11183.302 11399.202 
Years since SPA+5 10292.296 10204.624 9769.525 10469.771 11266.624 11537.100 11185.054 11399.525 
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Table 3.A3: IV estimates excluding people who retired before reaching state pension age 
 MALE FEMALE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
Age -0.019*** 
(0.004) 
-0.022*** 
(0.004) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
Years since retirement -0.030 
(0.035) 
0.006 
(0.033) 
-0.088*** 
(0.033) 
-0.070** 
(0.033) 
-0.039** 
(0.020) 
-0.053*** 
(0.020) 
-0.034* 
(0.019) 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
Low qualification -0.485*** 
(0.042) 
-0.387*** 
(0.042) 
-0.624*** 
(0.041) 
-0.298*** 
(0.044) 
-0.461*** 
(0.038) 
-0.389*** 
(0.038) 
-0.530*** 
(0.036) 
-0.401*** 
(0.037) 
Routine job -0.223*** 
(0.049) 
-0.183*** 
(0.048) 
-0.378*** 
(0.051) 
-0.228*** 
(0.051) 
-0.366*** 
(0.063) 
-0.285*** 
(0.062) 
-0.531*** 
(0.059) 
-0.319*** 
(0.055) 
Lives with partner 0.083* 
(0.046) 
0.020 
(0.044) 
0.168*** 
(0.043) 
0.186*** 
(0.045) 
0.017 
(0.035) 
0.032 
(0.036) 
0.096*** 
(0.035) 
0.110*** 
(0.036) 
Good health 0.202*** 
(0.048) 
0.182*** 
(0.045) 
0.193*** 
(0.047) 
0.206*** 
(0.046) 
0.209*** 
(0.044) 
0.222*** 
(0.043) 
0.224*** 
(0.045) 
0.155*** 
(0.041) 
Northern Ireland -0.136 
(0.098) 
0.077 
(0.092) 
0.304*** 
(0.074) 
-0.232** 
(0.103) 
-0.063 
(0.084) 
0.041 
(0.086) 
0.151* 
(0.077) 
-0.390*** 
(0.088) 
Wales 0.014 
(0.069) 
-0.141* 
(0.080) 
-0.037 
(0.075) 
-0.261*** 
(0.069) 
-0.184** 
(0.076) 
-0.231*** 
(0.072) 
-0.165** 
(0.079) 
-0.309*** 
(0.063) 
Scotland -0.028 
(0.061) 
-0.018 
(0.060) 
0.044 
(0.060) 
0.005 
(0.067) 
-0.039 
(0.061) 
0.014 
(0.059) 
0.108* 
(0.060) 
-0.219*** 
(0.058) 
_cons 0.012 
(0.065) 
0.040 
(0.062) 
0.087 
(0.062) 
-0.048 
(0.063) 
0.200*** 
(0.054) 
0.148*** 
(0.055) 
-0.327*** 
(0.056) 
0.064 
(0.054) 
N 2916 2916 2916 2916 3554 3554 3554 3554 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.A4: IV estimates including intercept and slope effect of retirement on cognitive abilities 
 MALES FEMALES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
Age -0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.022** 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
Retired 0.117 
(0.349) 
0.183 
(0.326) 
0.211 
(0.325) 
0.226 
(0.321) 
0.045 
(0.175) 
0.017 
(0.181) 
0.160 
(0.175) 
0.118 
(0.170) 
Years since retirement -0.079** 
(0.037) 
-0.049 
(0.034) 
-0.105*** 
(0.035) 
-0.095*** 
(0.034) 
-0.043*** 
(0.016) 
-0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.050*** 
(0.016) 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
Low qualification -0.483*** 
(0.039) 
-0.382*** 
(0.037) 
-0.644*** 
(0.039) 
-0.305*** 
(0.040) 
-0.445*** 
(0.035) 
-0.383*** 
(0.035) 
-0.553*** 
(0.033) 
-0.408*** 
(0.034) 
Routine job -0.233*** 
(0.047) 
-0.188*** 
(0.045) 
-0.398*** 
(0.048) 
-0.255*** 
(0.047) 
-0.366*** 
(0.058) 
-0.296*** 
(0.058) 
-0.533*** 
(0.054) 
-0.312*** 
(0.050) 
Lives with partner 0.081* 
(0.042) 
0.042 
(0.039) 
0.198*** 
(0.040) 
0.171*** 
(0.042) 
0.031 
(0.032) 
0.049 
(0.033) 
0.100*** 
(0.032) 
0.087*** 
(0.033) 
Good health 0.240*** 
(0.043) 
0.199*** 
(0.040) 
0.217*** 
(0.043) 
0.190*** 
(0.042) 
0.200*** 
(0.040) 
0.214*** 
(0.040) 
0.203*** 
(0.041) 
0.159*** 
(0.038) 
Northern Ireland -0.111 
(0.089) 
0.061 
(0.081) 
0.210*** 
(0.074) 
-0.261*** 
(0.092) 
-0.033 
(0.081) 
0.063 
(0.084) 
0.171** 
(0.074) 
-0.366*** 
(0.084) 
Wales 0.005 
(0.062) 
-0.133* 
(0.070) 
-0.098 
(0.070) 
-0.267*** 
(0.063) 
-0.175*** 
(0.067) 
-0.233*** 
(0.066) 
-0.135* 
(0.069) 
-0.285*** 
(0.056) 
Scotland -0.025 
(0.054) 
0.013 
(0.053) 
0.014 
(0.054) 
0.002 
(0.061) 
-0.048 
(0.054) 
0.009 
(0.054) 
0.129** 
(0.053) 
-0.199*** 
(0.052) 
_cons -0.048 
(0.063) 
0.007 
(0.061) 
-0.004 
(0.062) 
-0.027 
(0.063) 
0.189*** 
(0.053) 
0.135** 
(0.054) 
-0.339*** 
(0.055) 
0.088 
(0.054) 
N 3746 3746 3746 3746 4190 4190 4190 4190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.A5: IV estimates including intercept and slope effect of retirement on cognitive abilities, routine versus non routine occupations 
 NON ROUTINE OCCUPATIONS ROUTINE OCCUPATIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
Age -0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
Retired -0.121 
(0.184) 
0.014 
(0.183) 
0.012 
(0.171) 
-0.054 
(0.177) 
0.219 
(0.307) 
0.379 
(0.278) 
-0.140 
(0.327) 
-0.060 
(0.253) 
Years since retirement -0.027 
(0.017) 
-0.033** 
(0.017) 
-0.044*** 
(0.015) 
-0.026 
(0.016) 
-0.031 
(0.043) 
-0.046 
(0.040) 
-0.004 
(0.045) 
0.031 
(0.034) 
Male -0.216*** 
(0.023) 
-0.245*** 
(0.024) 
0.399*** 
(0.023) 
0.024 
(0.025) 
-0.044 
(0.077) 
-0.108 
(0.074) 
0.547*** 
(0.074) 
0.196*** 
(0.069) 
Low qualification -0.473*** 
(0.028) 
-0.381*** 
(0.027) 
-0.597*** 
(0.026) 
-0.353*** 
(0.028) 
-0.388*** 
(0.070) 
-0.416*** 
(0.069) 
-0.540*** 
(0.070) 
-0.347*** 
(0.067) 
Lives with partner 0.057** 
(0.027) 
0.058** 
(0.027) 
0.127*** 
(0.026) 
0.129*** 
(0.028) 
-0.002 
(0.076) 
-0.039 
(0.075) 
0.207*** 
(0.080) 
0.053 
(0.073) 
Good health 0.229*** 
(0.031) 
0.219*** 
(0.031) 
0.237*** 
(0.032) 
0.204*** 
(0.031) 
0.197** 
(0.080) 
0.164** 
(0.076) 
0.125 
(0.079) 
0.047 
(0.070) 
Northern Ireland -0.105* 
(0.062) 
0.039 
(0.062) 
0.155*** 
(0.055) 
-0.318*** 
(0.066) 
0.114 
(0.211) 
0.245 
(0.156) 
0.320 
(0.199) 
-0.467** 
(0.197) 
Wales -0.069 
(0.049) 
-0.153*** 
(0.051) 
-0.094* 
(0.052) 
-0.268*** 
(0.046) 
-0.215* 
(0.128) 
-0.387*** 
(0.137) 
-0.217 
(0.152) 
-0.241** 
(0.109) 
Scotland -0.031 
(0.041) 
0.015 
(0.041) 
0.075* 
(0.040) 
-0.093** 
(0.044) 
-0.079 
(0.103) 
-0.013 
(0.097) 
0.039 
(0.106) 
-0.185** 
(0.085) 
_cons 0.192*** 
(0.043) 
0.190*** 
(0.042) 
-0.362*** 
(0.042) 
0.011 
(0.043) 
-0.179 
(0.116) 
-0.020 
(0.120) 
-0.896*** 
(0.118) 
-0.240** 
(0.112) 
N 7034 7034 7034 7034 902 902 902 902 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.A6: IV estimates with people aged 50 to 80 
 MALE FEMALE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
Age -0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
Years since retirement -0.047*** 
(0.008) 
-0.043*** 
(0.007) 
-0.048*** 
(0.007) 
-0.038*** 
(0.008) 
-0.037*** 
(0.007) 
-0.041*** 
(0.007) 
-0.033*** 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
Low qualification -0.414*** 
(0.032) 
-0.339*** 
(0.030) 
-0.595*** 
(0.032) 
-0.277*** 
(0.033) 
-0.402*** 
(0.030) 
-0.344*** 
(0.031) 
-0.523*** 
(0.029) 
-0.403*** 
(0.029) 
Routine job -0.226*** 
(0.039) 
-0.189*** 
(0.038) 
-0.399*** 
(0.042) 
-0.240*** 
(0.039) 
-0.298*** 
(0.049) 
-0.247*** 
(0.048) 
-0.489*** 
(0.045) 
-0.244*** 
(0.041) 
Lives with partner 0.068* 
(0.035) 
0.025 
(0.033) 
0.206*** 
(0.035) 
0.157*** 
(0.035) 
0.027 
(0.028) 
0.022 
(0.029) 
0.084*** 
(0.028) 
0.087*** 
(0.028) 
Good health 0.252*** 
(0.034) 
0.184*** 
(0.033) 
0.233*** 
(0.036) 
0.216*** 
(0.034) 
0.211*** 
(0.034) 
0.208*** 
(0.034) 
0.189*** 
(0.034) 
0.154*** 
(0.032) 
Northern Ireland -0.052 
(0.070) 
0.102 
(0.067) 
0.185*** 
(0.067) 
-0.289*** 
(0.075) 
-0.077 
(0.070) 
0.012 
(0.073) 
0.102 
(0.069) 
-0.336*** 
(0.073) 
Wales -0.026 
(0.054) 
-0.110* 
(0.060) 
-0.064 
(0.059) 
-0.249*** 
(0.054) 
-0.127** 
(0.057) 
-0.209*** 
(0.055) 
-0.148** 
(0.059) 
-0.261*** 
(0.049) 
Scotland -0.027 
(0.047) 
0.017 
(0.047) 
0.058 
(0.049) 
-0.017 
(0.053) 
-0.064 
(0.049) 
0.004 
(0.048) 
0.103** 
(0.046) 
-0.185*** 
(0.045) 
_cons 0.093* 
(0.052) 
0.139*** 
(0.049) 
0.063 
(0.052) 
0.092* 
(0.053) 
0.301*** 
(0.045) 
0.287*** 
(0.046) 
-0.244*** 
(0.047) 
0.182*** 
(0.046) 
N 4798 4798 4798 4798 5169 5169 5169 5169 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.A7: IV estimates excluding general health from the regressors 
 MALES FEMALES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
Age -0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.027*** 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Years since retirement -0.070*** 
(0.020) 
-0.036* 
(0.019) 
-0.090*** 
(0.019) 
-0.079*** 
(0.019) 
-0.041*** 
(0.013) 
-0.049*** 
(0.013) 
-0.041*** 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.013) 
Low qualification -0.507*** 
(0.039) 
-0.403*** 
(0.037) 
-0.667*** 
(0.038) 
-0.326*** 
(0.040) 
-0.461*** 
(0.035) 
-0.400*** 
(0.036) 
-0.569*** 
(0.033) 
-0.420*** 
(0.034) 
Routine job -0.243*** 
(0.047) 
-0.197*** 
(0.045) 
-0.407*** 
(0.048) 
-0.263*** 
(0.047) 
-0.388*** 
(0.058) 
-0.319*** 
(0.058) 
-0.555*** 
(0.054) 
-0.329*** 
(0.050) 
Lives with partner 0.092** 
(0.042) 
0.050 
(0.040) 
0.207*** 
(0.040) 
0.178*** 
(0.042) 
0.047 
(0.032) 
0.066** 
(0.033) 
0.116*** 
(0.032) 
0.100*** 
(0.033) 
Northern Ireland -0.107 
(0.089) 
0.063 
(0.080) 
0.212*** 
(0.072) 
-0.261*** 
(0.092) 
-0.028 
(0.080) 
0.069 
(0.083) 
0.172** 
(0.075) 
-0.365*** 
(0.084) 
Wales -0.008 
(0.062) 
-0.143** 
(0.070) 
-0.110 
(0.070) 
-0.277*** 
(0.063) 
-0.182*** 
(0.067) 
-0.240*** 
(0.065) 
-0.145** 
(0.069) 
-0.293*** 
(0.056) 
Scotland -0.025 
(0.054) 
0.013 
(0.054) 
0.015 
(0.053) 
0.003 
(0.061) 
-0.039 
(0.055) 
0.019 
(0.054) 
0.139*** 
(0.053) 
-0.191*** 
(0.052) 
_cons 0.140*** 
(0.052) 
0.156*** 
(0.050) 
0.158*** 
(0.050) 
0.113** 
(0.053) 
0.345*** 
(0.043) 
0.305*** 
(0.045) 
-0.189*** 
(0.045) 
0.206*** 
(0.047) 
N 3746 3746 3746 3746 4190 4190 4190 4190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.A8: Different age specifications, IV-Estimates, male 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Age -0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.056* 
(0.029) 
 
 
-0.012* 
(0.006) 
-0.057** 
(0.027) 
 
 
0.028*** 
(0.006) 
0.013 
(0.025) 
 
 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.056* 
(0.030) 
 
 
Years since ret. -0.070*** 
(0.020) 
-0.238** 
(0.118) 
-0.123** 
(0.055) 
-0.035* 
(0.019) 
-0.178* 
(0.105) 
-0.091* 
(0.049) 
-0.089*** 
(0.019) 
-0.137 
(0.096) 
-0.044 
(0.044) 
-0.078*** 
(0.019) 
-0.271** 
(0.121) 
-0.091* 
(0.049) 
Age*Age/10  
 
0.050* 
(0.030) 
 
 
 
 
0.042 
(0.028) 
 
 
 
 
0.014 
(0.025) 
 
 
 
 
0.057* 
(0.031) 
 
 
53-55  
 
 
 
-0.069 
(0.053) 
 
 
 
 
-0.130** 
(0.056) 
 
 
 
 
0.002 
(0.053) 
 
 
 
 
-0.088 
(0.059) 
56-58  
 
 
 
-0.106* 
(0.057) 
 
 
 
 
-0.161*** 
(0.058) 
 
 
 
 
0.126** 
(0.053) 
 
 
 
 
-0.061 
(0.063) 
59-61  
 
 
 
-0.045 
(0.068) 
 
 
 
 
-0.140** 
(0.065) 
 
 
 
 
0.193*** 
(0.060) 
 
 
 
 
-0.015 
(0.071) 
62-64  
 
 
 
0.046 
(0.112) 
 
 
 
 
-0.073 
(0.103) 
 
 
 
 
0.203** 
(0.092) 
 
 
 
 
0.049 
(0.104) 
65-67  
 
 
 
0.093 
(0.195) 
 
 
 
 
-0.033 
(0.179) 
 
 
 
 
0.257 
(0.159) 
 
 
 
 
0.076 
(0.173) 
68-70  
 
 
 
0.233 
(0.323) 
 
 
 
 
0.070 
(0.292) 
 
 
 
 
0.190 
(0.258) 
 
 
 
 
0.097 
(0.292) 
low qualification -0.485*** 
(0.039) 
-0.529*** 
(0.055) 
-0.500*** 
(0.043) 
-0.385*** 
(0.037) 
-0.422*** 
(0.049) 
-0.400*** 
(0.040) 
-0.647*** 
(0.038) 
-0.660*** 
(0.046) 
-0.636*** 
(0.040) 
-0.309*** 
(0.040) 
-0.359*** 
(0.057) 
-0.313*** 
(0.043) 
routine job -0.233*** 
(0.047) 
-0.289*** 
(0.065) 
-0.250*** 
(0.051) 
-0.189*** 
(0.045) 
-0.236*** 
(0.060) 
-0.207*** 
(0.048) 
-0.398*** 
(0.048) 
-0.414*** 
(0.057) 
-0.384*** 
(0.049) 
-0.255*** 
(0.047) 
-0.320*** 
(0.067) 
-0.259*** 
(0.050) 
lives with partner 0.080* 
(0.042) 
0.089* 
(0.048) 
0.083* 
(0.043) 
0.040 
(0.039) 
0.048 
(0.044) 
0.044 
(0.041) 
0.196*** 
(0.040) 
0.199*** 
(0.041) 
0.195*** 
(0.039) 
0.169*** 
(0.041) 
0.179*** 
(0.050) 
0.170*** 
(0.042) 
Good health 0.240*** 
(0.043) 
0.184*** 
(0.062) 
0.221*** 
(0.046) 
0.198*** 
(0.040) 
0.151*** 
(0.056) 
0.178*** 
(0.043) 
0.216*** 
(0.043) 
0.200*** 
(0.055) 
0.230*** 
(0.043) 
0.190*** 
(0.042) 
0.126** 
(0.064) 
0.184*** 
(0.045) 
Northern Ireland -0.114 
(0.089) 
-0.070 
(0.107) 
-0.098 
(0.092) 
0.057 
(0.080) 
0.094 
(0.093) 
0.072 
(0.083) 
0.205*** 
(0.073) 
0.218*** 
(0.078) 
0.195*** 
(0.074) 
-0.267*** 
(0.091) 
-0.216** 
(0.110) 
-0.261*** 
(0.093) 
Wales 0.004 
(0.062) 
-0.046 
(0.078) 
-0.013 
(0.065) 
-0.133* 
(0.070) 
-0.176** 
(0.081) 
-0.153** 
(0.072) 
-0.099 
(0.070) 
-0.113 
(0.077) 
-0.090 
(0.070) 
-0.267*** 
(0.063) 
-0.324*** 
(0.083) 
-0.275*** 
(0.064) 
Scotland -0.024 
(0.054) 
-0.008 
(0.067) 
-0.018 
(0.057) 
0.014 
(0.053) 
0.027 
(0.063) 
0.020 
(0.056) 
0.015 
(0.053) 
0.020 
(0.056) 
0.011 
(0.052) 
0.004 
(0.061) 
0.022 
(0.074) 
0.005 
(0.061) 
_cons -0.056 
(0.061) 
0.107 
(0.109) 
0.002 
(0.066) 
-0.006 
(0.057) 
0.132 
(0.100) 
0.053 
(0.063) 
-0.019 
(0.059) 
0.027 
(0.097) 
0.041 
(0.062) 
-0.043 
(0.061) 
0.144 
(0.113) 
0.020 
(0.065) 
N 3746 3746 3746 3746 3746 3746 3746 3746 3746 3746 3746 3746 
AIC 10285.084 10286.385 10292.769 10201.892 10202.514 10208.416 9768.525 9769.237 9775.878 10462.664 10463.746 10471.657 
BIC 10347.368 10354.898 10386.196 10264.176 10271.027 10301.842 9830.810 9837.750 9869.305 10524.949 10532.258 10565.084 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; AIC and BIC from reduced form estimates;  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.A9: Different age specifications, IV- Estimates, female 
 Immediate recall Delayed recall Numeric ability Fluency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Age -0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.023) 
 
 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.024) 
 
 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.019 
(0.023) 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.024) 
 
 
Years since ret. -0.041*** 
(0.013) 
-0.026 
(0.066) 
-0.105*** 
(0.038) 
-0.048*** 
(0.013) 
-0.035 
(0.068) 
-0.087** 
(0.037) 
-0.040*** 
(0.013) 
-0.040 
(0.067) 
-0.078** 
(0.035) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.067) 
-0.056 
(0.035) 
Age*Age/10  
 
-0.006 
(0.024) 
 
 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.025) 
 
 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.024) 
 
 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.025) 
 
 
53-55  
 
 
 
-0.017 
(0.048) 
 
 
 
 
0.028 
(0.051) 
 
 
 
 
0.041 
(0.050) 
 
 
 
 
-0.024 
(0.053) 
56-58  
 
 
 
0.010 
(0.052) 
 
 
 
 
0.007 
(0.055) 
 
 
 
 
0.049 
(0.051) 
 
 
 
 
-0.052 
(0.053) 
59-61  
 
 
 
0.013 
(0.059) 
 
 
 
 
0.044 
(0.059) 
 
 
 
 
0.200*** 
(0.059) 
 
 
 
 
-0.065 
(0.059) 
62-64  
 
 
 
0.114 
(0.115) 
 
 
 
 
0.106 
(0.111) 
 
 
 
 
0.317*** 
(0.106) 
 
 
 
 
0.014 
(0.105) 
65-67  
 
 
 
0.295 
(0.195) 
 
 
 
 
0.232 
(0.187) 
 
 
 
 
0.524*** 
(0.181) 
 
 
 
 
0.124 
(0.180) 
68-70  
 
 
 
0.455 
(0.299) 
 
 
 
 
0.305 
(0.291) 
 
 
 
 
0.572** 
(0.278) 
 
 
 
 
0.141 
(0.268) 
low qualification -0.444*** 
(0.035) 
-0.450*** 
(0.042) 
-0.420*** 
(0.039) 
-0.383*** 
(0.035) 
-0.388*** 
(0.042) 
-0.369*** 
(0.039) 
-0.552*** 
(0.033) 
-0.552*** 
(0.041) 
-0.539*** 
(0.036) 
-0.408*** 
(0.034) 
-0.413*** 
(0.041) 
-0.393*** 
(0.037) 
routine job -0.367*** 
(0.058) 
-0.362*** 
(0.062) 
-0.389*** 
(0.062) 
-0.296*** 
(0.058) 
-0.292*** 
(0.062) 
-0.309*** 
(0.060) 
-0.535*** 
(0.054) 
-0.535*** 
(0.058) 
-0.548*** 
(0.056) 
-0.313*** 
(0.050) 
-0.308*** 
(0.054) 
-0.326*** 
(0.052) 
Lives with 
partner 
0.031 
(0.032) 
0.031 
(0.032) 
0.032 
(0.033) 
0.050 
(0.033) 
0.049 
(0.033) 
0.050 
(0.034) 
0.100*** 
(0.032) 
0.100*** 
(0.032) 
0.101*** 
(0.033) 
0.087*** 
(0.033) 
0.087*** 
(0.033) 
0.088*** 
(0.033) 
Good health 0.199*** 
(0.040) 
0.207*** 
(0.053) 
0.167*** 
(0.045) 
0.214*** 
(0.040) 
0.221*** 
(0.054) 
0.194*** 
(0.044) 
0.200*** 
(0.040) 
0.200*** 
(0.056) 
0.182*** 
(0.044) 
0.157*** 
(0.037) 
0.165*** 
(0.053) 
0.137*** 
(0.040) 
Northern Ireland -0.034 
(0.081) 
-0.035 
(0.080) 
-0.035 
(0.083) 
0.063 
(0.084) 
0.062 
(0.083) 
0.062 
(0.085) 
0.166** 
(0.074) 
0.166** 
(0.075) 
0.167** 
(0.075) 
-0.369*** 
(0.085) 
-0.370*** 
(0.085) 
-0.370*** 
(0.085) 
Wales -0.177*** 
(0.067) 
-0.180*** 
(0.068) 
-0.162** 
(0.070) 
-0.234*** 
(0.065) 
-0.237*** 
(0.066) 
-0.226*** 
(0.068) 
-0.139** 
(0.069) 
-0.139** 
(0.071) 
-0.131* 
(0.070) 
-0.288*** 
(0.056) 
-0.292*** 
(0.058) 
-0.279*** 
(0.057) 
Scotland -0.048 
(0.054) 
-0.052 
(0.057) 
-0.032 
(0.057) 
0.009 
(0.054) 
0.005 
(0.057) 
0.018 
(0.055) 
0.129** 
(0.053) 
0.129** 
(0.056) 
0.140** 
(0.055) 
-0.199*** 
(0.052) 
-0.203*** 
(0.055) 
-0.188*** 
(0.053) 
_cons 0.186*** 
(0.052) 
0.172** 
(0.079) 
0.203*** 
(0.056) 
0.134** 
(0.053) 
0.122 
(0.080) 
0.135** 
(0.056) 
-0.349*** 
(0.053) 
-0.349*** 
(0.080) 
-0.297*** 
(0.057) 
0.080 
(0.052) 
0.066 
(0.080) 
0.085 
(0.055) 
N 4190 4190 4190 4190 4190 4190 4190 4190 4190 4190 4190 4190 
AIC 11262.491 11264.129 11268.902 11531.770 11533.387 11539.676 11176.614 11178.481 11175.095 11398.528 11400.394 11405.805 
BIC 11325.896 11333.874 11364.008 11595.174 11603.132 11634.783 11240.018 11248.226 11270.202 11461.933 11470.139 11500.912 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; AIC and BIC from reduced form estimates;  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Conclusions 
This thesis has investigated three topics in the field of labour economics. In addition to its 
academic and policy interest, each chapter has analysed a theme related to a specific phase of the 
economic life of individuals: its beginning with school leaving, its maturity with unemployment 
scarring, and its end with retirement. The reminder of this section summarises the main findings 
of each chapter and briefly discusses policy implications and possible extensions.  
Chapter 1 shows that an association exists between local labour market conditions and the school 
leaving decisions of 16-years-old British students belonging to a less affluent socio-economic 
background. In particular, we show that among students from home renting families, and 
especially from social housing, a positive correlation exists between the probability of enrolling 
in full-time post compulsory education and the local youth unemployment rate. Conversely, the 
probability of remaining in education tends to decrease with higher values of the local adult 
unemployment rate. The association is explained by arguments related to the opportunity cost of 
schooling, and to the discouragement caused by a fall in the expected return of education when 
adult unemployment is high. Factors such as parental tastes for education and social norms, 
which are associated with belonging to a higher socio-economic background, are likely to justify 
why students from better-off families tend to enrol into post-compulsory education irrespectively 
of labour market conditions. 
Chapter 2 illustrates how unemployment experiences compromise the re-employability of British 
workers, a phenomenon known as “scarring effect of unemployment”. Focusing on the last two 
decades, and in particular on the Great Recession, we find that unemployment scarring follows a 
counter cyclical pattern, with the estimated true state dependence shown to be larger during 
downturns. Job crowding arguments explain the counter-cyclicality of unemployment scarring. 
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The results also show that both in the early 2000s and during the Great Recession youths have 
been those affected the most by state dependence in unemployment incidence.  
Chapter 3 investigates how retirement affects the cognitive abilities of British older workers. 
Consistent with the “use it or lose” hypothesis, the analysis suggests that retirement has a 
negative impact on the cognitive capital of both males and females as it worsens the natural age-
related cognitive decline. Our findings also highlight the presence of heterogeneity in the 
negative effect of retirement across job types, with women performing routine occupations 
experiencing a significantly smaller retirement-induced decline in their cognitive functions. 
The thesis allows some thoughts relevant from a policy perspective. Chapter 1 shows that the 
young people from a less affluent socio-economic background are not only less likely than 
youths from better-off families to participate in further education, but also more sensible to 
arguments related to the opportunity cost and the perceived returns of schooling. From a policy 
perspective, as labour markets recover following the Great Recession, measures should be 
implemented to keep education an attractive prospect among less socio-economically advantaged 
students. As well as from a reduction in the direct and the opportunity costs of post-compulsory 
education, participation among students from less affluent socio-economic background could 
benefit from interventions which raise the perceived return of schooling, such as information 
campaigns highlighting the real benefits of education. Promoting participation in further 
education among students from a less affluent family background would contribute to an 
increase in the stock of human capital in the economy, with beneficial effects both in terms of 
economic growth and social mobility. 
Chapter 2 finds that unemployment experiences significantly compromise workers re-
employability, especially during recessions. From a policy perspective, the finding implies that 
measures which cushion unemployment in short term are likely to be beneficial also for the 
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longer term employment perspectives of workers. Moreover, as job crowding significantly 
affects employability during downturns, adjusting the public interventions in favour of the 
unemployed to the severity of the labour market conditions could be not only beneficial for the 
their short term well-being, but also favour better quality job matches and hence reducing the 
unemployment risk in the longer term. 
Chapter 3 highlights the importance of maintaining a cognitively active lifestyle after retirement 
occurs. Given the correlation between cognitive functions and other dimensions of health, the 
benefits deriving from encouraging older people to take part in cognitively stimulating activities 
after leaving employment could extend well beyond their cognitive functions. Although more 
evidence is needed to frame interventions, such activities could be provided by local 
communities under the guidance of professionals in the field of cognitive functions.  
The research contained in this thesis can benefit from a number of extensions. With respect to 
Chapter 1, the analysis could be extended by factoring-in the role of wages as well as that of 
unemployment rates. Additionally, policy interventions could benefit from a better 
disentanglement of the role of family aspirations from that of financial constraints in affecting 
school leaving decisions. The process is however complicated by the correlation between 
aspirations, family socio-economic background and borrowing constraints. Changes in family 
economic circumstances which do not affect family aspirations, or policy intervention such as 
modification of minimum wages for youths, could contribute to overcome the identification 
issues. The analysis contained in Chapter 2 could be extended by taking into account duration 
dependence as well as state dependence. The extensions would allow to better study the causes 
of unemployment scarring and, consequently, better inform policy interventions. Finally, the 
employment of panel data would improve the analysis contained in Chapter 3. Panel data would 
in fact allow making use of instrumental variables techniques additionally controlling for 
individual unobserved heterogeneity trough fixed effects. 
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